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Anti-imperial world politics: 
Race, class, and internationalism in the making of post-colonial order 
 
Christopher Murray, PhD. LSE International Relations 
 
Why did many ‘black’ anti-imperial thinkers and leaders articulate projects for colonial 
freedom based in transnational identities and solidarities? 
This thesis excavates a discourse of anti-imperial globalism, which helped shape world 
politics from the early to late 20th century. Although usually reduced to the anticolonial 
nationalist politics of sovereignty and recognition, this study interprets ‘anti-imperialism 
globalism from below’ as a transnational counter-discourse, primarily concerned with social 
justice, social freedom, and equality. Anti-imperial globalism emerged and changed in 
response to developing world events, but it was also shaped by boundary-crossing 
discourses. One discourse understood global progress as dependent on the ability of 
different societies to unite through large-scale organisation and political integration. These 
political visions – which were often articulated as ‘federation’ – were enabled, but ultimately 
limited, by a second dominant discourse of racial hierarchy and race development. I argue 
that anti-imperial strategies changed throughout the 20th century not because the 
hierarchical relations of empire were defeated, but because empire was able to rehabilitate 
itself according to more ethno-culturally inclusive principles of global governance. This thesis 
makes two contributions to existing literature. Firstly, it builds on recent debates concerning 
empire, decolonisation, and world order. Empire is usually conceptualised as one polity’s 
alien rule over another, or, along with nation-states and international institutions, another 
type of unitary actor. This effectively flattens imperial relations into a coloniser/colonised 
binary, and relegates them to a distant, deniable past which predated the post-1945 nation-
state system. Tracing the histories of men and women who struggled against empire reveals 
it as a productive and adaptable form of transnational power, which created stratified yet 
lasting social identities. Secondly, in pursuing this historical-relational approach to empire 
and race, this study offers an alternative to sovereignty and recognition based models of 
state, political community, and world order.    
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Chapter One  
Introduction:  
Anti-imperialism as world politics 
 
1.1. Recovering anti-imperial globalism ‘from below’ 
 
Over the course of the 20th century, politics based in different national, international, and 
transnational solidarities played out against a backdrop of global upheavals. These upheavals 
– world war, economic crisis, revolution -- appeared to offer opportunities to transform race 
relations within societies, as well as more fundamentally address political and economic 
hierarchy within the dominant Euro-American configuration of world order. While these 
political solidarities helped bring about a renewed post-colonial order based upon the image 
of an international system of sovereign nation-states, theoretically rich discourses on social 
justice, social freedom, and egalitarian democracy sought more than national sovereignty and 
self-determination for the post-colonial state. This study excavates the international political 
theory of one such discourse and reveals how political ideas advocating an anti-imperial 
globalism from below emerged concomitantly with more familiar and well-studied 
anticolonial nationalist discourses.  
 This study attempts to offer a better understanding of why so many ‘black’ thinkers 
and leaders articulated projects for colonial freedom based in transnational identities and 
solidarities.1 It concentrates on the connected trajectories of two proposed unions, both as 
they were imagined as ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ projects: Pan-African federation and 
West Indies Federation.  A central, yet under-acknowledged, aspect of anti-imperial political 
thought was the goal of creating a new kind of multinational state and/or a poly-racial 
                                                          
1 For aesthetic reasons I have limited the use of scare quotes around Western, non-Western, native, black, 
white and their variants, but do use them periodically to emphasise the contested character of these terms.   
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citizenry.2 From the end of WWI to the beginning of the 1960s, activists and leaders from the 
colonies argued and organised for an end to the existing colonial order, but they also argued 
and organised for a deeper transformation of the social hierarchies, based in race and class, 
which sustained empire as a form of international power relation. Individuals such as Cyril 
Briggs, George Padmore, CLR James, Claudia Jones, Frantz Fanon, and Julius Nyerere 
challenged formal imperialism and colonialism as alien rule, but also pushed for the 
eradication of established social and material divisions, which both were the result of, and 
motivation for, imperial conquest and rule. Failure to attend to social inequality and injustice 
meant failure to attend to the underlying pathologies of empire. The goal of national unity 
and sovereign fortitude was articulated as a necessary condition of establishing a new world 
order on fairer and more radically democratic terms. These goals ultimately helped shape 
what is typically called the post-war, or post-colonial international order, informing projects 
to create new forms of state and international organisation.  
 In taking ‘federation’ as a discursive anchor point for various post-colonial visions, I 
am not advocating for the return to a federalist politics for the global South, nor even 
emphasising some crucial category distinction between federation and multi-national state.3 
Instead this study reveals the multivalence of ‘federation’: how the term was deployed to 
express different political visions and ideals.4 Federalism provides a lens onto the wider 
rhetorical content of anti-imperial nationalist discourse, revealing more of its political 
imagination, horizons of possibility, and the mechanisms of its delimitation. A federal 
structure was pursued by imperial authorities and national elites to more closely integrate 
                                                          
2 That African or Caribbean decolonisation concerned the quest for a new kind of state – not derivate political 
forms -- has been acknowledged by a few historical and political theory studies. For example, see Rathbone, 
2000; Lal, 2015; Sealy, 2020. 
3 For a study which emphasises the difference between federation and nation-state as political forms, see 
Burbank and Cooper, 2010.  
4 The West Indies Federation and United States of Africa were actually proposed federal unions, and the 
former realised for a time under that name. However, I am making a distinction between these specific real 
and proposed organisations, and the variety of imagined multinational configurations invoked in anti-imperial 
globalist discourse.   
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colonised societies into imperial organisation, but it was also pursued by anti-imperial writers 
and activists as a way to disable or diminish the possibility of neo-imperialism, state 
oppression, and top-down control of the global economy. More often than not, the sovereign 
nation-state came to replace federalist visions, creating a shifting political divide between 
ethno-nationalist conceptions of the state, and those who hoped it could contain a more just 
and equal multinational and multi-/poly-racial citizenship.5  
 Recovering the multivalence of anti-imperial federation also helps reveal the multi-
scalar character of decolonisation, and the plurality of subaltern politics. Thus, it can serve as 
a resource for those students of world politics not content with mainstream International 
Relations’ (IR) ‘Athenian’ focus on inter-governmental relations.6 This wider scope 
constructively complicates nation-state historiography in the story of ‘the transition from 
empire to nation-state.’ Framing anti-imperial globalism as from above and below offers an 
analytical position from which to critique both mainstream IR’s over-emphasis on state 
sovereignty and recognition, and decolonial IR’s over-emphasis on ethno-cultural essences, 
‘indigenous’ authenticity, and essential representations of ‘Western modernity.’ By 
emphasising the shifting historical connection and interaction between different politics of 
resistance and reform, this study attempts to move away from ontologies of peoples and 
polities as autonomous and unitary actors. 
 This thesis also attempts to give a partial answer to why transnational solidarities and 
visions did not remain the dominant driving force of African and black Atlantic politics after 
independence. While on one level this study is concerned with political ideas – or, more 
specifically, arguments and claims – it is also concerned with why those ideas took one form 
and not another. The subjects of this thesis were simultaneously historical actors and weavers 
                                                          
5 A tension which has given rise to, what David Lloyd has called, ‘nationalisms against the state.’ Lloyd, 1997.  
6 Hoffman, 1977. 
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of analytical narrative.7 As historical actors, their actions and arguments were enabled and 
constrained by the dominant discourse of their times. In order to avoid fetishization of 
political thought by abstracting it from its sociohistorical conditions of possibility, I employ a 
hybrid approach. This involves a symptomatic reading of historical discourse drawn from 
primary and secondary sources, whilst also putting this discourse into conversation with 
social theory. A key finding of this approach was the consistent and pervasive structural 
impetus to delimit political aims to ethno-cultural exclusivity, despite widespread feeling that 
this could not be the ultimate objective of anti-imperial world politics.  
 This structural impetus is best understood in terms of racialisation: a form of 
orientalism, through which contingent hierarchies are defined and presented as reflections of 
collective nature, character, or personality.8 Historical processes of European expansion, 
colonisation, and great power rivalry created racial divisions globally, which were reinforced 
through thick social relations in the colonies and metropole. Insulting caricatures of ‘African-
ness’, ‘blackness’, ‘coloured’, etc. were appropriated and redeployed as more flattering self-
stereotypes for a variety of different purposes. While these self-representations were 
sometimes adopted reflexively, and seen as a preliminary stage of more inclusive, longer 
term goals, they proved far stickier than some had hoped. In other words, ethno-national 
exclusivity and essentialism were more than ‘strategic.’9 They were over-determined by the 
discursive parameters of hierarchical empire/colony relations, and they consistently 
marginalised or delimited other strategic articulations of multi- or poly-racial political 
community.  
 In drawing this conclusion I am not suggesting that there is always equivalency, nor 
reproving all political organisation based in racial unity. Racialisation merely suggests that 
                                                          
7 See Trouillot, 1995: 2. 
8 Said, 1979; Cf. Robinson, 1983.  
9 Cf. Spivak, 1996.  
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‘race’ matters, in that it places limits on the possibility of pursuing social change and 
different political outcomes. More than attitudes, which can simply be discarded voluntarily 
or ameliorated with better norms, notions of racial difference make class solidarity or civic 
national solidarity structurally fragile. For contemporary political analysis, this conclusion 
does not imply an inevitable victory of ethno-nationalism over democratic globalism, but it 
does suggest a stubborn durability to identitarian politics. Identitarian politics are not simply 
personal prejudices arrived at through some process of reasoned cogitation, and they place 
limits on ambitions to improve racial and ethnic relations through reasoned argument alone.10   
 The remainder of this chapter gives an outline of the main themes, scope, and frame 
of analysis of the thesis. It briefly introduces the theoretical problematic of the study; situates 
the study within IR debates; and specifies in more detail, the historical parameters, the 
thinkers analysed, and the approach taken. These elements are all elaborated upon further in 
the next chapter.    
   
1.2. Anti-imperial globalism and racialisation  
 
Anticolonial nationalism was usually also internationalism. 11 Over the course of the 20th 
century, people from different parts of the world and different sectors of society argued that 
world war and economic crisis were pathologies of colonialism and imperial rivalry. Whether 
                                                          
10 The notion that better norms can be sewn into the social fabric through top-down argument and policy is 
claimed or heavily implied in Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2000; Crawford, 2002. However, these 
studies tend to overlook how power and historical structures of in-group/out-group formation (such as 
racialisation) might severely limit the socialisation of norms. See Krebs and Jackson, 2007; Zarakol, 2014.    
11 I began research for this project around the same time Adom Getachew’s similar dissertation Worldmaking 
After Empire: the Rise and Fall of Self-Determination (2019) was being revised as a book. I generally share 
Getachew’s view that the anti-imperial projects of African, Caribbean, and Africa-American intellectual activists 
should be understood as worldmaking projects, rather than merely as rejections of alien rule. However, I 
disagree with Getachew’s framing which defends the top-down nation-building of these projects, largely 
ignores the larger black radical tradition which serves as a foil to her worldmakers, and ultimately reduces anti-
imperialism to non-domination as racial sovereignty. Similarities and differences with Getachew’s study are 
discussed further in the next chapter. The conception of ‘the particular’ and ‘the global’ as overlapping political 
orientations is also explored in Rao, 2010; Younis, 2018.  
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or not they advocated an end to empire, several black writers and activists from colonised 
societies framed these problems as arising from institutionalised white supremacy and racial 
hierarchy, not global disorder. The solutions posited by these discourses concerned reforming 
and strengthening international organisation, even as they increasingly presented the need for 
national consciousness, sovereignty, and the right to pursue collective destiny without foreign 
rule. European and American statesmen, jurists, and professors were far from the only people 
working to build a better world after the First World War.12 
 Anti-imperial discourse – especially during the ‘third wave’ of decolonisation in the 
mid-20th century – eventually characterised empires’ failings as beyond the policies of any 
particular empire.13 Anti-imperialists rarely followed this diagnosis with prescriptions of inert 
nationalism or ‘communitarianism.’ For example, the anti-imperial poet and politician, Aimé 
Césaire (1913-2008), argued in 1955, that ‘it is a good thing to place different civilizations in 
contact with each other; that it is an excellent thing to blend different worlds; that whatever 
its own particular genius may be, a civilization that withdraws into itself atrophies; that for 
civilizations, exchange is oxygen.’ The connection and inter-penetration of societies which 
had characterised the modern world were thus welcome in principle; but Césaire concluded, 
‘has colonization really placed civilizations in contact? Or, if you prefer, of all the ways of 
establishing contact, was it the best? I answer no.’14        
 There were always more progressive and conservative visions of the world ‘after 
empire’, even amongst those outside the social and professional spaces of Euro-American 
diplomacy and scholarship. As Stephen Howe writes, anticolonial arguments shared four 
                                                          
12 Hathaway and Shapiro, 2017 and Rosenboim, 2017 both concentrate on white Europeans as the architects 
of a new world after empire. Sluga, 2013 gives a more balanced history, showing how these new governance 
agendas were shaped through dialogue and debate between statesman, jurists, and scholars on one side, and 
activists, theorists, and radicals representing different social movements.  
13 ‘Three Waves of Decolonisation’ are postulated by Kennedy, 2016: ch. 1. The first wave was constituted by 
decolonisation in the Americas beginning in the late 18th century. The second, in the Hapsburg, Russian, 
Ottoman, and German empires after World War I. The third predominantly in Africa and Asia after World War 
II.   
14 Césaire, 2000 [1955]: 33. 
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main features: claims of a right to national independence and self-determination; the 
recognition that struggles for national independence are interdependent with similar struggles 
elsewhere; the assertion of social equality between Europeans and non-Europeans, including 
the eradication of racism; and the commitment to ‘oppose the colonialism of one’s own 
nation.’ Howe also raises a fifth claim ‘popularised in the writings of Lenin and his 
disciples’, that colonialism is a consequence of global capitalism, and therefore must be 
addressed through the construction of ‘a socialist society.’15  
 While, as we will see, some were more authentically ‘socialist’ or ‘Leninist’ than 
others, demands for deeper transformation of national and international society were 
pervasive in the anticolonial nationalist arguments of the 20th century. Drawing on the black 
internationalist tradition, arguments that racism could not be eradicated by ending formal 
colonialism alone did not begin as an entirely separate political agenda from the ‘mainstream’ 
anticolonial nationalist discourse. Rather, radical internationalist elements grew 
concomitantly within nationalist movements. Concerns that ‘sovereigntism’ or ‘racialism’ 
would only reproduce ethnic chauvinism and inequality served as internal critiques of black 
nationalist politics. Rather than functioning always as discrete camps with an isomorphic 
membership representing consistent positions, nationalism and internationalism served 
different rhetorical positions depending on the claimant and context. The most visible and 
globally significant post-war anticolonial nationalist projects drew heavily on a more radical 
vision as a resource for their own legitimation. Pan-African unity was often presented as for 
the benefit of humanity: a global progressive step towards a world unencumbered by race 
prejudice or class division.   
 Rather than binary – conservative/progressive, cosmopolitan/communitarian, 
radical/mainstream – the rhetorical differences within anti-imperial globalism can be better 
                                                          
15 Howe, 1993: 1-2 
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clarified by emphasising their ultimate objectives and constituent solidarities, both implicit 
and explicit. As Or Rosenboim defines it, globalism ‘emerged from an awareness of the 
political significance of the globe as a unitary whole made of interconnected, diverse political 
units…. Globalism often implied a renewed awareness of diversity, and an attempt to 
envisage a world order to preserve it.’16 However, the preservation of a world of diversity is a 
highly ambiguous prospect, and does not always suggest the most progressive politics. 
Indeed, ‘to preserve’ connotes conservatism. Thus it is useful to sub-categorise anti-imperial 
globalism, which I do here as ‘from above’ and ‘from below.’  
 Anti-imperial globalism from above posited inter-governmental cooperation as the 
locus of projects to end imperialism and draw the world into more pacific and equitable 
integration. The ultimate objective of this position was inclusion and autonomy within the 
existing liberal capitalist order. By ‘liberal’ I do not mean that every nation-state would 
necessarily adhere to liberal democratic governance, but that international relations have a 
liberal foundation in the sovereign right to enter into cooperation and contract.17 Anti-
imperial globalism from above pursued a path to decolonisation, which sometimes 
emphasised regionalism or future world government; but most importantly, robust 
sovereignty for states and representative leaders by reforming international institutions with 
redistributive policies, or creating new institutions.  
 When the ultimate objectives of anti-imperial globalism from above intersected with a 
political imagination based in racial solidarity, this resulted in an ethno-nationalist anti-
imperialism. This is not to deny the existence of ethno-nationalist populism by saying that 
only political elites pursue racial solidarity. Rather it is to distinguish a particular discursive 
position, which premised regional unification or national building on the demand for racial 
sovereignty and race leadership, needed to protect the race from ‘outside’ intervention. These 
                                                          
16 Rosenboim, 2017: 4. 
17 See Devji, 2012: 69 
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politics were usually legitimated and gained currency through reference to racial grievance 
and essential characterisations of the race. As we will see in Chapter 3, this rhetorical 
position most consistently describes the politics of Marcus Garvey (1887-1940), although 
others drew upon it less consistently. Importantly, anti-imperial ethno-nationalism is 
conceptualised here as a type of globalism, not ‘isolationism’ or the like.18 The ultimate 
objective of these politics was still to order and participate in the world envisaged as whole, 
and to preserve its diversity. Actually, ethno-nationalist politics of this type were only anti-
imperial in the particular, and not the abstract. For while they challenged European empire, 
they also sought the opportunity for every race to build its own regional empire.  
 Anti-imperial globalism from above sometimes pursued class solidarity, rather than 
racial solidarity. This rhetorical position stressed the need for economic integration with the 
West, modernisation, multiculturalism, and ‘colour-blind’ nation-building and 
internationalism. This sometimes included low priority for the problem of racial or ethnic 
disparities in political power. It was legitimated by the perceived need to attain parity with 
the West in economic, social, and political terms. Diversity was to be preserved by 
international order: yet, diversity was drawn superficially, belonging to the realm of thinly 
conceptualised ‘culture’, which was framed as important, but ultimately separate and 
secondary to integration with liberal capitalist order.  
 Anti-imperialism globalism from below was a different politics both in terms of 
where it placed the locus of change and how it conceptualised diversity. While diversity was 
to be preserved as a principle and a right, social transformation was necessary to address the 
racial hierarchy encoded into imperial diversity. Speaking or writing from this rhetorical 
position, activists and leaders advocated social transformation through popular control of the 
global economy, through community driven, synchronised action with other nations and 
                                                          
18 A similar point is made by Younis, 2018: ch. 1.  
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regions. They also expressed the goal of total social equality: freedom of association, racial 
mixing, cultural freedom and cultural poly-genesis. Some, especially C.L.R. James (1901-
1989), sought an end to representative democracy, and envisaged a global order constituted 
by direct democratic control through the apparatus of a reconstructed state. When racial 
solidarity was invoked from this position, it was usually in the form of strategic and 
temporary segregation. For example, as we will see in Chapter 4, W.E.B. Du Bois (1868-
1963) advocated an initial stage of segregation for black communities so they could attain 
parity with white communities: at which point equal citizenship could be pursued. Du Bois 
diagnosed the causes of WWI as homologous with the drivers of imperialism and imperial 
rivalry: chauvinistic nationalism, global racism, militarism, and predatory capitalism.  An 
adequate solution therefore required an end to racial discrimination and increased political 
power for workers – what he called ‘industrial democracy for all humanity.’  These ideals 
needed to be enshrined by some international authority. A preliminary stage to achieving this 
would be to found ‘a new African World State, a Black Africa… recognizing in Africa, the 
declaration of the American Federation of Labor, that ‘no people must be forced under 
sovereignty under which it does not wish to live.’19    
 These anti-imperial world politics both ‘from above’ and ‘below’ did not really exist 
anywhere in the form of stable camps. Rather, the terms represent different positions taken up 
by activists, writers, and leaders in the pursuit of different political and personal goals. In 
recovering these histories, I do not assume that each historical actor held a completely 
coherent political ideology, which they ceaselessly put towards the achievement of consistent 
goals. Neither do I wish to reproduce the fallacy of a unified and undifferentiated anticolonial 
nationalism, which cast off the shackles of imperialism in the name of ‘the nation.’ As 
Jeremy Adelman observes in his history of Latin American decolonisation in the late 18th and 
                                                          
19 Du Bois, 2016 [1920]: 37. 
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early 19th centuries, the political dynamics between colonists and their respective dynastic 
empires in Europe can be read in terms of Albert O. Hirschman’s famous triad, exit, voice, 
and loyalty.20 These categories can also help distinguish between political visions and 
rhetoric in the case of African and Caribbean decolonisation. Empires engendered and 
sustained varying degrees of loyalty between social groups. Rather than a process of a 
nation’s self-recognition which logically resulted in a unified demand for independence, 
colonial ‘exit, voice, and loyalty’ reflected internally divided interests and opinions, which 
jostled against one another within the same political space.21 Although always also practiced 
by groups who took a principled stand against empire, anti-imperialism only emerged as a 
dominant discourse when empire came to be perceived as irreparably incapable of reforming 
itself to meet the demands of different strata of a colonised society. The transition of anti-
imperialism from a marginal discourse to a dominant discourse in the 20th century is only 
explicable in light of the catastrophic world events of that century, and the failure or inability 
of European empires to amend themselves accordingly. However, there was never a period 
when independence was not contested by colonial subjects. Influential leaders in French 
Africa, for example, fought for the reformation of empire along more egalitarian principles 
through the extension of citizenship rights until as late as 1956.22   
 Racialisation was a common denominator in all of these politics. In its loftier forms, 
and typical of modern political ideologies, anti-imperial globalism from below idealised 
abstractions, such as ‘the revolutionary working class’, and maybe too readily subscribed to 
the redemption of humanity through large-scale organisation and integration. Yet, even when 
race was reflected upon and posited as a barrier to overcome for the good of humanity, social 
and material divisions structured on racial lines held an almost inescapable agency. I 
                                                          
20 Adelman, 2006; Hirschman, 1970 
21 Adelman 2006, 8. 
22 Wilder, 2015; Cooper, 2014 
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approach racialisation here as both dominant discourse and social practice, each reproducing 
the other. The pervasive idea that races needed to act, develop, redeem themselves as races 
structured the possibilities of political argument and action. The ability to act for the benefit 
of social and world change were evaluated through the prism of skin colour, with each race 
possessing certain qualities, rendering them more or less fit agents for governance or 
revolutionary action. Such stereotyping was reinforced by disparities in material resources 
and political power, but also geographically, in societies where space was divided by racial 
difference. As we will see, racialisation played a prominent role from the early organising 
after WWI, to the state development projects of the 1950s and 1960s. 
 Another central finding of this study is the sheer flexibility of ‘federation’ as a 
rhetorical commonplace of anti-imperial argument. The United States of Africa and the West 
Indies Federation each existed in a variety of discursive forms, both representing anti-
imperial visions from ‘above’ and ‘below.’ Federalism from above pertained to the outward 
facing relationship with the international system/order, self-determination for the post-
colonial state, and the business of political, economic, cultural, and military development as 
these related to an integrated federal unit. Federalism from below pertained to class unity, the 
transnational organisation of workers’ interests, and the maintenance of progressive race 
relations within the independent nation and the rest of the world. Both forms of federation 
were initially suggested by colonial leaders as a way to improve relations with European 
empire rather than end them entirely. In their anti-imperial form, federal visions did not 
survive the transition from activist rhetoric to national policy, except in the case of Tanzania. 
After independence, antagonism over who federation was for became impossible to ignore. 
For the leaders of new states, federation became an impediment to new economic and 
political alliances with powers in the East and West. Political opponents in newly 
independent regions accused the other of betraying the federal dream over class, racial, and 
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tribal interests. Imperial racialisation also presented significant challenges to federal 
unification, even as some continued to look to unification as the means to improve race 
relations within the state and the international community.   
 
1.3. Sovereignty and difference 
 
After the Second World War, black anti-imperial writers, activists, and leaders argued for 
sovereignty and/or self-determination, but they also posited these as potential threats to social 
justice, freedom, and equality. The argument that sovereignty and self-determination could 
not be pursued as ends in themselves emerged concomitantly with nationalist discourse and 
organising. The ‘self’ of black self-determination was usually open to a certain degree of 
contestation, and was complicated by a widely held belief in the need for institutionalised 
forms of transnational solidarity, coalition, and integration. This conception of the post-
imperial ‘self’ as flexible – of needing to be flexible – even extended beyond the era of 
formal decolonisation. As Burbank and Cooper write,  
 
Other possibilities for a post-imperial world lived on in political imagination around the 
world in the second half of the twentieth century. Among these projects were an 
alliance of ex-colonial states in a “Third World bloc,” peasant revolutions that crossed 
state boundaries, diasporic solidarities, and regional groupings in Asia, Africa, and 
elsewhere. The United Nations both reinforced the new norm of equivalence among 
states and led some to hope that it could institutionalize community among all the 
world's people.23  
 
                                                          
23 Burbank and Cooper, 2010: 414 
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 Sovereignty was seen as potentially divisive: as a threat to anti-imperial unity, and a 
tool of neo-imperialism. Most progressive anti-imperial globalists eventually pursued 
sovereignty as a necessary first stage, but it could not be the ultimate objective. What was 
needed was a remaking of modern political form to address the iniquities and violence of 
racialisation and imperial society. Some argued for the voluntary surrender of sovereignty 
almost as soon as it had been won.  
 The notion that sovereignty and self-determination might not be the sine qua non of 
anticolonial nationalist politics has rarely been explored in IR. By highlighting the anti-
imperial goals which could not be addressed with sovereignty for its own sake, this study 
offers a response to IR’s taken-for-granted focus on sovereignty. For many IR scholars, 
sovereignty and self-determination are basic ontological conditions for the discipline’s main 
object of analysis: relations between modern nation-states. The English School, and 
Constructivism with a Liberal bent, posit sovereignty and self-determination as norms, which, 
though they are subject to change, allow the international system to hang together.24 When 
mainstream constructivists have explored sovereignty and self-determination in connection to 
anticolonial nationalist politics, it has usually been to argue for the diffusion of liberal norms, 
to premise non-Western rational agency, and to demonstrate the efficacy of rational 
argument.25 We might hope that, by including African or Asian agency in the socialisation of 
global norms, this might go some way to reversing the normative polarity of dominant 
discourses, which have posited the West as the carrier of liberal democratic norms throughout 
the world, and ‘non-Western’ states and societies as ‘communitarian’ impediments to the 
spread of these norms.26 Yet, by foregrounding liberal sovereignty – not social justice -- as 
the ultimate objective of anticolonial politics, Liberal Constructivists unintentionally valorise 
                                                          
24 Jackson, 1993; Bull, 1977; Philpott, 2001; Crawford, 2002; Barkin and Cronin, 1994.   
25 Crawford, 2002; Philpott, 2001; Risse, 2000.  
26 See Zarakol, 2014.  
P a g e  | 20 
 
the slide from progressive anti-imperialism to conservative sovereigntism, which 
characterised the period from about 1965 to the present.27 This analytical position can also 
create the illusion that nationalists were free to argue whatever they wanted, were not 
constrained by external power, discursive ‘common sense’, and internal division, and had 
their complaints resolved by the transfer of sovereignty. Often left out are the ongoing 
relations of informal empire, and the ways sovereignty for its own sake has not prevented the 
conversion of colonies into dependent, penetrable, and oppressive states.  
 Sovereignty and self-determination in anticolonial and anti-imperial discourse were 
often bound up with questions of preserving difference and diversity. As mentioned in the 
previous section, how to preserve difference and diversity varied; but, race and its connection 
to cultural development was prevalent. At stake were not only black populations’ relations 
with other races, but their relationship to modernity and potential to drive global progress. 
Political thinkers as different as Marcus Garvey, Claude McKay (1889-1948), and George 
Padmore (1903-1959) could all argue that ‘the black race’ was exceptional in its difference. 
Certain world historical and political developments made this justifiable: the socioeconomic 
legacies of slavery in the Americas; the mandates system, which effectively classified black 
populations at the bottom of a pyramid of world races; the fragmentation of labour organising 
on black and white lines; and Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia, which met with approval or 
relative indifference from much of the white metropolitan political class. With the emergence 
of black advocacy networks and international race leadership, insult and injury to black 
populations were countered with reference to Africa’s great civilizational past, as well as the 
potential of revolutionary blacks to bring about an ultra-modern transformation of global 
order. Especially after WWII, some, including C.L.R. James, Claudia Jones (1915-1964), and 
Amílcar Cabral (1924-1973), argued that standards of modernity and civilisation could not be 
                                                          
27 A related argument is made by Grovogui, 2002.  
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imposed on existing societies from outside. Transformation would need to come from 
radically democratic collaboration between races and classes. Not a Western-educated elite 
bringing modernity to the masses -- the more common prescription during the interwar period 
– but through direct democratic access to the state, individual and communal sovereignty, 
pluralistic representation, and through the principle of ‘diversity in unity.’ 
 Anti-imperialists saw ethnic and cultural difference – and used difference claims – as 
variable and often ambiguous tools of political strategy. By this I do not mean that anti-
imperialists had a free choice of a ‘menu’ of possibilities. As Meera Sabaratnam writes, 
recognizing ‘decolonial’ theory as strategy means we acknowledge that ‘the philosophical 
wagers and commitments made are located in and directed towards a particular problem, and 
express different interests.’28 Discourse about the world and for world change is necessarily 
situated in a specific set of historical presumptions and partisan loyalties: ‘problem-spaces’ in 
which a limited set of questions and answers can come to prominence.29 The strategies of 
those who wanted exit were shaped in part by those who expressed voice or loyalty. Because 
difference and authenticity politics could also act as a debilitating legacies of colonial divide 
and rule, part of the struggle to transform world order from below necessarily entailed the 
transcendence of difference in order to build revolutionary coalitions, and disable the 
hierarchal divisions which sustained imperialism. 
 Recent IR studies have retrained focus on ethnic and cultural difference and diversity, 
both as ontological features of society and as political referents. This study contributes to this 
emerging literature by highlighting: connections between ‘global’ imperial orders and 
‘particular’ social genesis; the importance of an international social imaginary of ‘world 
                                                          
28 Sabaratnam, 2011: 783.  
29 The term ‘problem-space’ is David Scott’s, who builds on the work of R.G. Collingwood to conceptualise the 
post-colonial condition (1999; 2004). However, the role of power-knowledge formations in limiting the ‘menu’ 
of questions we can ask about history, politics, and society is more clearly emphasised in Trouillot, 1995. 
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races’ before and after WWII30; and the plurality of power relations and knowledge 
formations between and within racialised groups. As we will see, political discourse often 
conflates racial and cultural difference.31 ‘Blackness’ in anti-imperial discourse was not 
conceptualised purely in terms of physical traits, but ascribed a host of cultural 
characteristics. 
 Questions about difference and diversity are raised to critique the totalising and 
homogenising tendencies of Realism, Liberalism, or modernisation theories more broadly.32 I 
concur with the argument that international theory needs to cast a wider net, and open its 
analytic scope to account for global processes and inequalities, subaltern politics, and inter-
societal connections. However, some anti-Eurocentric IR carries a danger of reifying ‘non-
Western difference’ by ascribing to it a geography and an essence. Take for example ‘Global 
IR’, which has come to stand in as the latest iteration of this longstanding debate. In his 2014 
declaration of Global IR’s new agenda to the International Studies Association, Amitav 
Acharya accepts Stanley Hoffmann’s account of IR as ‘born and raised in America’, but adds 
that the discipline has now ‘mushroomed’ through ‘schools, departments, institutes, and 
conventions’ around the world.33 He argues that this new state of affairs presents an 
opportunity to open IR to the rest of the world; to push for ‘greater inclusiveness and 
diversity’, and to address the widely acknowledged problem of the discipline’s empirical 
focus and ‘main theories’ being ‘too deeply rooted in, and beholden to, the history, 
intellectual traditions, and agency claims of the West.’34 
                                                          
30 Charles Taylor defines a social imaginary as more than a ‘set of ideas’, but a background system of thought, 
which ‘enables, through making sense of, the practices of a society’ (2002: 91). I am thus making a strong claim 
about racial and cultural hierarchy as a system which enables particular formations of social practice and 
organisation.   
31 Ford, 2006. 
32 Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004; Hobson, 2013. 
33 Acharya, 2014: 647 
34 Ibid.: 649 
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 Such a conception reproduces, what I call, epistemic mapping: the notion that 
knowledge has a single or rightful geographic provenance, that it is owned by a single race, 
culture, nation, or region. Similarly ‘decolonial’ scholars, often drawing on the work of 
Enrique Dussel or Walter Mignolo, characterise modernity as a bifurcated process in which 
‘epistemologies of the South’ have been systematically disenfranchised, excluded, or 
eradicated according to the racial chauvinism inherent to Western thought systems.35 Some 
writing in this register argue for the need to seek out ‘places of otherness’, to borrow a phrase 
from Gyan Prakash, as a resource from which to contest the fundamental assumptions of 
hegemonic liberal politics and nationalist historiography, which are characterised as 
essentially Western.36 Similar to Global IR, there is a danger of reproducing essential and 
stereotypical definitions of human difference in promoting a Western universalism/non-
Western authenticity binary. Strategic essentialism has long been a feature of political 
discourse; it can serve progressive or conservative ends, as well as have unintended 
consequences. The role of the scholar should not be to do strategic essentialism ourselves, but 
to better understand how it becomes possible, and/or to assess its aims and outcomes. 
 I also argue that inquiry into ‘difference’ in world politics should expand its 
conception of ‘recognition’, and even depart from it. Christian Reus-Smit’s recent project has 
done important work reconceptualising IR’s dominant notion of culture as bounded and 
homogenous, towards a conception which takes it as open to ‘external’ influence, contested, 
and prone to various forms of transformation and hybridity. Yet, Reus-Smit augments his 
ontology of culture with a complementary concept, which he calls ‘diversity regimes.’ 
Diversity regimes seem to have a lot in common with what Talal Asad called ‘authorizing 
discourses’, assemblages of practice, communicative action, and human authorities, which 
discipline rightful adherence to a culture, and how it gets represented to ‘the outside.’ Unlike 
                                                          
35 E.g. Dussel, 2013; Mignolo, 2011 
36 Prakash, 1994: 5; see also Chatterjee, 1993 
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Asad’s authorising discourses, Reus-Smit’s diversity regimes manifest as IR’s familiar 
‘unitary actors’: states, governments, and empires.37 According to Reus-Smit, these units’ 
primary impetus for cultural politics is ‘recognition.’38 Of course, authorities, such as states, 
do seek international recognition, but authority over cultural representation is sought for a 
host of reasons not reducible to recognition. The lost opportunity here would be to reassert 
cultural politics purely as form of particularism, which unitary actors rationally seek in order 
to make sovereignty claims. What I show in this thesis is very different: cultural politics were 
asserted and contested to advance rival universalisms and alternative world orders, but were 
strongly delimited by trans-boundary discourses, relational racial imaginaries, and not simply 
the recognition struggles of unitary actors.    
 Anti-imperial globalism was shaped through its interaction with a dominant trans-
boundary discourse, which understood the problems of the 20th century as requiring large-
scale forms of political organisation and integration. This discourse was determining in that it 
delimited the avenues out of empire. Representations of difference and identity were likewise 
determined by strategic necessity and historical possibility. I define to determine in a similar 
sense to the way Stuart Hall defined it, when he wrote: 
 
Structures exhibit tendencies- lines of force, openings and closures which 
constrain, shape, channel and in that sense, "determine." But they cannot 
determine in the harder sense of fix absolutely, guarantee. People are not 
irrevocably and indelibly inscribed with the ideas that they ought to think; the 
politics that they ought to have are not, as it were, already imprinted in their 
                                                          
37 For a critique of IR’s adherence to a unitary actor ontology, see Zarakol, 2017.  
38 Reus-Smit, 2018; Asad, 2009.  
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sociological genes. The question is not the unfolding of some inevitable law but 
rather the linkages which, although they can be made, need not necessarily be.39 
 
As we will see in the chapters that follow, the socio-economic structure of the British (and 
French) empire, the emergence of transnational black power, the legitimacy crises of 
‘Western civilisation’, and prevailing – though not uncontested – discourses of both racial 
and global progress all created linkages, which allowed for difference and identity to be 
articulated in different ways. While these articulations confirm the importance of ethno-
cultural difference to world politics, they also reveal a consistent imperative to prevent justice 
and freedom struggles from being reduced to it.    
 
1.4. Empire and race in IR, towards a historical-relational approach  
 
The period I have chosen to examine for this study encompasses six decades: the end of the 
1910s to the middle of the 1970s. Any decision to choose a beginning and an end for this 
kind of historical study must be somewhat artificial, and so my analysis sometimes reaches 
outside this range of dates. Some sections concentrate on the primordial form of this 
discourse, before anti-imperialism was widely or formally articulated; some look at what 
remained of the discourse after anti-imperial globalism had guttered out. While the discourse 
of 1919 drew on events and ideas that came before, the aftermath of WWI and the Russian 
Revolutions of 1917 gave rise to a new constellation of strategic possibilities. New polarities 
between the Soviet, Fascist, and Democratic capitalist empires galvanised and drew new 
intersections within loosely organized networks of empire-critical leaders and activists. The 
ambitions of the post-war Anglo-American alliance to build an ‘international order’ in the 
                                                          
39 Hall, 1985: 96. 
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wake of WWI created a new focal point—whether or not critics of empire entirely trusted or 
shared its professed ideals. 
 My analytical approach follows, to an extent, Duncan Bell’s ‘hybrid contextualism.’40 
I analyse the primary sources and biographies of certain figures, and combine and juxtapose 
these with contemporaneous patterns and assumptions expressed in the discourse more 
broadly. As well as secondary sources, my research materials include primary source books, 
personal papers, articles, newspapers, pamphlets, periodicals, and novels. The main anchor 
point in my reading of these texts is how the idea of federation was articulated over time. My 
approach has the aim of both accounting for the contextual possibilities of discourse, as well 
as emphasising its theoretical implications. This involves symptomatic reading: drawing out 
the theoretical wagers of texts, which were not necessarily produced originally as systematic 
or scholarly knowledge.41 For example, in Chapter Three, I show how Cyril Briggs (1888-
1966) and Hubert Harrison (1883-1927) theorised the possibility of a global cosmopolitan 
democracy, which would be attained through analysis and mobilisation of actually existing 
political communities in the United States and Africa. These theories were not produced as 
academic knowledge, but as political discourse meant to affect opinion and policy.  
 My approach is hybrid in that it also draws on the tools of global historical sociology 
to show how structures of racialisation cut across empire/colony relations in African, 
Caribbean, European, and North American politics. In practice this means drawing on a 
synthesis of secondary source histories in order to better contextualise and explain the 
possibilities of anti-imperial thought. It is putting the analytical frame of ‘the global’ into 
constant conversation with the analytical frame of ‘the particular.’ Imperial order in the 20th 
century can be described as, what George Lawson has called, a ‘transnational field of 
                                                          
40 Bell, 2007: 26 
41 Althusser et. al., 2016 [1965]. 
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contention.’42 Resistance and critique were constitutive aspects of imperial-colonial order in 
that they informed imperial strategies.43 The British Empire, for example, was less a rigid 
structure than a system or a ‘patchwork’, ‘whose contingent parts were constantly influencing 
the reevalution of British imperial policy.’44 But resistance and critique usually went beyond 
a two-way relationship between colonial nationalists and their respective imperial authorities. 
Anti-imperial globalists reacted and were informed by international processes: world wars, 
economic crashes, boundary-crossing ideas, social movements, revolutions, and the rise of 
multilateral organisations.  
 The British Empire worked through processes and relations of inclusion and 
differentiation, not binary inclusion and exclusion.45 Different groups were included to 
varying extents to serve a global division of labour related to extraction, production, security, 
and bureaucracy.46 In part, this differentiation followed logics related to the historical 
concentration of capital in particular geographical spaces,47 hierarchical classifications of 
economic sectors and forms of work, and logics of indirect rule, where owners and managers 
of capital needed to attain the loyalty of local clients. States, laws, and other institutions were 
modified to facilitate the flow of global capital.48 Although they were transformed in various 
ways after the dissolution of the old colonial order, the roots of these transnational processes 
are imperial, not post-war.49 The significance of this is that the reproduction of inclusion and 
differentiation in the contemporary world system was set in train by an imperial order which 
operated according to a social imaginary based on a hierarchy of races and cultures.50 
                                                          
42 Lawson, 2019: 25. 
43 Burbank and Cooper, 2010: 290. 
44 James, 2015: 6. 
45 As Anghie, 2005 and Getachew, 2019 argue, the modus operandi of empire was ‘unequal integration.’  
46 E.g. Wallerstein, 2004. See discussion of Wallerstein’s ‘word empire’ thesis in Buzan and Little, 2000: 62-64; 
Sassen, 2014; Anghie, 2005; Getachew, 2019  
47 Eg. Harvey, 2014; Das, 2017 
48 Brenner, 1997; Barkawi and Laffey, 1999  
49 Barkawi and Laffey, 1999: 407; Hopkins, 2002; Grant, Levine, and Trentmann, 2007: 17; Norfield, 2017 
50 Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 51-54; Wolfe, 2016; Getachew, 2019  
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 This conception of empire as a relational and differentiated network of societies, 
politics, and practices – rather than simply the dominant type of unitary actor before the 
nation-state -- builds on recent studies on empire and race in historical and historical 
sociological IR.51 While challenging the notion that the ‘transition from empire to nation-
state’ was uniform and seamless, these studies also seek to bridge the ‘analytical bifurcations’ 
reflected in many of IR’s traditional categories: for example, domestic vs. international and 
west vs. non-west.52 Anti-imperial globalism does not, in my reading, reflect something that 
we can reduce to the binary of ‘Western’ or ‘non-Western thought.’ Rather, I approach these 
categories in terms of their historical relation, inter-societal engagement, and co-constitution. 
Race and the common sense of racial development conditioned the possibility of thought and 
argument across the ‘black Atlantic.’53 Global events structured the social imaginaries, 
struggles, and political visions of people around the world and in various walks of life. Anti-
imperial globalism reflected ‘connected histories’ and ‘connected sociologies.’54  
 In excavating the different sides of anti-imperial discourse, and analysing how they 
were co-implicated, this study aims to challenge ‘attributional thinking’ in the study of 
empire and race. Attributional thinking refers to the notion that ‘the social world consists of 
fixed entities (the units of analysis) that have attributes (the variables).’55 The practice of 
fixing units and their variables as context-distant entities fails to recognise that social 
formations and subjectivities are not comprised of transhistorical properties, but are processes 
‘on the move’, and situated within matrices of relation informed by events.56 This does not 
mean total ‘fluidity’, because it is still possible to account for patterns and ‘stickier’ dynamics 
                                                          
51 E.g. Bayly, 2016; Barkawi, 2017; Phillips and Sharman, 2015; Go and Lawson, 2017; Shilliam, 2009; Younis, 
2019. 
52 See Hutchings, 2011; Krishna 2015: 139. 
53 Gilroy, 1993 posits the ‘black Atlantic’ as a particular geographical, social, and cultural field, defined by 
patterns of hybridity and interchange.  
54 See Bhambra, 2014.  
55 Abbott, 2001: 39 
56 Go and Lawson, 2017: 3; Sewell, 2005; chs. 7 and 8 
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and relationships between societies.57 Yet, as James Tully writes, from his Foucauldian 
framing, ‘it is practical conflict and war that lie at the foundations of modern political 
thought: not a war of all against all nor of economic classes, but of shifting yet analysable 
alliances.’58 
 The decision to focus almost exclusively on Anglophone black internationalist 
discourses was partly a matter of time and language constraints, but it also allowed for a 
deeper exploration of a particular political conversation.59 This meant sacrificing a certain 
degree of generalisability for nuance and detail: a trade-off which might have been the 
opposite had I opted for trans-geographic survey to produce a comparativist typology of anti-
imperial discourse.60 While I do not claim that the discourses analysed in this thesis can be 
said to represent anti-imperial world politics in all its forms everywhere, it has been possible 
to draw conclusions, which qualify relevant debates within IR and international theory in a 
more general way. There are precedents for this. Partha Chatterjee’s (1986) classic study 
reveals the limits of viewing Third World nationalism as purely ‘derivative’ by concentrating 
solely on three generations of Indian nationalist discourse. In a similar way, this study shows 
the limits of viewing decolonisation purely through the lens of state sovereignty and self-
determination, through analysis of three discursive shifts in (mostly) Anglophone black 
internationalist discourse. It also reveals the limits of approaching any intellectual tradition as 
if it were a hermetic container for a specified social group’s monolithic hopes and ideals. 61 
                                                          
57 Lawson, 2010  
58 Tully, 1988: 24 
59 This study has benefitted from a recent proliferation of excellent historical studies on black internationalism 
and anti-imperialism. E.g. Von Eschen, 1997; Makalani, 2011; Edwards, 2003; Polsgrove, 2009; Irwin, 2012; 
Bogues, 2003; James, 2015; Umoren, 2018.  
60 Cf. Lawson, 2010. 
61 With David Scott, I understand ‘traditions’ generally, and ‘the black radical tradition’ specifically, as 
‘essentially contentious.’ Traditions take place within ‘socially embodied and historically extended discursive 
terrain on which the identity of a community is argued out.’ They are also ‘modes of authorization’ which seek 
to express the durability of a community’s historical experience (Scott, 2013: 3).    
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Black internationalist anti-imperialism was entangled with other people’s politics in a variety 
of ways: economic, political, and social.  
 The discourses of Africans and people of African descent, which ultimately helped 
bring about the end of formal empire in Africa and the Caribbean, took place during a 
particularly important moment in the formation of ‘the international.’62 While the first and 
second waves of decolonisation comprised similar dynamics of empire-colony relations, and 
the internal divergences within colonised societies, the third wave of decolonisation came as 
the result of a uniquely global discourse around the role of imperialism in the First World 
War, the threat this represented to ‘world civilisation’, and the new forms of international 
governance and social relations needed to address global conflict. During this moment, 
empire came to be seen as in need of reform by some, and inherently destructive and 
regressive by others. In each case, the emergence of more powerful and organised racial 
advocacy networks and the depreciating returns of white imperial legitimacy galvanised 
arguments for non-white inclusion in governance. Objection to white supremacy proliferated 
in various transnational advocacy organizations and through colonial and metropolitan print 
cultures. These ideas were facilitated by the synchronisation of racial grievance throughout 
colonised populations, but also by the ideological and organisational resources supplied by 
the COMINTERN and the United States. Black anti-imperialism is not reducible to Soviet 
communism or American liberalism, but its entanglements with other political movements 
often led to important consequences, such as the crackdown on its print materials and 
organising by colonial authorities.63  
 The focus on black internationalism also has a rationale related to the relative neglect 
of certain discourses and ideologies in the formation of the international/states system. While 
                                                          
62 Although anticolonial nationalists like Gandhi and Du Bois play only small roles in their narratives, the 
constitution of the international as a particular social and political sphere, which gradually became inimical to 
older forms of imperialism is discussed in Sluga, 2013 and Pedersen, 2015. Cf. Mazower, 2009   
63 The argument that the black radical politics of the 20th century are not reducible to class politics or organised 
Marxism is well made in Robinson, 1983 and Makalani, 2011.  
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it would be possible to dig deeper into the anti-imperial politics of white metropolitan 
activists, the view that independence was gifted to the colonies by benevolent whites does not 
need further elaboration. The notion that white Western societies came around on their own 
to new moral positions on practices like colonialism already forms the bedrock for a plethora 
of liberal constructivist studies and popular histories.64 Analysis of the world political 
discourse of individuals like Marcus Garvey, Cyril Briggs, J.E. and Adelaide Casely Hayford, 
Paulette Nardal, George Padmore, among others, forms part of the unique contribution of this 
study.   
 Although they usually referred to peasant and worker communities, the discourses I 
analyse here were relatively elite. However, there is more in the history of anti-imperial, 
intra-elite discourse than has been sometimes suggested by historians of the subaltern. 
Excluded socially and politically, but rich in cultural capital, sufficiently resourced to travel 
between colony and metropole, and tailored towards low level, white collar professions, 
many anti-imperial writers and leaders were acutely aware of the transnational pecking order, 
and occupied a position of relative subalternity. For the most part, these individuals fit 
Edward Said’s category of the ‘secular intellectual.’65 Said defines secular intellectuals by six 
axes of activity and thought: 1.) the ‘archival function’ of preserving and deploying ‘counter-
information’ which is hidden by the ‘prevailing consensus’; 2.) translating specialized 
knowledge and literature into forms accessible to broad groups of people; 3.) demystifying 
the language of authority which appeals to so-called pragmatic common-sense in order to 
highlight the underlying ethical or political implications; 4.) disrupting attempts to privatize 
knowledge by challenging the boundaries of specialized domains of practice; 5.) resisting a 
                                                          
64 E.g. Jackson, 1993; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Hathaway and Shapiro, 2017; see Grovogui, 1996 Barkawi, 
2018. 
65 See also, Biswas, 2007 
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culture’s slide into total domination or trivialization; and 6.) insisting on the irreconcilability 
and irreducibility of oppositions.66  
 In Antonio Gramsci’s problematic and the European context, such figures would 
normally be considered intellectuals proper, the ‘organizers of culture’ contrasted with the 
‘organic intellectuals’ who derive their ideology from the ‘essential task of economic 
production.’67 But the relative marginality of colonial anti-imperial activists created a unique 
position where the function of intellectual critique often needed to be exercised outside the 
realms of formal knowledge production—in the function rooms and public parks of 
metropolitan centres, through art and literature, and in transnational print media.68  
 Through its empirics and approach this study seeks to contribute to the ‘(re)turn’ to 
empire and race in IR.69 A few scholars now recognise that analysis of contemporary 
international relations, whether it concerns Brexit; Russian, Chinese, and Western rivalry in 
Africa; NATO operations in the Middle East; Salafist movements; transnational protest 
movements like Black Lives Matter; or developments in organisations like CARICOM, the 
African Union, or ASEAN, is often poorer for not attending to legacies of empire and 
colonialism, as well as ongoing imperial relations. Critical histories of IR have pointed to IR 
as an academic discipline which got its start through the policy science of race development 
and imperial management70; which continues to advance self-flattering myths about Western 
exceptionalism; and which claims or assumes the universality of European history, 
institutions, and technologies. This can have the effect of whitewashing Euro-American 
                                                          
66 Said, 1996: 29-32.  
67 Cammett, 1967: 202.  
68 In her authoritative intellectual biography of Claudia Jones, Carole Boyce Davies also finds use for Said’s 
conception of the secular intellectual. She also points out its limitations in failing to account for the critical 
function of those who work by choice or opportunity outside the academy and – in her words – outside the 
“’status identity’ of the professoriat” (2007: 9).             
69 Bayly, 2014; Vucetic, 2011; Vitalis, 2015.  
70 E.g. Vucetic, 2011; Hobson, 2012; Vitalis, 2015; Bayly, 2016; Thakur et. al., 2017 
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world politics, or, more insidiously, continuing to normalise state-sanctioned violence and 
inequality.71  
 These critiques of IR as a Eurocentric discipline, historically bound up with white 
supremacy, have carried the discipline to a crossroads. Down one road, there is the possibility 
of attempting to address these omissions and biases with analysis based in liberal pluralist 
inclusion: adding a host of ‘non-Western’ categories and biases, which posit cultural and 
territorialised particularities. I argue that the likely outcome here is not an amelioration of 
Eurocentrism, but an extension of it. The West is still granted the terrain of the universal, 
with ‘the non-West’ granted tolerance to tack on a variety of cultural ‘differences’, as long as 
it largely continues to adhere to disciplinary shibboleths, such as order, sovereignty, and 
recognition. Another path – though not the only one -- is the relational-historical approach to 
empire and race I put forward in this study. This understands relations between former 
empires and colonies as asymmetrical and differentiated but connected, constituted through 
resistance and alliance as well as oppression, and interpretable through discourse, which often 
concerned bounded communities, but was usually also boundary-crossing.  
 
1.5. Structure of the thesis  
 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into four chapters plus a concluding chapter. Chapter 
Two explicates the theoretical wagers behind anti-imperialism as a world politics. I argue that 
the empire-building which emerged in the modern period should be understood as a part of a 
generative, networked hegemony. Not a collective will, but a loose agglomeration of 
practices and rationalisations sustained by inter-societal rivalry and the apparent existence of 
civilisational difference and inequality. The global hegemony of small L liberal imperialism 
                                                          
71 E.g. Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004; Grovogui, 2006; Jones, 2006; Agathangelou & Ling, 2009; Barkawi, 2010; 
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was a generative yet uneven system of capital dispensation and social ordering. Accordingly, 
the critiques and resistance to imperial authority and imperial legitimation scripts which 
began to emerge – at first infrequently -- in the late 18th century reflected this unevenness. 
Rather than purely expressions of autogenous national identity, the narration and assertion of 
different collective identities represented both strategic and principled claims on the 
injustices of imperial-colonial order. 
 Chapter Three is the first of three empirical chapters tracing the trajectory of pan-
African and black radical discourse from WWI to the final decades of the Cold War. These 
chapters are divided chronologically, but also thematically around different articulations of 
dominant anti-imperial discourse. The first chapter in this series analyses the concept of 
civilisation as it was deployed by race leaders from two continents: particularly Du Bois, 
Marcus Garvey, Joseph Ephraim (J.E.) Casely Hayford (1866–1930), Hubert Henry Harrison, 
and Cyril Valentine Briggs. I situate this discourse in its world political context, and show 
how the concept of civilisation was deployed in a variety of ways, but always to denote some 
vision of global progress. Although this intra-elite discourse took place between black leaders 
opposed to white supremacy, divergences within it based on attitudes towards class 
consciousness demonstrate an early example of the irreducibility of anti-imperialism to ethnic 
nationalism. Ultimately these differences demonstrate a tension between political decisions 
that emphasise race leadership and race development, and those that foreground global 
cosmopolitan democracy. 
 Chapter four analyses the articulation to revolution in pan-African and black radical 
discourse. This discursive shift is characterised by a more widespread rejection of the 
imperial civilising mission, and the argument that empire is essentially a destructive and 
regressive form of political organisation. I argue that movements which helped bring about a 
rapid dissolution of the imperial-colonial order in Africa and the West Indies grew out of a 
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relatively small subculture of intellectuals centred in imperial metropoles. Thus, rather than 
anti-imperialism and anticolonialism stemming from a pre-existing and widely felt ethnic 
nationalism, these politics were products of a specific intra-elite discourse engendered by the 
imperial social world. These groups were spurred by the Italian invasion of Ethopia in 1935, 
which resulted in a strengthened conception of a transnational black public. They were also 
significantly facilitated by Leninist anti-imperialism and the Communist International 
(COMINTERN); although an important split opened between Communism and African and 
Asian anti-imperialists due to the Stalinisation of the COMINTERN. Within this discourse 
there was a divergence between those for whom revolution should be for black sovereignty 
only, and those who wanted a systemic revolution in the fabric of imperial-colonial society. 
Some of the important voices of the period I analyse are Claude McKay, Paulette Nardal 
(1896-1985), George Padmore, T. Ras Makonnen (1909-1983), Cyril Lionel Robert (C.L.R.) 
James, Frantz Fanon (1925-1961), Nnamdi Azikiwe (1904-1996), and Jomo Kenyatta (1897-
1978).               
 Chapter five analyses the discursive articulation to development and liberation. This 
articulation was enabled by global Cold War rivalries, which strongly determined a 
conception of Third World history as taking place on the same temporal terrain as American 
and Soviet history. This world political context was defined by new national elites choosing 
strategic alliances within a Cold War dynamic, rejecting old ‘revolutionary’ alliances, and 
getting drawn deeper into a new paradigm of the international state system and the logics of 
national development. However, the development logics of Third World elites were rarely 
nationalistic in the narrow sense of the term, and encompassed demands to remake the global 
economy according to more democratic and egalitarian principles.  
 Chapter six concludes by reviewing the main takeaways of the thesis, and suggests 
general ways forward for the study of empire and race in IR.   
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Chapter Two 
Imperial modernity and its others: 




Only 13 years after the independence of India, and 3 years after Ghana’s independence, 
anticolonial nationalist projects were celebrated and enshrined by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations. However, anti-imperial theorists like C.L.R. James saw that they were 
also already building towards crisis. Writing on October 23, 1961 to Carl La Corbiniere, the 
Deputy Prime Minister of the West Indies Federation (WIF), James protested Norman 
Manley’s decision to hold a public referendum on the future of the WIF. The Jamaican 
premier had ignored James’s repeated advice not to hold the referendum. Now, not only had 
Jamaica voted to leave, but the ‘political atmosphere in the WI’ had been ‘poisoned.’72
                                                          
72 Letter from James to La Corbiniere. C.L.R. James Collection, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine 
(UWI). Box 5, Folder 105.  
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 The referendum result gave Eric Williams, the first Prime Minister of James’s native 
Trinidad and Tobago, an excuse to withdraw his own nation from the federation. For James, 
Manley and William’s actions represented competition over power within the WIF. But even 
worse, abandonment of the WIF represented the collapse of a decades’ long dream to build an 
allied democratic front against the influence of imperialist capital in the West Indies.  
 Less than three years later, James published two articles in the Trinidad Evening News 
which expressed grave concern for the future of Kwame Nkrumah’s premiership in Ghana.73 
The articles came after Nkrumah had unconstitutionally dismissed a Chief Justice who had 
just exonerated five people charged with attempting to assassinate Nkrumah. For James, this 
too represented the failure of an anticolonial nationalist leader to deliver on the democratic 
promise which had been the whole point of independence from imperial rule. With a single-
minded focus on nation-building, as part of his push to build a federated United States of 
Africa, Nkrumah was driving the young nation too hard towards modernisation. As with the 
WIF, James supported pan-African federation in principle, but it would never work without a 
strict adherence to democratic accountability, which would ultimately mean state deference to 
Ghana’s multi-cultural, multi-ethnic masses.  
 The early years of West Indian and African independence have usually been 
subsumed under dominant accounts of the expansion of international society, the birth of the 
states system, and the end of empire. These narratives assume a global acquiescence to liberal 
principles of national self-determination and territorial sovereignty, a universal ratification of 
Wilson’s fourteen points envisioned decades earlier. This account is premised on a model of 
West-to-Rest diffusion, which has further enabled the assumption that formerly colonised 
nations appropriated liberal principles in order to defend authoritarian sovereignties. These 
diffusionist accounts have virtually erased histories of anti-imperial projects to build 
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federations, multilateral economic organisations, and other formal associations meant to 
address the uneven terms of the international system.  
 On the other hand, recent scholarly attempts to set the record straight have resulted in 
indirect promotions of elite nation and institution-building. Recasting anticolonial leaders 
from narrow nationalists to worldmakers effectively provides excuses for the democracy-
undermining projects of national elites. While these studies have enabled further inquiry into 
the hierarchical structure of world politics by theorising double-tiered relations, they have yet 
to include the third tier of transnational democratic politics. As a result, this scholarship 
performs a further erasure of the radical democratic and egalitarian politics of anti-imperial 
activists throughout the interwar period and after decolonisation.            
 Reframing the hierarchical relations of the 20th century as multi-tiered allows us to 
recover the discourse that I call anti-imperial globalism. Anti-imperial globalists were all 
concerned with the ideological and material underpinnings of imperial hegemony, and not 
just ending specific power relations with Western states. These concerns led them to 
challenge the world ordering of liberal empire and to push for radical democratic and 
egalitarian principles on a global scale. Understanding the trajectory of anti-imperial world 
politics first requires us to understand international order not as the sum of legitimate 
practices of a particular civilisation which became universalised, but as the world political 
arm of a historically contingent global hegemony. Second, it requires us to account for the 
various forms of unevenness that structure relations between societies, and the ways in which 
liberal hegemony serves to naturalise historically contingent hierarchies in the form of class, 
race, gender, and culture. Third, it requires us to study the dialectical dynamics between the 
‘local’ and the ‘global.’ More specifically, how global processes are concretised at the local 
level, the tensions they cause between elite institution-building and democratic decision-
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making, the various loyalties created by the uneven penetration of capital, and the ways these 
processes engender and constrain different forms of resistance and critique.  
    
2.2. Beyond diffusion: pluralising anti-imperial politics  
 
With the momentum of decolonisation building in the late 1950s and early 1960s came a rush 
of analysis from Western theorists to explain it. Chief among these interpretations was the 
framework of diffusion, which continues to orient the debate. Diffusion is the notion that 
ideological principles which belong to ‘Western civilisation’ spread from Europe to the rest 
of the world. Works published in 1960, such as On Alien Rule and Self-Government by John 
Plamenatz and From Empire to Nation by Rupert Emerson heralded a framework of diffusion 
for the post-colonial world. Seeking to explain the delegitimation of colonial rule, Plamenatz 
and Emerson concurred that Western imperialism had caused its own downfall by supplying 
a set of principles – ‘self-determination, democracy, and freedom’ – which allowed colonial 
nations to win their liberty.74  
 Two decades later, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson applied the doctrine of diffusion to 
explain the convergence of norms, values, and institutional forms within a globalising 
international society. ‘Standards of civilisation’ such as ‘right of all nations to self-
determination, the right of all states equally to sovereignty, racial equality, the duty of rich 
nations to assist poor, were all ideas present, or at least implicit, in the liberal political 
tradition of the Western countries.’ Decolonisation could be largely explained by ‘the impact 
of this tradition on the beliefs of Western-educated leaders of Asian and African countries.’75 
However, Bull and Watson used the same analysis to explain the divergence of norms and 
values within their own post-colonial context. Primarily, Bull was concerned with what he 
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P a g e  | 40 
 
called ‘the revolt against the West’, which was also a revolt against a universalised Western 
civilisation and its right to order the world.76 Bull attributed post-colonial despotism, in part, 
to non-Western rejection of Western values, to the fact that Third World states had ‘been 
freer to adopt a different rhetoric that sets Western values aside.’77 
 For Bull, international order is not a static object or a historical accident, but an 
ongoing practice of organisation, re-enforcement, and adjustment. The purpose of order is to 
maintain favourable conditions for the social intercourse of states: sovereignty, coordinated 
action, and the minimization of violence.78 Colonies, for Bull and Watson, rather than being 
extensions of international society, represent that which is excluded or ‘outside’ international 
society.79 ‘Western norms and values’ are essentialised as ‘good’, or as representing an 
essentially legitimate and benevolent form of hegemony (see also Doyle, 1986: 20). Failure 
to recognise the colonies as already an extension of international society was not due to any 
trait of Western civilisation, but to the colonies initially providing poor conditions for 
Western norms and values. It is only when ‘Westernised’ colonial elites learned these values 
through imperial channels that they were able to demand and win their inclusion in 
international society.80 
 The diffusion framework has done a lot to obfuscate and occlude historical and 
theoretical analysis of anti-imperialism. I refer to the analytical assumption which structures 
the debate around diffusion as civilisational ordering. Civilisational ordering operates, on one 
hand, on the belief that world politics should be managed according to a set of rules, values, 
and norms, and on the other that the world is divided into rival civilisations, and the social 
                                                          
76 Bull, 1984; see Hobson, 2012: 229 
77 Quoted in ibid. 
78 Bull, 1977: 4, 8 
79 Bull and Watson, 1984 
80 Similar arguments have been reproduced and embellished outside ‘the English School’ by liberal 
constructivists. See Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Philpott, 2001; Crawford, 2002.  
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codes used to establish order derive from self-contained, sui generis civilisations. I refer to 
the politics which arise from an ontology of rival civilisations as civilisationism. 
 The obfuscation of hierarchy works in three ways. First is through an ahistorical 
notion that the transition from empire to nation-state was ‘seamless and inevitable.’81 The 
diffusionist story of state sovereignty’s global approval effectively erases the political 
histories of anticolonial thinkers and movements, many of whom viewed decolonisation as 
either a revolutionary upending of Western global hegemony,82 or as a threat to the 
possibility of reforming relations with the West along egalitarian principles.83 This story also 
facilitates the ‘failed states’ ideology, which legitimates continued intervention of Western 
powers.84 The logic goes that because the West is the assumed standards bearer of 
international norms, it has the right and duty to assess latecomers and discipline them 
accordingly.    
 The second obfuscation is the analytical bifurcation of ideas and material power. 
While this is a more general problem of mainstream IR theory,85 it takes on particular 
significance in the context of empire-colony relations. In defining the divide between 
Western order and non-Western disorder in terms of essentialised values and norms, 
civilisational ordering obfuscates how hegemonic orders are arranged for the purpose of 
reproducing hierarchies which protect imperial capital. For example, Anthony Anghie (2007) 
shows that sovereignty was always an important feature of imperial-colonial ordering, 
demarcating indigenous peoples as both subject to the law of nations and ineligible for its 
protections due to their political and cultural otherness. This was not primarily for the 
purpose of ethnic humiliation, but to extend European power in order to make European 
states rich.  
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 Hierarchy is obscured a third way through an analytical bias which privileges ethnic 
and cultural political leaders over forms of racial, class, and gender hierarchy internal to 
groups. The sole focus on elite representatives can reproduce a civilisationist ontology, and 
can lead to self-orientalism, or the appropriation and inversion of stereotypes about ‘non-
Western’ civilisations in order to carve out autonomous space for ethnicised authority (Said, 
1979). Against the claim that non-Western civilisations cannot order because of inferior 
values, comes the counter-claim that they can, and that those values will make them just as 
good ‘orderers’ – if not better – than the West. This can lead to the inclusion of non-Western 
values which are seen to be more amenable to hegemonic international order, and the 
marginalisation of other non-Western values deemed destabilising.86  
 Even recent scholarship which has attempted to nuance and pluralise the 
historiography of anticolonial nationalism remains stuck in this way. For example, Getachew 
(2019) presents a convincing and welcome argument that the anticolonial nationalisms of 
Caribbean and African thinkers were not inert and narrow, but should be judged as attempts 
at worldmaking. She correctly argues that activist theorists like Du Bois, Padmore, Nkrumah, 
and Eric Williams were not building nations as ends in themselves, but were initiating 
international projects meant to address the disparities within international society. 
 However, against her own intentions, Getachew ends up valorising the democracy-
undermining projects of elite worldmakers by focussing entirely on the activities of racial – 
i.e. civilisational -- representatives. Instead of opening possibilities for a truly transnational 
approach to the problems of post-colonial politics, Getachew reinscribes R.B.J. Walker’s 
(1993) ‘inside/outside’ divide between ‘the international problem of hierarchy’ and ‘the 
internal question of pluralism and diversity.’87 Critiques of elite nationalism, such as those by 
Fanon, James, Lorde, Glissant, or even Du Bois in his later years, are mostly missing from 
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Getachew’s analysis. These writers did not accept that hierarchy was simply an inter-
governmental problem which was separate from ‘internal’ problems of pluralism and 
diversity. Getachew is correct that worldmakers like Kwame Nkrumah or Norman Manley 
were concerned with establishing an international norm of non-domination. However, her 
framing does not sufficiently address the problem that international non-domination built on 
‘domestic’ domination of cultural minorities not only reproduced the logics of empire, but it 
also undermined the moral upper hand and strategic alliances between oppressed groups 
represented by the transnational solidarity of radical activists pushing for greater democratic 
controls on global capitalism. The democratic scale required to address problems of 
international hierarchy was, and is, transnational, making pluralism and diversity not just the 
province of national elites, but the concern of any group attempting to build solidarities and 
alliances to address global ills.              
          In agreement with the view that anti-imperialism is worldmaking, but against 
civilisational ordering, I argue that a major animating impetus of anti-imperialism was the 
desire to remake the world in order to enable the continual formation of pro-democratic 
alliances beyond national or civilisational boundaries. As a broader discourse, anti-
imperialism was not just about negative right to freedom from alien rule, but about 
democratic access to the international realm of politics and the global economy.88 Within the 
anti-imperial discourses which began in the interwar period, there was a fundamental tension 
over where the authorisation of democratic right would come from: post-colonial states or the 
international proletariat. While worldmakers like Nkrumah or Manley wished to build the 
capacity of post-colonial nation-states, critics like Fanon or James also wished to radically 
extend the franchise of global democracy.      
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 As C.L.R. James argued in a lecture series in August, 1960, the increasingly global 
penetration of capital gave rise to a need for new forms of political and economic unification 
beyond the national state. ‘National capitalistic states’ were already in the process of 
unification, with new states in the formerly colonised world in danger of simply replicating a 
political form which was quickly becoming subordinate to the demands of the world 
market.89 Presaging Quinn Slobodian’s (2018) recent argument about the symbiosis of free 
market ideologues and nation-states, James saw that  
 
[A]t a certain stage capitalism begins to run to the government for salvation. 
Government also begins to enclose its production within the national boundaries 
because of war and tariffs. The capitalist, as soon as he gets into trouble, runs to the 
government and says, “Look how many people I am feeding, and look at the value of 
the production that I am producing for the benefit of the country. I am in a crisis. I am 
in difficulties owing to no fault of my own, but these miserable people in the other 
countries are under-selling me. They are paying their workers very little. Look how 
much I am paying mine. I would be glad if you could give me a subsidy of some kind.” 
And as he has helped to put the government into power, the government looks into the 
matter and appoints a commission and tells the commission to examine the industry 
rigorously and give him the subsidy he wants. He takes hold of the subsidy and, 
especially if an election is near, he goes to his political party, passes a little bit to them, 
and tells them to be careful to say how government interference is ruining capitalist 
production all over the world.90   
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 For James, the unification of states into larger federations was a particular means to a 
more important end: the creation of radical democratic controls on the world market and the 
global promotion of egalitarianism as justice. The most important question of the post-
colonial world was not which civilization should have the right to impose order, but ‘who’ – 
as in which class – ‘will control the world market?’91 Because the national state’s democratic 
accountability was compromised by capital, James believed that a progressive form of 
unification could only be achieved ‘by a social class which, from its very position in industry 
and the structure of society, can reach out to others of the same class in other countries.’ As I 
discuss further in Chapters 4 and 5, James was not of the opinion that states could be 
abandoned entirely, but it was a necessity that ‘[m]ankind… leave behind the outmoded 
bourgeois class and all the obstacles which the national state now places in the way of an 
international socialist order.’92 
 Importantly, ‘international socialist order’ was not West-to-Rest diffusion, nor just a 
scaling-up of the state-civil society relationship, but a new global order built on the 
coordination of different national and sub-national organisations, each working through its 
own sociohistorically particular processes of cultural, political, and economic change. 
Writing favourably of Julius Nyerere’s Tanzania in 1969, James argued that no Western 
thinker – not ‘Plato or Aristotle, Rousseau or Karl Marx’ -- had yet dared propose a national 
society so radically progressive.93 Yet it was necessary to stress the particular ‘African-ness’ 
of Nyerere’s progressivism, because  
 
from the beginning of the contact between Western civilization and Africa, it has been 
the almost universal practice to treat African achievement, discoveries and creations as 
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if Western civilization was the norm and the African people spent their years in 
imitating, trying to reach or, worse still, if necessary going through the primitive early 
stages of the Western world.94 
 
 Anti-imperial globalism is not an alternative analytical framework to civilisationism, 
but a neglected critical problematic which requires an alternative frame of analysis to become 
visible. Civilisationism and the framework of West-to-Rest diffusion ultimately obfuscate the 
inter-societal character of world politics and the hierarchical structure of international order. 
A hierarchical order which ‘ensured that non-European states were not afforded the full rights 
of membership in international society’ after decolonisation.95 For anti-imperial theorists like 
James, international order was multi-tiered. Imperial nation-states and transnational capital 
comprised one tier, the transnational proletariat another, and the anticolonial nationalist elite, 
he hoped, would be able to serve as a force to protect the interests of the latter against the 
former. 
              
2.3. Generative empire: imperialism and the modern mode of power 
 
Hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses are not binary and autonomous, but built on 
dialectical relationships characterised by differentiation and co-constitution. Differentiation 
makes it necessary to distinguish between counter-imperial politics and anti-imperial politics. 
Both are categories of counter-hegemonic critique, with the first corresponding to a range of 
calls for imperial and colonial reform, and the second to various calls for abolition of 
imperial and colonial practice. (However, reform and abolition should be imagined as 
positions on a continuum, not necessarily as opposites). Counter-hegemonic politics cannot 
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speak from an ‘autonomous zone’ uncontaminated by hegemony, but must do so with respect 
to shared terms, categories, and sociohistorical conditions.96 Hegemony is not autonomous 
either, but can be shaped and transformed by counter-hegemonic resistance and critique. 
While hegemony limits the utopian scale of counter-hegemonic political action, counter-
hegemonic politics can coerce or persuade hegemony to self-adjust.97 
 The anti-imperial politics which arose in reaction to the globalisation of liberal 
capitalism from about the middle of the 19th century differed from those of earlier periods. 
The transition to global modernity was not an epochal rupture, but was ‘gradual and 
uneven.’98 Many aspects of anti-imperial critique and resistance after the globalisation of 
liberal capitalism had antecedents in prior moments. Non-European responses to liberalism 
and European success – many of them favourable and emulative -- predate the period of 
widespread European expansion.99 Challenges to the ethno-cultural chauvinism of Europeans 
and the maltreatment of non-European peoples are as old as the so-called ‘Age of Discovery.’ 
European thinkers like Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), Bartolomé de las Casas (1484(?)-
1566), and Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) all wrote passionately against racial 
hierarchy and imperial force. The ‘Age of Revolution’ from 1789-1848, to use Eric 
Hobsbawm’s (1988) periodization, saw mobilisations of liberal ideology to challenge 
monarchical ‘mercantilism’ and imperial conquest.100 This period also saw major colonial 
confrontations, such as the Haitian Revolution of 1791-1804, the American Revolution, and 
the gradual decolonisation of much of South America. These conflicts mobilised 
combinations of new productive and communication technologies, transnational networks, 
coercive and ideological forces in forms which looked similar to those of global modernity 
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full-blown.101 So what was different about anti-imperial politics in the age of global 
modernity?   
 The important difference for the purposes of this thesis is the increased perception 
during the modern period that ‘Europe’ constituted a hegemonic civilisation, which had a 
right to order the world and direct the destinies of other civilisations.102 This further 
established a picture of the world in which contingent hierarchies between different human 
groups could be read into nature. This perception was enabled and promoted by the 
globalisation of market capitalism, the rationalisations inherent to the modern mode of 
power,103 and the expansion of liberal, and nominally illiberal, European empires.104 
 By ‘liberalism’ I am invoking a particular definition which is not necessarily 
reducible to the forms of economic laissez-faire and plural political contestation associated 
with representative democracies. Instead, liberalism here is defined in terms of an ontology of 
inter-state relations: where the state is viewed in dominant social imaginaries as the sovereign 
owner of territory, the arbiter of ‘internal’ pluralism, and a contractual party with the right to 
enter into contract relations with other rights-holding parties.105 Liberalism thus refers to a 
form of relationality between political communities, and not necessarily to the form of 
governance by which any particular political community identifies or operates.     
As Buzan and Lawson (2015) define it, ‘global modernity’ emerged through a constellation 
of political expansion, productive practice, and dominant ideology.106 Industrialisation, 
rational state building, and ideologies of progress allowed a collection of European empires 
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to gain an enormous advantage over others in the 19th century. Like never before, significant 
disparities in wealth and power were felt between societies as well as within. While a few 
European monarchies had gained prominence even earlier,107 this ‘modern mode of power’ 
produced a global division premised on ‘civilisational’ – and also racialised – hierarchy.108 
 For most of the mid to late-19th century, liberal hegemony had really been the 
hegemony of two states, Great Britain and France, with the United States emerging as a third 
liberal hegemon later. Modern Britain and France were virtually unmatched until about 1870 
when the German Reich rose to defeat France in the Franco-Prussian War. France and Britain 
had built vast empires through commercial imperial enterprises and wars of expansion, 
eventually formalising quasi-feudal relations with overseas territories. Along with other 
imperial players like Germany, Belgium, and Portugal, Britain and France attempted to 
regulate their own competition for overseas possessions through a series of congresses 
beginning in 1815.109 Internal European organisation ultimately failed to prevent world war 
between the imperial powers, after which, fascist and communist counter-hegemons rose to 
challenge the war’s nominally democratic victors. 
 In employing the term ‘hegemony’ I am not only referring to a state of prominence, 
but to a networked politics of world ordering. My use of hegemony therefore aligns with the 
critical tradition of Gramsci, Perry Anderson, Robert Cox, and Stuart Hall, and not 
hegemonic stability theorists like Kindleberger (1986) or Gilpin (1988). Hegemony in the 
critical sense is both a direct and diffuse, coercive and productive form of power.110 
Hegemony is ‘inherently interventionist’ in that, through its agents, it interfaces with its 
historical conditions, strategizes, and implements policies to justify and reproduce itself.111 
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Hegemony is also scalable, in that it can refer to the dominion of a particular empire,112 to the 
upper hand gained by a revolutionary group, such as the Bolsheviks after 1917,113 or to ‘the 
prevailing order of the world.’114 Hegemony utilises some combination of authority through 
acquiescence – or ‘domination’ in Weber’s usage115 – and force, or tacit threat of force.116 
One channel of hegemony’s rule through acquiescence is its ideological reproduction through 
mass culture, media, and education. Race ideology, for example, can be reproduced through 
mass representations of ethnicity.117  
 Hegemonic liberal imperialism proceeded through a specific ‘regime of power’ which 
promoted and enforced certain ideological principles.118 These principles included the belief 
that ‘free trade’ between highly unequal societies was not imperialism, but its antidote; that 
liberal reform and cultivation of ‘higher’ culture represented progress; and that all societies 
should be integrated into the global market economy in some way, with all meant to play by 
the same rules even if they did not enjoy equal protections.119 The realisation of these 
principles often legitimated interventionist politics.   
 In the 1860s, the civilizing mission was less the concern of British parliamentarians – 
who would have rather not spent Treasury money ‘civilizing’ Africans -- than 
missionaries.120 By the turn of the century, the British imperial state saw itself as a liberal 
democracy and a force for good in the world. Some historians have attached the transition to 
the Edwardian period in British history to this ‘second British Empire.’121 However, ‘the 
civilizing mission’ ideology which served to legitimate imperial intervention was expressed 
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as a range of policies which changed over time, and there is some discrepancy over when or 
if the civilising mission was abandoned as a moral project.122 This could have something to 
do with a lag or unevenness in the application of new rationales, or even heterogeneous 
opinion amongst imperial authorities. Karuna Mantena shows that ‘sociological 
understandings of subject societies’ had begun to replace ‘moral justifications’ for imperial 
rule in India by the latter half of the nineteenth century.123 The sociological interpretations of 
non-European ‘backwardness’ by imperial theorists like John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) created 
alibis for empire, supplying a ‘scientific’ justification for the failure of empire to sufficiently 
‘civilise’ subject populations. According to this logic, ‘a savage or barbarous society, unable 
to either suppress immediate instincts or conceptualize long-term interests, was 
fundamentally incapable of the organization and discipline necessary for the development of 
the division, for commerce and manufacture, and for military achievement—in short, for 
civilization.’124   
 From this premise, Henry Maine’s (1822-1888) theory of ‘traditional society’ helped 
inform new policies of indirect rule, and to enshrine the ‘native’ as a political and juridical 
category.125 Under new rubrics of traditional society and indirect rule, highly educated 
colonial subjects in Asia and Africa were reclassified as ‘trousered natives’ who had ‘aped 
the trappings of Western culture without ever really understanding it.’ Africans who had held 
senior positions in colonial governance, medicine, law, and journalism in the 1880s had 
nearly all been culled from middle class professions by the turn of the twentieth century.126 
Meanwhile, representatives of ‘traditional societies’ could rule with relative autonomy over 
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local communities. Colonial officials who believed themselves experts on native culture were 
often open to manipulation by these representatives.127     
 Thus, imperial capital and liberal ideology were dispensed unevenly in the colonies. 
The result of unevenness was the generation, transformation, and differentiation of societies. 
As Amílcar Cabral argued, writing for a UNESCO conference in 1972, ‘imperialist capital’ 
had ‘imposed new kind of relations on the indigenous society, imparting to it a more complex 
structure, and engendered, fostered, sharpened, or resolved contradictions and social 
conflicts… it gave birth to new nations based on human groupings or peoples at different 
stages of development.’128 Imperial unevenness gave counter-imperial critique and anti-
imperial resistance an internally ‘classed’ character, which fundamentally shaped the 
dynamics of decolonisation throughout the 20th century and after.   
 In referring to ‘modern’, ‘liberal’, ‘European’ empire as global hegemony, I am not 
attributing to it a collective, monolithic will situated in a transhistorical Europe. I do not 
subscribe to a grand theory of ‘coloniality.’129 There is no single Europe, liberalism, or 
modernity which is reducible to the worst practices of empire and colonialism.130 The 
globalisation and hegemony of market capitalism does not belong to one civilisation, but 
comprises globally-dispersed networks of practices, laws, power relations, and legitimating 
rationalisations.131  
 Yet, the complexity of liberal imperial hegemony does not immunise it from serving 
as a concrete referent. Liberal imperial politics have produced and reproduced worldwide 
effects, and are therefore a shared reference point for multiple generations of anti-imperial 
thinkers. Rather than flattening liberal imperial hegemony, it is necessary to account for its 
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internal complexities and mutations over time, a pursuit which also helps us to pluralise and 
historicise anti-imperial world politics.  
 
2.4. The structure of anti-imperial counter-discourse  
 
2.4.1. A modern discourse 
 
The counter-hegemonic politics of anti-imperial activists and intellectuals did not begin and 
end with specific relations with Western states, but as a response to the underlying ideologies, 
rationalisations, and overriding practices of the modern mode of power. Counter-hegemonic 
anti-imperialism was also envisaged and practiced on a global scale, and thus comprised 
projects to utilise, as well as subvert and displace, networked hegemonic power. Critics 
representing colonial peripheries or metropolitan ethnic minorities initially attempted to avoid 
weak, inert forms of national sovereignty, and sought to remake the world through new 
alliances, international organisations, and federated polities.132 
 In these aspects, anticolonial nationalism and anti-imperial globalism should be 
understood as modern discourses. My definition of what constitutes a modern discourse is 
more expansive than other studies which have theorised the relationship between anti-
imperialism and modernity. As outlined in the previous section, modernity describes a world 
system of relations between ethnic and culturally-defined societies characterised in terms of 
unprecedented inequality. Modernity comprises, what Manu Goswami calls, a ‘historical-
geographical field’: ‘a multi-form, differentiated, and profoundly uneven global space-time 
engendered by the deepening and widening of colonial territorial and capitalist expansion 
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during the last third of the nineteenth century.’133 It is also a site of ‘material and symbolic 
struggles’, where social forms, ideologies, and categories spread and are contested across 
relations of varying interdependence.134 A modern discourse is therefore a site of political 
dialogue which is enabled and constrained by the shared yet highly unequal historical-
geographical field. The nation-state, when analysed through this lens, can neither be reduced 
to a generic form of political organisation which emerged through objective processes of 
social development, a social form which has been imposed upon a passive society, nor the 
end result of an epochal struggle characterised by the total failure of the weaker society to 
reinvent itself. Though it attains its premises from concrete referents -- material and political 
institutions and practices -- the nation-state is a discourse, an ongoing process of identity 
negotiation and assertion, which is heavily determined by the constantly developing social 
and material relations with other societies.135    
 In this conception, attempts by some scholars to replace modernity and the global 
nation-state ontology with indigenous universalisms and the pre-modern practices of non-
Western societies are not external to modern discourse. As Dipesh Chakrabarty writes in a 
critique of Ashis Nandy, the political impetus to replace ‘myth for history, tradition for 
modernity, wisdom and intellect for science and intelligence’ is a form of ‘decisionism’, 
which ‘entails the same kind of heroic self-invention that has characterized the modern in 
Europe.’136 Postcolonial scholars have sometimes interpreted the post-colonial condition in 
terms of a bifurcation between hegemonic modernity and cultural authenticity. This 
scholarship sometimes presents legacies of imperial unevenness as having preserved 
particular spaces -- although officially within the boundaries of modern, liberal, post-colonial 
states -- from hegemonic liberal modernity. In these spaces, European empires and post-
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colonial rulers achieved ‘dominance without hegemony.’137 This condition produced a Janus-
faced subject position for elites. Looking ‘out’, elites constructed a nationalist historiography 
in order to oppose the subjugation of their Western rulers, matching ‘the alien colonialist 
project of appropriation’ with ‘an indigenous nationalist project of counter-appropriation.’138 
Looking ‘in’, elites held no more sway over these autonomous zones than had their imperial 
rulers: ‘[b]ecause liberal capital never acquired hegemony, the ruling class has never been 
able to authentically speak for “the nation.”’139 
 Yet, these autonomous zones remained constantly under threat of ‘deterritorialisation’ 
and ‘deculturation’ from post-colonial states acting on behalf of global capital and modern 
standards of statehood.140 Anti-Eurocentric scholars often understand this conflict as between 
modernity and tradition, or between two forms of modernity, depending on how the argument 
is formulated. One modernity reproduces the logics of global hegemonic liberalism, and the 
other preserves ‘local’ authenticity, both in terms of categories of thought and productive 
practice. These ‘places of otherness’, to borrow a phrase from Gyan Prakash, are resources 
from which to contest the fundamental assumptions of hegemonic liberal politics and 
nationalist historiography.141   
 Although formulations of hegemony/authenticity have often been based in a spatial 
ontology of ancestral lands and territorialised tradition, more recent formulations attempt to 
remove the territorial element. For example, Robbie Shilliam (2011; 2015; 2016; 2017) 
argues that modernity was ruptured in the slave societies of the West Indies. Thus, ‘other’ 
‘hybrid’ modernities composed of imported West African cultural traditions, creole slave 
cultures, and the communities of escaped slaves, or ‘maroons’, also provide ‘places of 
otherness’ from which to imagine alternatives to hegemonic liberal politics. Butler and 
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Athanasiou (2013) appear to go even further, arguing that political claims to territory are 
themselves ‘hallmarks’ of hegemonic liberal capitalism, and therefore new forms of 
‘performative politics’ drawn from Western and non-Western struggles must replace old 
battles over territorial rights.142 
 Instead of attempting to uphold the analytical autonomy of non-colonial social and 
cultural space, I argue that it was precisely those questions of how to incorporate difference 
into new solidarities and institutions that made up the substance of anti-imperial activists’ 
worldmaking projects. Critical postcolonial inquiry into world politics is itself a counter-
hegemonic practice, and is therefore usually obliged to position itself in contradistinction to 
‘mainstream’, ‘Western’ scholarship. In practice, this has produced critical literature which 
can reproduce the spatial and ethnicised imaginary of the diffusion framework. Some 
postcolonial scholarship posits ‘autonomous zones’ outside of the diffusion of ‘Western 
civilization’, some posits hybrid formations such as ‘Buddhist IR’ or ‘Confucian capitalism.’ 
Such interventions employ that which needs to be better understood: the politicisation of 
ethnic and cultural difference, and the related difficulty in building strategic alliances 
between ascriptive groups.   
 Deep structural hierarchies bolstered by race, culture, and gender differentiation were 
not always neglected by ‘Westernised’ anti-imperial activists, but formed the content and 
horizons of possibility for anti-imperial strategy and collaboration. Different imperial, 
counter-imperial, and anti-imperial discourses were coproduced, as Manu Goswami writes, 
‘within a common, if asymmetrically structured, social field.143 To suggest otherwise is to 
overlook how claims of difference and identity exist within a dialectical relationship, which 
not only underwrote the contentious processes of decolonisation, but also the strategic 
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alliance-building and worldmaking viewed as essential to disabling the possibility of future 
imperial encroachment after the formal end of empire.   
   
2.4.2. Colonial recognition and imperial dialectics 
 
Recognition of the legal personality of ‘the native’ was a central aspect of the modern 
expansion of European empire. Moral comportment to non-Christians, the remit of law to 
protect commercial interests outside state territory, and the right of the state to wage war were 
all aspects of international society theorised by 16th and 17th century writers with respect to 
imperial encounters.144 The ideas of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) in particular, devised to 
enable Dutch treaty alliances with East Indian rulers against the Portuguese, allowed for the 
expansion of commercial relations with non-Christians to include legal relations.145 By the 
modern period, inclusion of non-Europeans into the law of nations reflected uneven and 
selective integration.146 Treaties between imperial patrons and colonial clients ‘presupposed a 
common legal universe to which both parties adhered.’147 Subjugated non-Europeans 
dispossessed by imperial expansion were also drawn into the common legal universe, but 
were ruled by a ‘logic of exclusion-inclusion.148 This logic both recognised the potential of 
natives to achieve the standard of civilization and punished them for deviating from the 
standard in practice.149 Thus, colonial recognition was qualified by normalisation: a form of 
disciplining where power grants itself permission to apply an ‘exceptional policy to bring the 
deviation closer to the norm.’ 150 
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 At the height of the British Empire in the late 19th century, this international hierarchy 
which was ‘internal to the very development of the legal regimes that came to govern 
international relations’, could be justified in terms of racial difference.151 The international 
dispersal of Europeans through settlement, and the global phenomenon of non-European 
subjugation and resistance to European expansion spread and reinforced the notion that 
‘white’ symbolised a race of civilizers in a world of races to be civilised. Liberal advocacy of 
empire as a training ground for uncivilised races lived in tension with other views which cast 
doubt on whether this was really possible.152 This tension characterised the turn to indirect 
rule, and the greater concern with the management of colonised populations than their 
evolution into civilised equals.153 Although it had local variants, the management of 
uncivilised races was practiced and theorised as a transnational issue. For example, the 
question of how to train African-Americans for their integration into the American economy 
was linked to a ‘transnational problem of how to rule large black populations.’154 As 
Getachew argues, W.E.B. Du Bois’s comment in 1900 that ‘the problem of the twentieth 
century is the problem of the color-line’ was ‘not only an empirical description of a world in 
which Europe was dominant but also a reference to how a set of ideologies and practices of 
racial domination, emerging out of the experience of New World slavery, were 
internationalized.’155 
 However, imperial uneven integration in the modern period was often about the 
intersecting categories of class and race. As is discussed in the next chapter, Du Bois was 
equally concerned with the colour bar as the colour-line: the limits imposed on black 
populations for entry into existing social, professional, and political hierarchies. Throughout 
his life, Du Bois remained an energetic defender of world civilisation as a telos to be 
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achieved through the cultural education of non-European peoples and the global adaption of 
modern forms of political, economic, and social organisation. His commitments in this 
respect rendered him an elitist, and an unrepresentative member of the black race, in the eyes 
of some black leaders in the United States, the Caribbean, and continental Africa. Employing 
the logics of a counter-hegemonic discourse, Du Bois, as well as many other nationalist 
leaders, were often obliged to reverse the signs of white superiority and non-white inferiority 
rather than reject these essentialisms entirely. The supposed characteristic traits of ethno-
cultural personalities thus became contested symbols for deeper struggles over political 
inclusion and social and economic justice. For Partha Chatterjee, the reversal of signs is an 
early stage of any nationalist discourse, meant to appropriate and invert the essentialisms of 
the coloniser. Thus, the claim that Europeans are rational and material while non-Europeans 
are spiritual and cultural is appropriated as a positive collective identity against the colonising 
other.156  
 This is a problem for scholars who want to reduce conflict and cooperation between 
societies to recognition and non-recognition. Take as an example Frost’s normative theory of 
world politics, which is based on a colour-blind reading of Hegelian co-constitution: 
 
The relationship of mutual valuation is not a contractual type of relationship in which 
one individual approaches another and says, “I’ll value you, if you’ll value me.” In the 
contractual perspective the parties do indeed only value one another as individuals who 
can make contracts. But constitutive theory understands mutual valuation in a different 
way. Individiuality only becomes a value where it is the case that two or more people 
do, through their reciprocal recognition of one another, give concrete practical 
expression to valuing one another, rather than through merely saying that they value 
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one another. Thus the task for normative theory become the one of showing how we as 
individuals are constituted as such through our participation in a particular set of social, 
economic and political institutions which in turn are grounded in our adherence to 
certain norms.157  
 
Frost’s theory neglects how ‘certain norms’ and the institutions they sustain can codify highly 
unequal forms of mutual valuation: for example, Hegel’s own master/slave dialectic which 
was probably inspired by the slave uprisings in Haiti.158  
 Reading the imperial-colonial encounter into this formulation emphasises the need to 
account for what the other is being recognised as. For Inayatullah and Blaney, after 
Todorov159, colonial recognition stems from an archetypal colonial encounter, where the 
agents of European Christendom arrived in the ‘new world’ to face an existential challenge 
from the mere existence of the Amerindian. Rather than ‘embrace’ the ‘ambiguity’ of contact 
with such radical difference, which ‘seemed to open the possibility of alternative political and 
ethical understandings, challenging existing constructions of self and other and threatening 
degeneration into disorder’, the Christian European split himself in two and attributed his less 
desirable traits to the other. The Amerindian was designated the qualities of the wild savage, 
the Christian European the rational civiliser.’160  
 Colonial recognition refers to the different ways in which hierarchies in social 
relations can be reproduced despite the appearance of, or rhetorical adherence to, formal 
equality. Notions that certain social identities are better suited to specific roles and positions 
within a socioeconomic hierarchy become naturalised through their reproduction. Thus, 
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mutual recognition between subjects is determined by the role that each subject is meant to 
fill within (international) society and the (global) economy. The reproduction of colonial 
recognition is ideological and material. It is also a multi-scalar relation in that it operates 
within the context of inter-state relations and is linked dual-directionally to inter-personal 
relations within societies. For example, the ability of post-colonial states to govern, or the 
ways in which they govern, are assessed through gendered and ethnicised stereotypes which 
are reflected in particular societies.161 
  While Inayatullah and Blaney’s is a stark binary between civilised and savage, 
colonial recognition can also apply to forms of essentialism which elevate the native as a 
being more spiritual, moral, or guileless than the coloniser. Here, the native is recognised as 
being superior to the coloniser, but only at certain roles determined by their function within a 
connected economy and symbolic order. The archetypal example of this is not Columbus’s 
meeting with the Amerindians, but the turn to higher-valued African slave labour by 1720. As 
Eric Wolfe argues, different rationales for why Amerindians were less well-suited to slavery 
than Africans – proximity to free Amerindians, Amerindian military support of English 
colonists against French and Spanish rivals, and the use of Amerindians in retrieving African 
maroons – became articulated to the claim that Africans made ‘better and more reliable 
workers.’162 With the signs of inferior and superior reversed, the native is still denied a 
multidimensional humanity and an equal social existence.  
 This is partly why, for Frantz Fanon, a nativist embrace of traditional culture could 
reproduce the forms of social alienation experienced under colonisation. Fanon defined 
colonisation as a specific kind of war, where the arrestment – not necessarily the death – of 
native culture is a tool of domination. Cultural and racial chauvinism are not the primary 
concern of empire. Rather, it is the ‘gigantic business’ of ‘colonial war’ that makes ‘the 
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enslavement… of the native population’ the ‘prime necessity.’ Colonial enslavement required 
that native populations’ cultural ‘systems of reference’ had to be ‘broken.’ This is not initially 
chauvinism for its own sake, but a ‘condition’ which accompanies and legitimates 
‘[e]xpropriation, spoliation, raids, objective murder.’163 Colonialism did not necessarily lead 
to the death of native culture. ‘On the contrary’, Fanon stated, it takes a culture ‘once living 
and open to the future’ and renders it ‘closed, fixed in the colonial status, caught in the yoke 
of oppression’. Subverting Hegelian recognition, empire made it impossible ‘for a man to 
evolve otherwise than within the framework of a culture that recognizes him and that he 
decides to assume.’164  Because native culture had been systematically arrested by the 
coloniser, reclaiming it was part of a dialectic response to oppression, and a necessary stage 
to building a revolutionary social formation. However, this could also result in the new 
regime becoming stuck in a retrograde cultural inertia, and cause the momentum for social 
transformation to stagnate. Failing to overcome particularism would mean that newly 
independent nations would fail to integrate into larger, unified federations, and therefore 
remain susceptible to new forms of colonialism, authoritarianism, and division. In a reply to 
his admirer, the Iranian political thinker, Ali Shariati, Fanon wrote, ‘I respect your view that 
in the Third World… Islam, more than any other social and ideological force, has had an anti-
colonialist capacity and an anti-Western nature.’ However, he concluded, ‘I, for one, fear that 
the fact of revitalizing the spirit of sectarianism and religion may result in a setback for a 
nation that is engaged in the process of becoming, of distancing itself from its future and 
immobilizing it in its past.’165   
 Anti-imperialism was therefore never just about legislating a norm of mutual 
recognition between unequal societies, but about demonstrating shared humanity by 
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defeating and surpassing whites and Europeans. Famously, Fanon saw violence as a means to 
achieve this: where the colonized subject would take the place of the European settler through 
armed insurgency. An earlier version of this sentiment appears in Du Bois’s classic text, the 
Souls of Black Folk. Du Bois defined his own social position both in terms of ‘double-
consciousness’ and ‘the Veil’: the former describing a subjectivity straddling the black and 
white worlds, and the latter a lived social reality created by the interdependent yet 
incommensurable relation between the two worlds. Du Bois expressed the wish to use his 
self-awareness, social insight, and talent to escape the dichotomy of the Veil – neither 
relegating himself to the (black) ‘prison-house’ within the veil, nor attempting to join the 
world of false white superiority outside it – but to tear it down and live ‘above it in a region 
of blue sky and great wandering shadows.’166 Du Bois was best able to do this, he wrote, 
when he could beat his white peers ‘at examination-time, or beat them at a foot-race, or even 
beat their stringy heads.’167 Even Gandhi, the arch resistor of modernity and advocate of non-
violence, was not above this sentiment. Writing of the outcome of the Russo-Japanese of 
1904-05, Ghandi wrote that the Japanese had made the Russians ‘bite the dust on the 
battlefield.’ And ‘the peoples of the East will never, never again submit to insult from the 
insolent whites.’168 
 Claims that non-European societies were capable of outpacing Europeans at various 
modern practices involved forms of self-essentialism. For example, some argued that 
colonised populations had the potential to surpass Europeans because they had developed a 
higher stage of modernity through their unique social and historical experience. In an early 
essay, The Case for West Indian Self-Government, C.L.R. James wrote 
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The bulk of the population of these West Indian islands, over eighty per cent [sic], 
consists of Negroes or persons of Negroid origin. They are the descendants of those 
African slaves who were brought almost continuously to the West Indies until the slave 
trade was stopped in 1807. Cut off from all contact with Africa for a century and a 
quarter, they present today the extraordinary spectacle of a people who, in language and 
social customs, religion, education and outlook are essentially Western and, indeed, far 
more advanced in Western culture than many a European community.169 
 
 While more sophisticated than biological explanations of ethnic and cultural 
otherness, sociohistorical development claims still attempted to code whole groups of people 
according to generic attributes. Thus self-representation was essentialism – even if ‘strategic 
essentialism.’170 Claims that colonised populations had/have the potential to become better 
democrats, liberals, socialists, etc. because of their unique historical experience often fail to 
account for the fact that such claims are elicited through a dialectical relationship between 
hegemon and counter-hegemon. This is reproduced in the work of some contemporary 
scholars who take theorists like Fanon primarily as a source of ‘epistemic blackness’, without 
fully addressing his concerns about essentialism. For example, the philosopher Lewis R. 
Gordon writes that ‘Fanon’s body… is a subtext of all his writings…. Anxiety over 
embodiment is a dimension of Western civilization against which Fanon was in constant 
battle. The body, he laments, is a denied presence, and black people are a denied people.171 
Gordon thus associates black or colonised identity with a particular way of thinking. But for 
Fanon, colonised populations were not so much universally ‘denied’ as relegated to certain 
roles within a social  hierarchy—the French empire most specifically. Natives could be 
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higher or lower status, but racial and cultural hierarchy were the basis for social relegation 
which alienated the subject from a full, dynamic social existence. Fanon the dialectician 
characterised every particular experience is an instantiation of the universal, and his analysis 
of his own experience is a demand to be recognised as a fellow human with an equal stake in 
humanity, not as irreconcilably other. Blackness is not a generalisable perspective from 
which we can derive a radically different ‘non-Western knowledge’ singular, but a reminder 
to pay attention to the social and historical specificity of dialectical relation.172  
 Other postcolonial scholars have reinscribed generic attributes in the process of 
theorising something called ‘the postcolonial subject.’ For example, Jabri argues that the 
postcolonial subject’s definitional attribute is the drive for access to international politics, but 
she does not draw a clear enough distinction between different forms of international politics 
which different postcolonial subjects might embrace or reject at different conjunctures. The 
vastly different world politics of the Indian National Congress circa 1946 and the Chinese 
Communist Party circa 2019 are reduced to one category. As a result, the notion that non-
Western imperialism might be the result of a post-colonial nation-building project is largely 
missing from Jabri’s frame of analysis.173  
 Others have attempted to reconcile what they perceive as an ‘ambivalence’ in Fanon’s 
dialectics by reinscribing ambivalence – or ‘strategic ambivalence’ – as an attribute of the 
postcolonial subject.174 However, Fanon’s strategy was not ambivalent – defined as holding 
more than one valid meaning simultaneously -- but dialectical. Fanon characterised 
essentialised self-representation as a dialectical response to colonial domination which must 
be surpassed. Certain conjunctures in the relationship between coloniser/colonised, 
white/non-white, West/non-West elicited certain representations which appeared strategically 
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necessary. The problem with ambivalence defined as a generic attribute is that it makes it 
appear as if strategic essentialism can simply be selected as a free choice of a range of 
options, without negating the possibility of other forms of self-representation.175  
 But the meanings associated with political identity and subjectivity are determined in 
large part by the strategic content of a given conjuncture. To avoid transhistorical 
essentialism, it is necessary to account for the globally-connected social worlds which make 
up the modern historical field: its social formations, identities and political horizons, and how 
these developed in relation to other societies over time. 
 
2.4.3. Discursive transformation and the normalisation of the nation-state  
 
To recover anti-imperial globalism is not to reconcile or pick a side between the forces of 
modernity and tradition, internationalism and ethno-nationalism, statism and syndicalism, 
etc., but to pick up the thread of a debate, and to understand the historical trajectory of anti-
imperial world politics in terms of this debate. Scholars of decolonisation usually characterise 
counter-imperial and anti-imperial politics in terms of either a pure rejection or pure embrace 
of modern liberal relationality between states.176 Rarely if ever does this scholarship highlight 
the multi-sidedness of these politics—that they were practiced as dialogue over how to best 
address the internal contradictions and multiple exigencies presented by post-colonial 
independence. The modern liberal state and ‘the existence and quality of sovereignty’ 
certainly functioned as a focus of neo-colonial normalisation and disciplining.177 However, 
for many anti-imperial activists and politicians attempting to build socialist polities after 
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empire, the establishment of the state as a ‘neutral arbiter’ of different interests within 
multinational societies came to be seen as indispensable. This was not only to ward off neo-
colonial retrenchment, but also the condition whereby post-colonial polities could build 
lasting institutional relationships with other post-colonial polities.178 Although he does not 
access the transnational democratic tier, Manning Marable provides a good laundry list of the 
considerations held by anti-imperial politicians and intellectuals: 
 
Any socialist ruling party in peripheral societies must embody a creative synthesis of 
statism and egalitarianism, maintaining organic links with the masses, and encouraging 
structures of independent autonomous authority exercised by working people, which 
permit close accountability of the government and the ruling party. A socialist ruling 
party should reflect the broadest possible range of constituencies within a society, 
permit all democratic criticism, and allow effective channels of nonviolent opposition 
to exist.179  
   
 Certain specific challenges were unique to Africa and the Caribbean, but others 
resonated with nation-building projects in Europe, America, India, and elsewhere. Several 
colonial critics of empire were students of European history and politics, and were well aware 
of the exploitation of particular groups and the democratic toll paid by local societies in the 
name of the nation. Building a national consciousness which did not breed lasting internal 
conflict was framed as an ethical problem, but also a matter of stability and durability. The 
problem with most European and American nation-building was that it had been undertaken 
with a ‘colonial mentality’—a belief in the cultural, racial, or class superiority of those 
driving the nation-building process, and therefore little respect for difference. 
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 In Germany, for example, state consolidation with a view to empire-building as 
championed by Otto van Bismarck or the economic historian, Gustav von Schmoller (1838-
1917), were resisted by German radicals. From Germany’s romantic anarchist tradition, 
which had produced fin de siècle intellectual activists like Gustav Landauer (1870-1919), 
Rudolf Rocker (1873-1958), and Erich Mühsam (1878-1934), came early arguments for 
gender equality, racial equality, and gay rights viewed both nationally and internationally. 
These arguments built on the anarchist collectivism of Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876) by 
emphasising the particular forms of German pre-industrial society under threat by top-down 
state-building. Writing twenty years after the defeat of the socialist alliance in the German 
Revolution of 1918-19, and predating Harold Lasswell’s formulation of ‘the garrison state’ 
by 4 years, Rocker argued that ‘national unity turned Germany into an enlarged Prussia, 
which felt itself called to pursue world politics. The barracks became the high school of the 
new German mentality. Germany became great in the fields of technique and applied 
sciences, but narrow-minded and poor of soul.’180 Rocker followed Landauer, who had been 
murdered by reactionary forces during the revolution, in the view that anarchism was not 
particularism. Instead it was a form of international socialism from below, which vested 
political power in local communities while encouraging ‘free union’ between them.181 Rather 
than framing this in all or nothing terms, Rocker and Landauer conceived the vestment of 
power in community as a principled demand, the aspiration to which could be achieved in 
part. English political society, for example, with its history of democratic opposition and 
sustained municipal autonomy was singled out approvingly by Rocker as ‘the freest in 
Europe.’182  
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 Many African and Caribbean critiques shared this deeper commitment to liberation 
from the anti-democratic effects of the ‘barracks state’, even as they came to recognise the 
necessity of the state in some form. The Marxist/Bakunian tension between elite 
worldmaking and radical democratic decision-making was already present in the 
transnational ontologies of black interwar intellectuals. In 1920, Du Bois described the turn-
of-the-century downgrading of black status in the world as a technique whereby white 
imperialism perpetrated injustices on non-white subjects. His distinction illustrates the 
classed character of colonial management, and indirectly, the classed character of counter-
imperial problem-framing. ‘Negroes of ability have been carefully gotten rid of’ he wrote, 
‘deposed of authority, kept out of positions of influence, and discredited in their people’s 
eyes.’183 With regard to African labourers: ‘a new slavery approaches Africa to deprive 
natives of their land, to force them to toil, and to reap all the profit for the white world.’184  
While already ‘civilized’ imperial subjects were being robbed of their jobs, and, by extension, 
their equal place in imperial society, African natives were being robbed of their land and 
livelihood, and by extension, their connection to ancestral cultures and traditions. Creating a 
‘self’ of black self-determination therefore necessitated processes of class collaboration and 
inter-societal co-constitution, rather than mobilising a pre-existing national consciousness or 
adherence to a generic liberal state-society arrangement.185   
 Rather than a primary focus on the social and cultural differentiation of post-colonial 
space, the above/below framing as a transnational dynamic focuses attention on the processes 
and rationales behind political projects-- the strategic and collaborative aspects of 
institutionalising anti-imperial ideals. Anti-imperial political action thus had an ‘uneven and 
combined’ character. Resurrecting and advancing Trotsky’s concept, Justin Rosenberg offers 
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‘uneven and combined development’ as a constitutive process of world history, characterised 
by the ‘international’ – or inter-societal – interaction of asymmetrical social groups.186 That 
the development of colonial societies had been, to paraphrase Buzan and Lawson, 
multilinear, variegated, and uneven, rather than linear, uniform, and smooth was precisely the 
challenge for anti-imperial and anti-colonial political projects.187  
 As a result, the temporal horizons of these politics were also differentiated and 
contested. Members of the radical diaspora and African intelligentsia sometimes adhered to 
different versions of ‘development time’—viewing certain segments of their communities as 
‘backwards’ and need of ‘catching up’ with the West.188 However, the discourse was just as 
often about contesting this view of progress: it would highlight the ways in which non-white 
populations were ahead of the West – more modern even – or point to the circular rise, fall, 
and return of different civilisations and social formations.    
 The multi-temporality of anti-imperial world politics also suggests that we study them 
in terms of discursive transformations, rather than discrete phases. There is a tradition in 
postcolonial scholarship to characterise epochal phases in the antagonistic relationship 
between coloniser and colonised.189 For example, Chatterjee’s (1986) formulation of different 
Gramscian ‘moments’ in nationalist discourse, or Scott’s (2004) account of a transition from 
a ‘romantic revolutionary’ phase to a ‘tragic’ phase. While such periodization might be useful 
if the goal is to make sharp contrasts, it is also too limiting in its narration of a linear march 
of time totally defined by homogenous symbolic orders. I argue instead that historical 
advances in anti-imperial politics operated more as interstitial transformations in the 
discourse between societies.190 While this involved articulation to different dominant counter-
discourses, the spread of these articulations was never even. The significance of this is that it 
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helps us to account for political pluralism within societies, and to resist reduction of political 
history to deterministic teleology. Old ideas and symbolic orders were never fully displaced, 
but were temporarily marginalised, and sometimes regained significance later.     
 Specific events usually served as the precipitating occurrence for discursive 
transformations.191 Between 1919 and 1975, counter-hegemonic class collaborations re-
articulated themselves around new key terms. ‘World civilisation’ became ‘revolution’, 
‘revolution’ became ‘development and ‘liberation.’ These articulations were responses to 
both specific conflicts -- from labour strikes to world wars – and imperial hegemony’s re-
articulated justifications. The term ‘articulation’ refers to chains of association and meaning 
which are constructed at different historical conjunctures. Articulation is often a form of 
representational practice, where phenomena which are susceptible to a range of 
interpretations are attached to particular meanings, which then give rise to potential courses 
of action.192 As Jutta Weldes writes, specific articulations are ‘socially constructed and 
historically contingent’ rather than arising from strict structural necessities internal to a 
particular linguistic context.193 This is captured in the term ‘articulation’ itself, which, as 
Stuart Hall explains, 
 
has a nice double meaning because “to articulate” means to utter, to speak forth, to be 
articulate. It carries that sense of language-ing, of expressing, etc. But we also speak of 
an “articulated” lorry (truck): a lorry where the front (cab) and back (trailer) can, but 
need not necessarily, be connected to one another. The two parts are connected to each 
other, but through a specific linkage, that can be broken.194  
 
                                                          
191 See Sewell, 2005: 226-227 
192 Weldes, 1996: 285; see also Sewell Jr., 2005: 339-340 
193 Weldes, 1996: 284-285 
194 Quoted in Weldes, 1996: 285 
P a g e  | 72 
 
 However, taking Hall’s counter-hegemonic materialism seriously, articulations are not 
completely arbitrary either, but as a general practice, serve particular purposes with regard to 
felt political necessities. For example, C.L.R. James’s support for federal unification was a 
specific articulation of his anti-imperial globalist politics, which was animated by the threat 
of imperial retrenchment after independence. Ultimately, his emphasis on federalism 
underestimated the ability of market capitalism to make new clients out of revolutionaries, to 
create differentiated loyalties within classes, and to deliver more democratically successful 
political societies than had any socialist one party state. He acknowledged these 
underestimations in later life, without re-articulating his anti-imperialism to any other specific 
political form.195  
 Anti-imperial discourse around the meaning of European hegemony was articulated to 
different racial, socialist, and (inter)nationalist scripts after the Great War. As Michael Adas 
contends, Europe’s role as the world’s provider of cultural and techno-scientific civilization 
began to be seriously challenged after WWI in what became the ‘the first genuinely global 
intellectual exchange.’ More than any other period, the inter-war context inspired ideological 
‘interchange between thinkers from the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia.’ This global 
discourse became ‘a site for the contestation of the presuppositions of the civilizing mission 
ideology that had undergirded the West's global hegemony.’196 Imperial states’ re-articulation 
to indirect rule and ‘trusteeship’ over the colonies stimulated anti-imperial activists’ turn to 
the Communist International (COMINTERN) during the interwar period. However, despite 
the perception that the state-controlled economies which appeared after WWI might represent 
an alternative to free trade capitalism, fascist and communist counter- hegemons emerged as 
rival imperialists, not as anti-imperialists. As we will see in Chapter 4, colonial anti-
imperialists sometimes looked to both fascist and communist states as alternatives to 
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‘democratic’ imperialism. Rather than retreating from the world towards inert nationalisms, 
or fighting to reform the world according to an ideal of freedom for all people, fascist and 
communist states became regional hegemons, who universalised their own ideologies in order 
to challenge nominally democratic states.   
 This new world of rivalries appeared to present opportunities for colonised people, 
who looked to improve their positions within the colonial order, to eject colonising powers, 
or to remake the world according to ideals of radical democracy and egalitarianism. During 
and immediately after WWII, gains made by rebellions and nationalist parties suggested the 
possibility of imminent independence for some colonies, but also the likelihood that 
leadership would be handed to a native bourgeoisie with cliental ties to imperial authorities. 
By the 1950s, this could refer to an intellectual elite, as well as a political or economic elite. 
For example, starting in 1952 and 1953, native African intellectuals like J.B. Danquah, Ali 
Ahmed Jahadhmy, and Adeboye Bablola published articles alongside colonial administrators 
(Duncan Cumming) and Oxford lecturers (Albert Hourani) in the journal, African Affairs.  
 Although certainly a product of the colonial system, elite internationalism always also 
involved attempts to establish new political forms in creative ways which reflected cultural 
difference.197 Rather than the rejection of Western culture and political forms in principle, the 
substance of anti-imperial critiques of pan-nationalist projects -- such as pan-Africanism, 
pan-Asianism, or pan-Arabism – was more often about failure to create or strengthen 
democratic pluralist institutions. In other words, to institutionalise after independence the 
class collaborations between political elites, educated elites, and the masses which had been 
hallmarks – at least rhetorically -- of the pre-independence period.     
 Class collaborations between labour organisations had also formed the foundations of 
anti-imperial institution building. The West Indies Federation, which collapsed as an elite 
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project in 1962, developed in large part from the organising of trade unionists involved with 
the Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC) in the mid-1930s to mid-1940s.198 Organising labour 
across the islands was facilitated by the collective grievances of the impoverished West 
Indian working class and peasantry, as well as the relative ease of travel and contact between 
the islands. The CLC represented a cross-gender and multiracial organisation, which had both 
local and international designs. The idea that ‘federation was the logical development of 
working class unity’ was principally the reason for C.L.R. James’s support of the West Indies 
Federation right up until its dissolution.199  
 Vertical class collaboration between the intelligentsia, the proletariat, and the 
subaltern also formed the basis for Frantz Fanon and Amílcar Cabral’s anti-imperial globalist 
politics in Algeria and Guinea-Cabo Verde. Both argued that it was from the process of 
organised resistance against hegemonic culture – both in its imperial and native forms – that 
new emancipatory identities would emerge. In a 1969 seminar presentation to his 
revolutionary African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC), 
Cabral remarked that ‘culture is... a product of a people’s economic level.’200 This made for a 
diverse map of cultures, all of which contained elements which were ‘useful and 
constructive’ for resistance and liberation, but also had to be liquidated of their ‘negative 
aspects’—i.e., those particularist beliefs, practices, or power structures which might hinder 
the success of the liberation movement.201  
 Overtures to radical democracy represented by the spread of decolonisation 
movements were quickly obstructed by the connected phenomena of post-colonial states’ 
anti-democratic practices and liberal imperialism’s self-reconfiguration as global 
neoliberalism. The formation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
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(OPEC) and the proposed New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the early 1970s each 
represented attempts to balance Third World economies against the dominance of Western 
economies.202 In the 1970s, neoliberal economists from Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and 
the United States – but associated with institutions in Britain and the United States -- were 
able to implement policies to insulate global capitalism from the democratic demands of post-
colonial states.203 New rifts emerged between oil producing countries, state-controlled 
manufacturing countries, and primary goods producing countries, a development which 
delivered a massive blow to those who hoped for Third World unity, even as it produced 
unprecedented wealth for a new global elite.204 
 Reframing anti-imperial world politics in terms of strategic, collaborative projects to 
institutionalise radically democratic and egalitarian principles thus builds on recent projects 
to reassess and pluralise anticolonial nationalism as worldmaking, rather than inert 
expressions of ethno-cultural particularism. But shifting focus to imperial unevenness and 
class collaboration emphasises the need to pluralise and historicise elite institutional politics. 
Anticolonial nationalism and anti-imperial globalism were imbricated, not mutually reducible 
discourses. Recovering one without the other can serve to romanticise elite nationalist 
projects, or re-enforce interpretations that it could not have been otherwise, thus continuing to 
limit the scope and continued relevance of anti-imperial critique in a new era of globalisation.          
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Chapter Three 
‘World Civilisation’ between the wars: 





On the 11th of March, 1920, the Gold Coast Fante lawyer, politician, and newspaperman, J.E. 
(Joseph Ephraim) Casely Hayford, gave the inaugural address of the British West African 
Conference in Accra. Like the National Congress of British West Africa, its parent 
organization, the Conference had been convened by a self-described ‘intelligentsia’, or class 
of ‘educated Africans.’205 Casely Hayford’s address reflected the main concerns of this 
interest group: regional unity, land rights, cultural autonomy, and greater, more secure access 
to employment and political representation for native leaders and professionals. Quoting a 
colleague who had spoken at a previous conference in Lagos, Casely Hayford presented the 
position of educated Africans vis-à-vis the British Empire and its aspirations for world 
civilization: ‘This Conference is not founded as an anti-government movement but for the 
purpose of helping the Government in the work of civilization that they are doing in our 
midst.’206  
 Helping the colonial government did not mean that criticism was not permitted – 
particularly with regard to land expropriation207 and the colour bar208 -- but such criticism 
was to be ‘pointed out in a loyal and constitutional manner.’209 In October of the same year, 
delegates of the National Congress of British West Africa met with the League of Nations 
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Union in London. At this meeting, Casely Hayford made the case for constitutional change 
granting a greater share of native representation in the colonial governments of West Africa: 
a concession which had just been granted to Ceylon. ‘In this great war, we all united for the 
common cause in common sacrifice for common hopes’, Casely Hayford said, invoking West 
Africans’ support for the British Empire in the First World War,  ‘if Ceylon has been given 
this Constitution, why should it not be given to British West Africa?’210 Moreover, if the 
British Empire hoped to lead in the work of civilization, why would it not seek to emulate the 
French Government which had ‘no colour bar to Africans, so that an African may rise to any 
position, according to his ability[?]’211 
 As Michael Adas contends, discourse around the meaning of ‘the Great War’ for the 
future of European hegemony, and its legitimising scripts based in the promise of techno-
scientific civilization, was perhaps ‘the first genuinely global intellectual exchange.’ More 
than any other period, the post-WWI context inspired ideological ‘interchange between 
thinkers from the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia.’ This global discourse became ‘a site 
for the contestation of the presuppositions of the civilizing mission ideology that had 
undergirded the West's global hegemony.’212 
 Yet, as Casely Hayford’s remarks at both events in 1920 show, 1918 was not a clean 
break from the idea of ‘civilisation’ as global progress within the framework of European 
imperial rule. Casely Hayford suggested that greater access to meritocratic social 
advancement for the colonised might be a way to redeem and expedite – not end -- the 
civilizing mission after the catastrophe of world war. Such attempts to win greater access to 
power for the colonised, while continuing to draw on the promise of a global telos of 
civilization, were not unique to Casely Hayford. The counter-discourses of Africans, West 
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Indians, and African Americans all drew on the concept to some extent, even if only to 
present an alternative global civilization to the one presented by defenders of white Western 
dominance.    
 In the previous chapter I set out a conception of global modernity as predicated on the 
unprecedented disparity between ethnic and cultural groups, and the attendant practice of 
dividing the world into hierarchical, racialised civilisations. This chapter develops the 
importance of ‘civilisation thinking’ for what it reveals about the real and potential solidarity 
of groups as they sought to bring a global challenge to the existing political, economic, and 
racial order. It does this by analysing pan-African and radical discourse between circa 1910 
and 1930. Racism and imperial retrenchment after WWI created the impetus to challenge 
imperial ‘civilisation’ and to posit new meanings of the concept. World civilisation and 
universal cultural progress were also deployed as anti-imperial globalist concepts, to counter 
undemocratic visions of ethnic nationalist internationalism.           
 I argue that the ways in which ‘civilisation(s)’ was deployed in this context was 
critical, but also aspirational, reflecting the term’s ambiguity.213 In the context of interwar 
counter-imperial politics, the deployment of both ‘civilisation’ as representing world progress 
and ‘civilisations’ as representing a plurality of different cultures can be understood in terms 
of both strategic necessity in the practice of (inter)national alliance-building, as well as 
disagreement over who could authorise racial representation. As enmeshed with hierarchical 
racial and cultural signifiers as it was and is, civilisation was just as much a category of class 
politics for interwar counter-imperial writers. Civilisation and civilisations as counter-
imperial categories were not used merely as markers of particular and distinct cultural 
formations, but as proxy concepts representing criticism of the imperial-colonial order. 
Instead of being rejected entirely, the concept of civilisation was positively repurposed to 
                                                          
213 Also see Edwards’s discussion of Alain Locke’s distinction between singular ‘civilisation’ and plural ‘culture’ 
(2003: 112-114). 
P a g e  | 79 
 
argue for both ethnic nationalist internationalisms and anti-imperial globalist alternatives. 
The disagreements which constituted the civilisation talk of the interwar period were shaped 
profoundly by social forces and the world political context, and were not merely reflections 
of generic ethnic and cultural perspectives.    
 
3.2. Civilisational difference – essentialist and ‘post-essentialist’ conceptions 
 
Scholars writing after and against Samuel Huntington’s famous Foreign Affairs article have 
tended to establish civilisation as an analytical category of separation: differentiating races, 
cultures, values, and meta-theoretical bases for inter-societal interaction.214 Broadly, the 
debate concerns to what extent civilisations and civilisational difference can be established as 
‘useable analytical tools’, and whether these categories can be employed without 
essentialism, ahistoricism, or the assumption of ‘implacable opposition.’215 These categories 
have a long history as demarcations of essentialised cultural formations, used by scholars like 
Max Weber, Oswald Spengler, Fernand Braudel, and William H. McNeill to denote distinct 
societal-cultural units. Spengler, in particular, writing at the end and in the aftermath of the 
First World War, imbued the term with a specific spatiotemporal and teleological dimension. 
Civilisation for Spengler was the apex of a culture’s development, which had reached its 
apotheosis with Western Civilisation (1926: 3-4). Spengler combined the romantic pluralism 
of Herder, wherein cultures are autogenous and in possession of their own unique ‘genius’, 
with an imperialist imaginary of civilisational hierarchy and a Hegelian teleology. Scholars, 
including IR scholars, tend to return to these reified and essentialised cultural concepts as 
‘default’ categories.216 Even attempts to pluralise the concept, for example by arguing for 
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‘multiple modernities’ which emerge from different paths of intra-cultural contestation, tend 
to reify, albeit as multiple rather than singular.217   
 Another valence of civilisation can be derived from the writings of postwar Realists. 
As Nicolas Guilhot shows, early Realists like Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans J. Morgenthau 
articulated a counter-Enlightenment discourse which characterised world civilisation as under 
threat from the radically democratic ‘illlusions’ of the French Revolution.218 The 
conservative, often Christian founders of IR ‘adopted the classical counter-revolutionary 
view of the Enlightenment as a de-civilizing attack on the throne and the altar that 
undermined the Christian foundations of the ancient regime.’ Realism was thus invented, in 
part, to serve a civilisationist ideology of conservative morality counterposed against ‘the 
diffusion of secular nationalism.’ 219  
 More recent critical attempts to reconceptualise civilisation as a ‘process of 
production’ rather than a ‘reified thing’ have revealed more helpful lines of inquiry, even if 
they are not quite as ‘post-essentialist’ as their instigators might wish. Defined as ‘an ongoing 
process through which boundaries are continually produced and reproduced’, and as 
‘necessarily power-laden’, civilisation becomes more useful as an analytical entry point to the 
social forces that shape imaginaries and the possibilities of political action.220  
 Anti-Eurocentric critiques of ‘Western civilisation’, though they deploy the concept in 
its processual, power-laden sense, have tended to reinscribe civilisation within broad 
narratives about Western chauvinism and non-Western subordination, rather than fully 
address the inter-societal forces which shape political imaginaries and possibilities. As 
Mustapha Kamal Pasha warns, defining civilisation as a process of power is necessary, but it 
does not guarantee by itself a relapse into essentialism. ‘Celebratory accounts of Indigeneity 
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or Nativism’ used to deflect Western civilisational chauvinism are often instances of ‘anti-
essentialist essentialism’, which reproduce Orientalist binaries and conceal the plurality of 
social forces and sites internal to ‘civilisations.’221 Bowden, for example, characterises both 
liberalism and socialism as ‘competing visions of Enlightenment utopianism’ which together 
define ‘Western civilization’ against ‘non-Western’ civilisations rendered inferior.222 Western 
civilisational chauvinism, Bowden tells us, is pointless for its ‘scorekeeping’, but he then 
suggests that we deflect this scorekeeping by pointing to – and in effect celebrating -- the 
‘East’s influences in the realm of ideas and innovations that were introduced to the West.’223 
Just as scholars have contested the concept as an essential category of cultural difference, it 
has become re-essentialised as a category of flattened, transhistorical oppression.                   
 Increased interest in civilisation and other cultural categories has yet to fully establish 
that ’civilisation(s)’ was often deployed by counter-imperial activists and theorists after WWI 
as a multi-valenced and strategic concept directed towards a horizon of global cosmopolitan 
democracy. Although the root ‘civilisation’ was used in many contexts, there was a 
distinction made within the discourse of the time between ‘civilisationism’ as a negative, 
oppressive ideology, and civilisation as representative of global democratic progress. More 
specifically, African and diasporic cultural elites used civilisation in at least five distinct 
senses, both critical and aspirational: to contest claims of inherent racial inferiority through 
the defence of past (and future) African civilisation; to defend the right of the colonised to 
share in Western civilisation’s perceived bounty; to argue for diaologic coexistence between 
cultures for the purposes of racial unity and civilisational advancement; to narrate the role of 
African and black contributions to universal cultural progress; and to narrate the real and 
potential contribution of colonised societies to the global democratic and egalitarian projects 
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which would constitute a ‘World Civilisation’ yet to come. These different meanings were 
employed singly or in combination to sometimes contradictory purposes. Sometimes versions 
of these different arguments were used by the same individual depending on world events or 
the intended audience. Though civilisation as a marker of an individual’s culture is often 
assumed to explain the genuine perspective of that individual, analysis of the concept as 
strategic brings us better into contact with the multiple relationalities, epistemic repertoires, 
and conjunctural limits that give cultural categories like civilisation their particular relevance 
and power.  
 Analysis of the strategic content also brings into focus other social categories which 
complicate the picture of mutually-exclusive and counterposed cultural formations—in 
particular, class. As I argue below, civilisation thinking in the interwar period was rarely 
practiced without class thinking. How one thought and what one said about civilisation 
depended to some extent on positioning within the imperial sociopolitical hierarchy. 
Civilisation and class – as both racialised and global concepts – were modes of understanding 
the transnational sociopolitical field after WWI, as well as discursive anchor points to 
mobilise intensifying anti-imperial critique.            
 
3.3. Saving civilisation - liberal hegemony and conflict after WWI 
 
For the victors of WWI, the aspiration to build a post-war global order was inherently 
connected to the task of managing and preserving inter-imperial order in the face of a shifting 
Atlantic power balance.224 The question of what to do with German and Ottoman territories 
captured by allied forces sparked a multilateral debate which led to the creation of the 
mandates system in January 1919. At the heart of this debate were questions about culture, 
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race, and fitness for self-rule, nested within the logic of a universal standard of civilisation. 
For George Beer (1870-1920), a historian and colonial policy expert who accompanied 
Woodrow Wilson to Europe in December 1918, the challenge presented by captured colonial 
territories was how to continue the ‘tutelage’ of ‘backwards’ people in a manner befitting a 
transformed global order. For Beer as well as Wilson, the task of making a more 
humanitarian inter-imperial system had to be balanced with the maintenance of the 
hierarchical racial order. ‘The negro race,’ Beer had once written, ‘has hitherto shown no 
capacity for progressive development except under the tutelage of other peoples.’225 The 
British and Wilson’s delegation would agree at the Peace Conference in Versailles that both 
the protection of native rights and the standard of civilisation were most effectively guarded 
within the model of the British Empire, which should therefore be internationalised.226 Built 
on Atlantic economic cooperation and the perception of shared values, the Anglo-American 
alliance also needed to reflect the threat of Bolshevism and the American public’s enmity to 
imperial expansion. The League of Nations and the mandates system were thus presented as 
vehicles for liberal humanist improvement on the old world order, carrying a duty of 
guidance for backwards people on the principle ‘that the well-being and development of such 
people form a sacred trust of civilisation.’227 Evincing the imperial spirit of the Treaty of 
Versailles, a hierarchy of standards was even written into the first charter of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), with the caveat that ‘differences of climate, habits and customs, 
of economic opportunity and industrial tradition may restrict uniformity in the conditions of 
labour difficult of immediate attainment’ intended to heavily qualify international standards 
for non-Europeans.228                
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 Although its inauguration presaged the more inclusive forms of global governance 
which emerged later in the 20th century, and although many different interests and opinions 
were represented by its delegates, the League of Nations often represented the interests of 
white nationalist internationalism and the geopolitics of liberal hegemony. In this, the League 
was particularly reflective of Wilson’s own beliefs and policy perspective. Wilson once 
expressed the belief that internationalism represented a later stage of human development, 
‘from ancient and medieval times to the late nineteenth-century epoch of international 
congresses and internationality.’229 His record of support for racial segregation in the South 
and opposition to international organisations based on racial equality reflected his belief that 
the white race was meant to lead in the mission of human development.230 Wilson’s principle 
of national self-determination was multivalent, suggesting both a human right and a particular 
achievement of the Anglo-Saxon race. He conceived of American empire as a white man’s 
burden, and of colonies as accidents of fate, which had fallen into the United States’ lap. He 
wrote of the Phillipines that it had ‘fallen to us by the wilful fortune of war’, and that it was 
‘our duty to administer the territory, not for ourselves, but for the people living in it.’231  
 Wilson’s support for national self-determination also had a geopolitical basis, rather 
than a purely ideological one.232 In one aspect, Wilson used calls for anticolonial nationalism 
and liberal internationalism as a counter-revolutionary strategy against the Bolshevik 
sentiment which threatened to spread throughout imperial dependencies. After the Bolsheviks 
published treaties which suggested that the allies planned to divide up East European 
territories amongst themselves, Wilson produced his Fourteen Points, playing ‘the nationalist 
card against Lenin’s international appeal.’ While it sounded to many like a universal call for 
national freedom, the desired effect was to create independent East European nation-states to 
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act ‘as a quarantine belt against the Red virus.’233 This policy would eventually lead to 
sustained backlash against liberal internationalism in the global South after Wilson’s rhetoric 
proved both ideologically hollow and practically unsustainable.234 Meeting in March 1919, 
the COMINTERN excoriated the League of Nations as an ‘international association of sham 
democracies’, and its version of national self-determination as a project ‘meant only to 
change the commercial label of colonial slavery.’235 The following year, Lenin wrote his 
‘Draft Theses on National and Colonial Questions’ (1920), which laid out a theoretical 
differentiation between bourgeois nationalism and revolutionary nationalism. Bourgeois 
nationalism included both state sovereignty and international federalism when they were used 
to concretise the rule of elites, with revolutionary nationalism a necessary step to establish 
proletarian control for the ultimate purpose of building an international unity of workers.      
   If 1918 was the end of WWI for the Great Powers, 1919 marked a continuation, and 
even an intensification, of conflict for the colonial world. The role of the League to 
internationalise a mixture of British and American imperialism effectively internationalised 
indirect rule, in that it further established – to paraphrase Timothy Mitchell --  ‘forms of local 
despotism through which imperial control would continue to operate.’236 Post-war racial 
abuse for returning soldiers and economic precarity in the colonies led to renewed labour 
upheavals in Africa and the Caribbean. In Trinidad, impoverished stevedores, railway 
workers, and tramcar operators carried out work stoppages in 1919. Working men’s 
associations were augmented by returning soldiers of the British West Indies Regiment, who 
had begun to organise around the indignities and exclusion they suffered by whites during the 
war and on arriving home. These strikes were given ideological oxygen by the labour 
publication Argos and Marcus Garvey’s newspaper Negro World, and turned violent in 
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December of 1919.237 A series of strike actions also related to post-war instability occurred in 
Jamaica, British Honduras, St. Lucia, St. Kitts, Anguilla, and Tortola until 1924. Similar 
upheavals occurred in Sierra Leone and southern Rhodesia.238 Even the metropole was not 
immune, with attacks by white crowds on non-white communities provoking violent race 
riots in London, Liverpool, Newport, Bristol, Cardiff, Barry, Hull, Glasgow, South Shields, 
and Salford between January and August, 1919.239     
 Colonial unrest and racial animosity coincided with unprecedented growth in the 
surveillance and intelligence apparatuses of the British and French empires. France and 
Britain operated as ‘intelligence states’ which required the endless collection of data to 
function.240 While most of this data collection involved prosaic monitoring of bureaucracy, 
population, weather, and infrastructure, surveillance of persons suspected of political dissent 
or otherwise opposed to the goals of the French state increased after WWI. In North and West 
Africa, surveillance of anti-imperial suspects grew and peaked in the late 1920s and early 
1930s.241 Keller identifies a ‘culture of suspicion’ which ‘exposes an imperial administration 
that was anxious [and] fearful’ in French West Africa and Paris.242 French police divisions 
and the political affairs bureau kept collections of files on ‘Suspects’, ‘Suspicious persons’, 
‘surveillance of foreigners’, ‘suspected propagandists’, ‘communism’, ‘pan-Africanism’, and 
‘Garveyism’ amongst others.243 British intelligence and surveillance also ballooned after 
WWI. MI5 expanded from a small number of staff to 844 in 1918. Its central registry grew 
from ’17, 500 card indexes in 1914 to over 250, 000 cards and 27, 000 personal files in 
1918.’244 The primary reason for MI5’s growth was the management of the empire, which 
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comprised its largest expanse of colonies, protectorates, ‘protected states and trust territories’ 
by 1918.245 In the United States, the rapid expansion of Marcus Garvey’s global movement 
was met with an FBI investigation with input from British Military Intelligence.246 J. Edgar 
Hoover (1895-1972) helped lead an investigation into whether Garvey should be deported. 
Hoover scanned UNIA documents for ‘anarchist utterances’, while black special agents 
infiltrated UNIA meetings and black-run establishments.247 A black FBI special agent named 
William A. Bailey, codenamed WW, submitted reports on black radical movements in 
Nashville and New York in 1919 and 1920. After reading a copy of Negro World at a barber 
shop in Nashville, Bailey concluded that the newspaper was ‘[a] menace’ in that it reflected 
‘a dream of world dominion based on selfishness’ and that its ‘doctrine will cause riots, 
revolutions, rebellions and finally chaos.’ Bailey warned that ‘if unchecked’ the UNIA would 
‘offer a greater menace than that of the Russians, for it will be a growing black peril.’248 
 Ironically, this hysterical response from imperial authorities took place at a time when 
many colonial elites were expressing conciliatory views with respect to empire. Though not 
uncritical, most African and diasporic elite opinion was along the same lines as Casely 
Hayford’s ‘loyal and constitutional’ opposition. Few African leaders and leaders of African 
descent expressed the position that colonisation was necessarily destructive or regressive, at 
least not until 1935. For these leaders, ‘civilisation’ as global progress remained a cause 
worth fighting for, and WWI had provided reason for ‘non-European civilisations’ to be 
granted greater access to ‘the work of civilisation’ within an imperial organisation. 
 
3.4. Civilisation as an articulation of counter-imperial discourse 
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3.4.1. The construction of African difference  
 
As an articulation of counter-imperial discourse, civilisation represented critical and 
aspirational aims, but the term would have been empty if it had not corresponded to the 
sociopolitical reality of different opportunities and projects which emerged during the war. 
Without this strategic content, the analytical category of civilisation readily becomes a label 
of reified and essentialised cultural difference. As a term of strategic discourse, it is 
revelatory of the different social, economic, and political fault lines produced by liberal 
hegemony and imperial hierarchy.  
 In a global context where black soldiers had helped the allies win the war, social 
conflict and labour unrest intensified, and the spectres of communism and nationalism 
inspired the growth of the intelligence state, counter-imperial elites sought to reform the 
empire. According to the logic of indirect rule in Britain and association in France, a major 
cause of imperial conflict in the past had been the impetus to assimilation based on disrespect 
for cultural difference. The orientalist notion that Africans and people of African descent 
were fundamentally different from Europeans was promoted on both sides of the colour line 
and was not necessarily inimical to empire. Amongst other organisations formed, revived, or 
expanded in the same period, Du Bois’s Pan-African Congress and Garvey’s UNIA enjoyed 
transnational membership largely because they offered institutional support and world 
political recognition for racial and cultural grievances across the black world.  
 However, culturalist claims also had economic and territorial bases. The pattern of 
indirect rule on the African continent was similar to that of elsewhere in the empire, where 
elite clients and more remote rural societies constituted a pluralist empire based on territorial 
nativist claims which were often under threat. By the end of WWI, Africans and people of 
African descent were already long-versed in juridical European politics through a history of 
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grievances with extra-territorial and settler land seizures. Indigenous Africans had pursued 
these claims through the courts since at least the late-19th century. Founded in 1897 by Casely 
Hayford, the Gold Coast’s Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) mounted a 
successful case against the colonial government’s plan to take possession of all unused land 
on behalf of the Crown. Neither was this course only pursued by ‘Westernised’ elites. In the 
same period, the rural Kenyan Maasai tried to resist settler land seizures with the aid of 
British lawyers.249 Support for pan-African organisations was also driven by post-war 
economic concerns. Deflation had led to burst commodity bubbles, which hit primary 
commodity economies in the colonised world particularly hard. As Adam Tooze writes, the 
drop in commodity prices led West African businessmen ‘into the ranks of the Pan African 
Congress.’250  
 Yet, the language of reform was often communicated in ethno-culturalist terms, a 
practice which had roots in the last decades of the 19th century. In the social imaginary of 
mid-19th century Victorians, Africans were not essentially different from Europeans as they 
were ‘subject to redemption and liable to civilisation.’ The uncivilised customs of Africans 
were held in diametric opposition to the Victorian ideal of European civilisation, but the gap 
could be bridged with the dual treatment of ‘commerce and Christianity.’251 That the Africa 
and Europe of this imaginary were discursive fictions did not diminish their ability to 
construct an inter-societal symbolic order, on which economic and political relations were 
built. In this context, cultural and religious converts – ‘black Victorians’ as they would later 
be described – acted as middlemen between Europeans and natives, but also understood 
themselves to be the future leaders of a renewed, independent African civilisation to come. 
Generally this class viewed the civilising mission as a force for improvement on the 
                                                          
249 Parsons, 2014: 43, 48-49 
250 Tooze, 2014: 375 
251 Zachernuk, 2000: 44 
P a g e  | 90 
 
continent. As Philip Zachernuk writes, ‘the early Nigerian intelligentsia were more 
preoccupied with promoting the civilizing mission than questioning it, and it is not clear that 
the meaning of being “African” was deeply probed.’252 
 This had begun to change by the 1880s, when empire was refashioned as a more 
permanent ‘guide’ of backwards races. While the idea that humanity was divisible into races 
was not new, racism took on a new valence which disavowed Western-educated Africans as, 
‘at the very best’, to quote the British historian William Winwood Reade (1838-1875), 
imitators ‘with an utter barrenness of creative power.’253 This new understanding marked 
Africans as radically different, and therefore able to attain civilisation only gradually, if at all. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, this was the period which saw a cull in Africans from government 
and bureaucratic roles. Reclassified as inauthentic imitators, they were reduced from the 
status of future leaders of a new African civilisation to indefinite imperial functionaries.   
 The response from counter-imperial critics was to appropriate and invert claims of 
fundamental difference. A new wave of intellectual and cultural elites thus embraced 
essential African difference and applied it to spheres of religion, law, politics, and culture. 
John Mensah Sarbah (1864-1910), was a Cape Coast native who studied law in England, 
became a barrister in 1887, and returned to West Africa in the late 1880s. He published a 
book in 1897 on Fante customary law, which gives a sense of this new wave. Favourably 
quoting the Scottish judge, Sir James Marshall (1829-1889), Sarbah argued that African legal 
custom was to be rooted in ‘ancient’ cultural tradition, with Europeans meant only to impel 
acquiescence: ‘The Gold Coast must remain the country of the natives, but with a handful of 
Europeans among them who have the power by which they rule these people and enforce 
obedience.’254  
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 Thus Sarbah, along with others like Nigerian Christian minister Mohola Agbebi 
(1860-1917), Casely Hayford, and the West Indian politician, Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832-
1912) espoused the underlying rationale of indirect rule. This included an emphasis on the 
fundamental cultural difference of Africans, their ill-suitedness for European custom, while at 
the same time not presenting a challenge – at least publicly – to European rule itself. Blyden 
became an influence on later anti-imperial leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and George 
Padmore for his radical criticism of Africans who ‘imitated’ Europeans in works such as 
African Life and Customs (1908). In this book, Blyden levelled a class conscious critique of 
civilisation ‘as it exists in practice’, which was comparable to European socialism. Blyden 
wrote that civilisation’s ‘modern tendency is to beget classes and masses—to emphasise the I, 
and suppress the We, to create the capitalist and the proletariat; and is a constant struggle 
between the “top and the bottom dog.”’ Blyden’s message to Europe was if it sincerely 
wished to help Africa, it should do so ‘by assisting her in the maintenance and development 
of her own social system.’255 Blyden and Sarbah were welcomed on both sides of the colour 
line. Their ideas received a warm reception in British and American lecture halls.256 The 
assertion of a unique African social model -- which was not connected to racial biology and 
therefore a rebuttal of racial inferiority -- coincided with the Boasian turn in American 
anthropology, which substituted historical development rather than race as explanation for 
cultural difference and hierarchy.257 It also resonated with the genteel socialism and amateur 
anthropology of British figures such as Mary Kingsley (1862-1900) and E.D. Morel (1873-
1924), who defended African societies on behalf of their different historical trajectories. 
 However, African difference did not serve as an atomising politics of indirect rule 
exclusively. For example, Adelaide Casely Hayford (1868-1960, born, Smith), the first wife 
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of Joseph Ephraim, articulated African difference as part of an egalitarian pluralist vision for 
imperial African society. The unique intersection she occupied is well-expressed by the title 
of Adelaide Cromwell’s biography, An African Victorian Feminist (1986). Adelaide was also 
an early pan-Africanist and a cultural nationalist.258 Born into a Sierra Leonean elite family, 
and later a lawyer and an activist, she opened a Girls’ Vocational and Industrial Training 
School in Freetown in 1923. Her vision for the school, which she described in a 1954 issue of 
the West Africa Review, demonstrated an egalitarian pluralist conception of African and 
European difference, in which the world political resides within domestic activity: 
 
In my mind’s eye I could see a school in which girls, instead of blindly copying 
European fashions, would be dressed in attractive native garments which would 
enhance their personal charms. I could see them sitting in homes which combined 
European order, method and cleanliness with the beauty of native basket furniture, art 
work and draperies. I could see the young mothers teaching the little children on their 
knees that to be Black was not a curse nor a disgrace, that the color scheme of the races 
was part of God’s divine plan, and that just as it was impossible to make a world 
without the primary colors, so it was impossible to make a world without the Negro. I 
could head the young mothers teaching their sons the glory of Black citizenship, rather 
than encouraging them to bewail the fact that they are not white. I could hear the native 
musical instruments, developed on scientific European lines discoursing sweet music in 
the place of wheezy harmoniums. I could imagine the artistic youth of the hereafter 
painting pictures depicting Black faces rather than white ones. I could visualize the 
listless, lethargic, educated town girl of today, through the medium of equipped 
gymnasiums and trained physical cultures enjoying the energy and vitality of her 
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grandmother who thought nothing of spending days hoeing fields or of carrying a load 
as weighty as any man’s. And then I could picture the sons and daughters of Africa’s 
race ‘looking the whole world in the face’ without any apology whatsoever for the 
color of their skins, and with such self-respect as to command the respect of all 
nations.259    
   
 While African difference was not fabricated out of whole cloth, it was heavily 
exaggerated and reinterpreted through an imperial context which elicited nativist claims. 
Post-WWII histories of African societies have cast doubt on accounts of ‘ancient custom’ and 
pure African difference, and have instead emphasised the inter-societal interchange, 
syncretism, and transculturation which constructed modern African identities. While there is 
no question that the patrilineal ‘households’ of pre-colonial Africa persist in some version 
today, these societies were heavily modified by colonial and imperial encounters.260 The 
Fante-Akan group – to which Casely Hayford, Sekyi, and Sarbah belonged -- is one of the 
clearest examples. Coastal merchant communities in West Africa had developed distinct 
societies and identities by the 17th century. New social forms were shaped by the transatlantic 
slave trade. Akan, Fante, and Yoruba ethnic identities were direct products of the shared 
experiences of disparate coastal communities as they navigated relations with foreign 
merchants and local rulers.261 Gold Coast trade in slaves, 81 percent of which was sponsored 
by the British, and two-thirds of which was destined for the British Caribbean, produced 
fortified port towns which required home grown authorities and militias to manage escalating 
cases of warfare and banditry.262 The slave trade and internal political violence were 
mutually-reinforcing. Most of the enslaved Africans in the Bight of Benin, Bight of Biafra, 
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and the Niger Delta were war captives, in addition to victims of kidnap and subjects of 
criminal convictions.263 The Kingdoms of Ouidah and Allada expanded to rival the Kingdom 
of Dahomey, which subsequently defeated and absorbed them.264 By 1730, warfare in the 
competition for trade and gold-mining had stripped several coastal polities of their traditional 
royal families.265  
 At the beginning of the 17th century, an alliance between the Dutch West Indies 
Company and Asante came under threat from the Borbor Fante, a group that had migrated 
from Akan hinterland to the coast prior to 1471.266 Fante asafo (literally, ‘war-people’) 
companies won a string of victories along the coast, eventually establishing a decentralised 
and networked power rivalling Asante in the region. In 1868, as the British Empire was 
consolidating itself in Africa, the Fante Confederation was established with the British in 
order for both to challenge the rival Ashanti Confederacy and the Dutch. Asafo flags -- Fante 
military banners -- displayed Union Jacks in the upper left corners and depicted a variety of 
scenes. Some depicted scenes of white and black cooperation; later they depicted planes and 
trains to signify British technological prowess—symbols of Fante pride as part of the British 
Empire. 
 Some Africans, such as the Fante intellectual, Kobina Sekyi (1892-1956), embraced 
cultural nationalism after the shock of discovering to what extent they were considered 
racially inferior in the metropole. Before travelling to London, Sekyi accepted the belief that 
‘”anglicization”… was the passport to “civilization” and “progress”’ and he even appeared in 
a school photograph in an Edwardian collar and woollen suit.267 Bad experiences with 
English women, and racial abuse, including from destitute men begging in the street, helped 
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to sour him on European culture.268 Returning to the Gold Coast in 1915 after studying 
philosophy at University College London (UCL), Sekyi became involved in the ARPS with 
Casely Hayford, and contributed editorials to various colonial peoples’ newspapers and 
journals. Sekyi also wrote a play, published in 1915, called the Blinkards. The play is a satire 
of Africans who try and fail to adopt Christianity, the English language, and English customs. 
Through satire, Sekyi critiqued Fante incorporation of English language and customs, and 
linked this to the social divisions which had emerged in colonial Africa.269 The Blinkards of 
the title crave status, and thus become eager adopters of English ways. Sekyi negatively 
compared them to those who are proficient in the imperialist’s language, such as himself, but 
who embrace their culture and resist assimilation.  
 Between 1917 and 1923, Sekyi published articles in West Africa, the African Times 
and Orient Review, and Gold Coast Leader. Many of these ideas continued on from those he 
had written in an essay, ‘Morality and Nature’, and his UCL thesis, The Relation Between the 
State and the Individual Considered in the Light of its Bearing on the Conception of Duty, but 
applied to the particular political problems of the British Gold Coast. Sekyi had argued in his 
thesis that ‘the development of statute law and the rise of the modern state and bureaucracy 
had nothing to with morality and progress, but were merely the manifestations of increasing 
artificiality and decadence.’270 Sekyi subscribed to a stadial conception of political 
development, and saw history as composed of the rise and fall of nations, which was due in 
part to the rise of the modern nation-state. Capitalism, industrialisation, and imperialism, 
engendered decay which ate away at the nation.271 Sekyi, however, rejected all elements of 
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stadial developmental theory based on the imperial mission driven by ‘civilised’ men and the 
ascendancy of scientific reason.272  
 In the first part of a three-part serial, entitled ‘the Future of Subject Peoples’, and 
published in African Times and Orient Review in 1917, Sekyi took a particularly dim view of 
subject peoples adopting any of Europe’s social and political attributes. The European 
civilisation Africans and others hoped to mimic, Sekyi argued, represented ‘a diseased state 
of society’, which made a habit of ‘denationalising peoples” through the disruptive logics of 
Empire.273 Europe, he argued, ‘knows no such thing as Nationality; she knows only Empire, 
which means the exaltation of one nation and the debasement of all other nations that are 
unable to resist aggression.’274 Europe had evolved and is evolving, but only through and 
towards imperialism, and not its alternative, which, Sekyi called, “the Brotherhood of 
Nations.”275 
 Rather than rule by state administration over a territory, and its domination of a 
national populace, Fante and other African conceptions of the state, society, and sovereignty 
were based on authority vested in ‘the people as a whole.’276 Sekyi drew a comparison to the 
African state as an organic entity working in concert, or the state as interwoven with the 
family.277 In his serial for Gold Coast Leader, ‘Our White Friends’, Sekyi also endorsed the 
idea of a return to a confederation of Fante states within the British Empire.278 Although he 
argued that British imperialism has hindered African political development, and that its rule 
by force also made it a threat to itself, Sekyi dide not express the idea that European rule 
should be forcibly overthrown, or the Europeans should adopt African culture for the sake of 
their own development. Rather,  
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Africans, Asiatics, Europeans, Americans, each… has its natural and normal 
environment, and within each large group there are smaller groups with distinct 
characteristics, and therefore different mode of life. Let each social group develop 
along the line marked out for them by their unwesternised and therefore undemoralised 
ancestors, accepting from the West only such institutions as can be adapted to, and not 
such as cannot but alter, their national life.279 
 
Demonstrating the politics of direct rule, Sekyi’s general tone in ‘Our White Friends’ is 
conciliatory to British rule, even dismissive of formalised self-government: 
 
I would submit, in short, that what is wanted is not municipal self-government, which 
will simply emphasise the local feeling, which, we are all agreed, will not do in these 
days. We want training in thinking and feeling for a wider administrative area than that 
of each of the native states.280 
  
 The construction of African difference was shaped in part by the changing social 
contract between empire and African societies. This was a response to more hostile race 
ideology which accommodated a new phase in imperial legitimation, and was facilitated by 
new academic trends and self-regarding white supremacy. As they turned towards more acute 
nation building projects in the interwar period, African and diasporic elites drew on different 
aspects of this transformed contract to build movements around alternative global visions.       
 
3.3.2. Nation-building and elite global visions  
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The trajectory of debates about international black unity was not only determined by white 
supremacy, but by the hierarchy of class interests and perspectives within black political 
societies. Debates about international black unity developed alongside questions of 
African/black difference, and the place of Africans and people of African descent within 
larger white-dominated polities. Elites on both sides of the Atlantic connected their visions of 
imperial reform to the prospect of federalism and international integration. They expressed 
the idea that federation was a means to unify and strengthen black national projects, and a 
way to advance black contributions to world civilisation. However, this conversation was 
always characterised by intra-elite disagreement and conflict. Intra-elite conflict was not 
purely a matter of personal dislike or petty personal ambition, but a result of counter-imperial 
and anti-racist politics taking place within different social, political, and economic 
contexts.281 White patronage and wider, inter-racial discourses played various roles in each of 
these contexts. 
 The success and influence of African-American and Afro-Caribbean leaders and 
international organisations, though they helped inspire solidarity across the black world, were 
met with both admiration and concern by continental African elites. Throughout the early 
interwar period, Garveyism was a powerful force to which contemporaneous and subsequent 
anticolonial movements were compelled to position themselves in relation. Between 1916 
and 1921, Garvey built a mass movement around the idea of black uplift and self-
determination in the face of white supremacy. Though his entrepreneurial enterprises like the 
Negro Factories Corporation and the Black Star Line eventually collapsed under 
mismanagement, Garvey reached millions through Negro World and local branches of the 
UNIA in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Americas. A gifted propagandist, Garvey’s global 
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vision extended from the conference halls of Harlem to rural East Africa, where his politics 
of ‘unity, preparation, and self-help’ inspired the Kikuyu nationalist movement amongst 
others.282 During the period of interwar West Indian strike actions, the Barbadian working 
men’s association was ostensibly a wing of the UNIA.283  
 While West African elites like Casely Hayford approved of Garvey’s ethno-
nationalism and support for black economic cooperation, they also worried that Garveyism 
would bring a host of extra-continental interlopers to Africa to endanger African leadership 
and further undermine African culture.284 If Garvey’s Back to Africa project had been more 
viable, Casely Hayford’s concerns would have been well-founded. Though he routinely 
praised ancient African civilisations and the resistance of black groups against European 
conquest, Garvey also expressed the opinion that blacks had ‘done nothing praiseworthy on 
their own initiative in the last five hundred years…. They have made no political, 
educational, industrial, independent contribution to civilisation for which they can be 
respected by other races.’285 Garvey’s solution to the deficit of black contributions to world 
civilisation was to re-colonise and ‘redeem’ Africa through the guidance of Western-
educated, new world blacks. In the January 19, 1924 issue of Negro World, Garvey wrote that 
as part of his plan to re-colonise Africa, ‘all thoughtful Negroes of American and the West 
Indies’ ‘should convey to Africa all that we have imbibed by the way of education and 
culture from the contact of three hundred years with western civilisation.’286  
 Key to the cultural nationalism of a Casely Hayford was mistrust of the inauthenticity 
of new world leadership, as part of a deeper concern about Africa’s diaspora returning to the 
continent en masse. However much the British Empire enforced a colour bar, or threatened to 
deterritorialise native Africans, the imperial republicanism of Marcus Garvey threatened the 
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‘balance’ of indirect rule which had been worked out over decades. As early as 1913, Casely 
Hayford had advocated a federation of West African colonies.287 However, the ‘one policy’ 
which should be implemented to ‘guide all the Governments of the West African 
Dependencies’ was to be administered with ‘a clear conception’ of West Africa’s ‘place 
within the British Empire.’288 As we saw in the introduction, Casely Hayford placed West 
African federation within a pluralist British Empire which had just been made the model for a 
new inter-imperial order based on the mandates system. Through the logic of indirect rule, 
embrace of African culture – not Atlantic unity – was Africa’s inroad to the international. 
Casely Hayford advocated this through the ideology of ‘Ethiopianism.’ This meant a 
rejection of the cultural tropes of Western civilisation which would ‘destroy African 
nationality’; resistance to black republicanism, but acceptance of its principles of racial pride 
and transatlantic economic cooperation; and acceptance of British rule.289 ‘[I]t is not so much 
Afro-Americans that we want’, Casely Hayford stated bluntly, ‘as Africans or Ethiopians.’ 
This included the opinion that Africans needed to represent cultural authenticity to white 
rulers:  
 
Without servile imitation of our teachers in their get-up and manner of life, it stands to 
reason that the average white man would regard the average black man far more 
seriously than he does at present. The adoption of a distinctive dress for the cultured 
African, therefore, would be a distinct step forward, and a gain to the cause of 
Ethiopian progress and advancement.290  
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  Casely Hayford’s assertion of African culture and loyal opposition was in part a 
response to the perception that new world blacks were emerging as global race leaders. Over 
a decade earlier, Casely Hayford had expressed a suspicion of African-American’s right to 
speak for the race. In an introduction to a collection of Blyden’s speeches in London, Casely 
Hayford opined that the ‘work of men like Booker T. Washington and W.E. Burghart Du 
Bois’ was ‘exclusive and provincial in a sense’, while Blyden’s work was ‘universal, 
covering the entire race and the entire race problem.’291 Although born in the Dutch West 
Indies, Blyden was of Ewe descent, spent much of his professional life in Liberia, and shared 
many of Casely Hayford’s cultural nationalist views. The idea that Du Bois and Washington 
did not share these authentic African credentials would have been enough reason for the 
unfavourable comparison.  
 By at least 1911, Du Bois was an influential international race representative. In that 
year he had acted as secretary for the U.S. delegation to the Universal Race Congress in 
London. The event was attended by delegations from 50 countries, a group which also 
included parliamentary presidents and delegates to the Second Hague Peace Conference.292 
As the editor of the NAACP newspaper, the Crisis, Du Bois was able to promote these events 
– and his participation at them – to a wide audience. In the pages of the Crisis and Atlantic, 
Du Bois had also published widely read diagnoses of the Great War. Du Bois argued that 
global racial hierarchy was a fundamental aspect of war for commercial and industrial 
dominance. The roots of world war were not just national jealousy nor competition for 
profits, but in theories of non-white inferiority and the belief that whites could ‘confiscate’ 
the land of ‘black, brown, and yellow peoples… work the natives at low wages, make large 
profits and open wide markets for cheap European manufactures.’293 Du Bois offered a 
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radical defence against ‘the imperial movement’ on behalf of Africa, and argued that white 
supremacy was the greatest hurdle to those ‘who desire peace and the civilisation of all 
men.’294 Du Bois’s Pan-African Congress, reconvened during the Paris Peace Conference in 
1919, became ‘a harbinger of a new consciousness that eventually percolated through the 
African diaspora.’295    
 Usually invoked as a theorist of the ‘colour line’, Du Bois’s universalism and his 
espousal of a global telos of World Civilisation are under-acknowledged aspects of his 
thought. Du Bois’s anti-imperialism stemmed in part from a Fabian belief in gradual progress 
towards universal socialism. Du Bois recognised important differences between civilisations, 
but these different civilisations should ultimately aspire to one global modern culture defined 
by a set of higher order values. WWI, which was caused by racist imperial rivalry, was a 
‘terrible overturning of civilization.’ Racial subjugation and war for territory had to end, but 
it was also necessary to ‘train native races in modern civilisation.’296 In an NAACP volume 
published in 1919, and titled Africa in the World Democracy, Du Bois laid out ‘a platform’ 
for ‘the future of Africa.’ In it, he advocated that the former German colonies in Africa be 
‘internationalised’, and reorganised ‘under the guidance of organized civilization.’297 The 
Governing International Commission should represent, not simply governments, but ‘modern 
culture—sciences, commerce, social reform and religious philanthropy.’298 Favourably 
quoting the words of journalist, Simeon Strunsky, in 1920’s Darkwater, Du Bois asks 
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Just as the common ownership of the northwest territory helped to weld the colonies 
into the United States, so could not joint and benevolent domination of Africa and of 
other backward parts of the world be a cornerstone upon which the future federation of 
the world could be built?299  
 
Du Bois did believe that Africa was to be governed by Africans – not African-Americans or 
Afro-Caribbeans -- at some stage.300 However, he took for granted top-down nation building 
as the approach for future international unification of Africa: 
 
If Africa unites, it will be because of each part, each nation, each tribe, gives up a part 
of its heritage for the good of the whole. That is what union means; that is what Pan-
Africa mean…. When the tribe becomes a union of tribes, the individual tribe 
surrenders some part of its freedom to the paramount tribe…. 
  When the nation arises, the constituent tribes, clans must each yield power and 
some freedom to the demands of the nation or the nation dies before it is born. Your 
local tribal, much-loved languages must yield to the few world tongues which serve the 
largest number of people and promote understanding and world literature.301  
 
 White hegemony undermined its own potential to lead in the work of civilisation 
because of its aggressive expansion of capital, preferential dispensation of democratic rights, 
and enforcement of a global colour line.302 Likewise, the United States’ treatment of its black 
citizens compromised that nation’s ability to claim its participation in the war as for the good 
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of world civilisation. In a 1917 speech to the Ninth Annual Convention of the Intercollegiate 
Socialist Society, Du Bois stated that he would condone world war if it were legitimately for 
the good of world civilization:                 
 
If at the cost of this World War, the death of millions and the sorrow and degradation of 
many millions more, if at that horrible cost we can put down anarchy among the 
nations, reduce them to some system of law and order, curb the bullying of the 
highwayman by armed international police and make the freedom of nation a freedom 
under law, as we have done partially with the individual, then the fight is worth every 
drop of blood that it costs…. But when the [United States] enters, can it enter and fight 
for such a stake? Are its hand reasonably clean and its soul sincere? I maintain that the 
one tremendous handicap which makes it almost impossible for this nation to fight with 
clear conscience or with untrammelled limbs is today, as yesterday, her attitude toward 
twelve million Americans of Negro descent.303 
  
 The turn-of-the-century discourse and set of policies characterised by essential 
African/black difference was transnational, and, as in the African context, determined how 
new world blacks argued in their own societies.304 While Du Bois advocated the guided 
civilisation of ‘native races’ on the one hand, his subject position within imperial hierarchy 
also obliged him to defend his race and its contributions to world culture. In 1924’s the Gift 
of Black Folk, Du Bois devoted each chapter to a different contribution made by the black 
race to the United States and to the democratic forces of the world. He narrated black 
contributions with reference to the cultural development of the race in relation to its 
geographical setting: ‘[t]he Negro is primarily an artist…. [th]e only race which had held at 
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bay the life destroying forces of the tropics, has gained therefrom in some slight 
compensation a sense of beauty, particularly for sound and color, which characterizes the 
race.’305 Against the imperial ideology that Africa was savage and had no culture of its own, 
he deployed the counter-narrative that Africa was once the site of powerful civilisations and 
complex, autogenous cultures.306 In the United States, the colour bar – exclusion of certain 
races from the upper echelons of modern society – was as important as the colour line. Du 
Bois’s view that blacks should be educated for leadership, cultural, and intellectual work was 
the ideological basis for his rivalry with Booker T. Washington, who argued that blacks 
should be trained in trades and form an organic society with white middle and upper classes. 
Du Bois’s controversial article which argued that blacks should ‘close ranks’ – i.e. set aside 
grievances -- with whites during WWI was, in part, a gambit to demonstrate black loyalty in 
the hope of greater social equality after the war.307 However, there is also strong evidence 
that the article was written to advance Du Bois’s own career, during a period when he was 
being considered for a captaincy-adjutant position at the U.S. War Department.308  
 Civilisation thus reflected the different worldmaking aspirations of different white and 
black leaders. While there were ideological bases for these visions of world civilisation, the 
concept was just as much a reflection of strategy and politics vis-à-vis rival leadership. For 
Wilson and the liberal imperialism of the League, civilisation represented global progress led 
by civilised nations, institutionalised by the mandates system. For African elites like Casely 
Hayford, civilisation represented global progress with more African integration and input, an 
aspiration most fully realised by indirect rule in the British Empire and the policy of 
association in the French Empire. For certain diasporic elites like W.E.B. Du Bois, 
civilisation represented Fabian global progress: advancements in democratic right and 
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economic justice guided by the most talented members of a social group. For others like 
Marcus Garvey, civilisation required the establishment of a black nation, economic and racial 
autonomy, the redemption of Africa, and the consolidation of leadership in the hands of black 
nation-builders. All of these projects were met with criticism from those who conceptualised 
world civilisation as desirable, but more importantly the prerogative of radical democratic 
control of the global order after 1918.   
 
3.5. ‘Civilisation(s)’ and the emergence of anti-imperial globalist critique 
 
Despite their relatively large influence, black leaders like Du Bois, Garvey, and Casely 
Hayford were not universally accepted spokesmen for the black race. The respective 
nationalisms of these three leaders were criticised from an alternative political position, 
which I defined in previous chapters as anti-imperial globalism. Du Bois’s, Garvey’s, and 
Casely Hayford’s criticism of anti-black racism and white supremacy, and the alternative 
globalisms they suggested, are of course helpful for giving a fuller picture of the political 
imaginaries, social forces, and economic rationales which shaped the post-war order. 
However, ‘white versus black’ was only one axis of a debate which was just as much about 
radical democratic control and egalitarianism. While the recovery and reinstatement of these 
figures to the social sciences in the last few years is certainly important, a singular focus on 
influential black representatives within white world order can bury the dissenting voices and 
animating questions which included but went beyond race ontologies. Sole emphasis on black 
– or non-white -- versus white plays into nationalist historiographies and romantic narratives 
which characterise emancipation as always self-generated. These narratives are difficult to 
square with historical analysis that does not take race as the only important factor. The fact is 
black leaders were held to question by black critics – not just for capitulating with whites -- 
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but for claiming to speak for the entire race, and for failing to consistently support radical 
democratic control as a universal principle.              
 
3.5.1. Rival leaders and the progress debate 
 
As was argued in the previous chapter, the representation of different particularisms within a 
globalising liberal universalism was a problem central to anti-imperial globalist critique. The 
problem emerged as a result of the deep disparities which defined global modernity, and the 
association of these disparities with definable traits which belonged to particular societies. 
While few articulated the more radical anti-imperial globalism which defined the post-1935 
period, and which included the need to go beyond ‘uplift’ or inclusion to revolutionise 
subjectivities, anti-imperial globalism is evident in the challenges to the democratic deficits 
implied by Du Bois’s and Garvey’s interwar worldmaking programmes. These democratic 
deficits served as fusillade for two important critics who will be discussed further below: 
Hubert Harrison and Cyril Briggs. However, they also served as the basis for Du Bois’s and 
Garvey’s criticisms of one another.  
 This is important because it speaks to the central contradiction of the twentieth 
century nation-building of colonised peoples. With the need to centralise and institutionalise 
representations of a nation – racially defined or otherwise – came the simultaneous need to 
deflect or undermine the oppressive, imperialist logics of such centralisation and 
institutionalisation. Minority leaders were obliged to assert counter-hegemonic movements 
which were effective at building support amongst internal and external groups; which needed 
to reflect some degree of national or cultural authenticity; and which were also obliged to 
offer a challenge to the deeper disparities of social inequality within their own communities 
and the larger world. Rather than produce a continuum of nationalism/internationalism which 
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flowed into one another as part of a coherent ideology, these multiple exigencies often 
produced inconsistency and confusion. Thus, a Du Bois could critique a Garvey for his 
imperialism, while at the same time suggesting a different imperialism of his own. These 
differences were social as well as ideological. Du Bois and Garvey disliked one another not 
just because of their leadership rivalry, but because each to the other represented an inferior 
social standing in relation to its ability to represent the race.                    
 Criticism of Du Bois and Garvey was precipitated by specific decisions that both 
leaders made, but these decisions were consistent with their broader worldmaking strategies. 
Du Bois’s crime was to pursue the captaincy at the War Department and to advocate that 
African-Americans ‘close ranks’ with whites during wartime. Garvey’s was to cooperate with 
white nativist organisations like the Ku Klux Klan, and to investigate the potential of an 
autonomous enclave for UNIA governance in Liberia. Du Bois’s critique of empire was 
complemented by loyal opposition to the United States, and this meant, ultimately, the United 
States government. Thus, Du Bois’s black nationalism was not about keeping the races 
separate, but about pushing the United States to better reflect its democratic pluralist promise 
to the world. ‘[P]olitical power for the Negro citizens of the United States’ was a 
foundational issue on which global democracy rested, because, Du Bois argued, the United 
States was ultimately the best leader for the improvement of the rest of the world. ‘[I]f 
democracy fails in the United States’, Du Bois said at the Interracial Conference in 
Washington, D.C., December, 1928, ‘and fails because of our attitude toward a darker people, 
what about democracy in the world, and particularly in India, China, in Japan and in Egypt? 
We have got a chance today, and an unrivalled chance, again to rescue and guide the world, 
as we did at the end of the eighteenth century.’309  
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 The assumption on which Garvey’s worldmaking rested was that ‘the Negro… must 
build a civilization of his own or forever remain the white man’s victim.’310 This led Garvey 
to welcome anti-black white nativism, because he believed it would better emphasise the 
crisis conditions of black and white relations than any appeal to social equality. In one 
instance he suggested that ‘lynchings and race riots… work to our advantage.’311 In 1922 he 
met and ‘conferred amicably’ with KKK Imperial Wizard Edward Young Clarke, 
corresponded with Earnest Sevier Cox of the White America Society, with John Powell of the 
Anglo Saxon Clubs of America, and also accepted financial donations from white nativist 
groups to ‘repatriate’ blacks to Africa.312 Comparing the KKK to Du Bois’s NAACP, Garvey 
said, ‘give me the Klan for their honesty of purpose towards the Negro. They are better 
friends of my race, for telling us what they are, and what they mean.’313 
 Garvey did not hold that racial hierarchy was unavoidable, but race was a 
fundamental and timeless category of social existence, and races needed to be kept separate 
and pure in order for the black race to attain parity with the white.314 Garvey’s worldview 
was underpinned by race realism, but also a Christian universalism which deferred more 
radical social improvement to some eschatological future. In February, 1924, Garvey 
published a tribute to the recently deceased Woodrow Wilson as a ‘great loss’ to the ‘white 
world.’ In the tribute, Garvey wrote that Wilson had made a ‘blunder’ by promoting global 
democracy on behalf of minority nations. This was because the achievement of ‘the liberation 
of weaker peoples’ would have ‘resulted in a terrible compromise between the dominant 
white races and the darker peoples of the world who were being kept down by the former.’ 
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Proclaiming a standard of ‘larger democracy and freedom’ for darker races was ‘against the 
interest of the scattered and separate dominant white groups.’ The League of Nations was 
thus a unity of white races which resulted from the scaling back of this promise. 
‘Materialism’ and racial competition were unavoidable realities of the twentieth century, and 
peace would only be achieved through ‘the return of Christ or some one [sic] greater than 
Christ.’315                               
 As part of black self-help, Garvey announced plans to force Europe out of Liberia to 
set up an autonomous enclave for the UNIA. C.D.B. King (1875-1961), Liberia’s president, 
ejected Garvey and the UNIA when colonial powers began to make inquiries about Garvey’s 
plans.316 Despite praising Garvey’s charisma and success in establishing the feasibility of a 
return to Africa, Du Bois lambasted Garvey for his mismanagement of finances and his 
imperialist disposition towards Liberia. ‘He proposes to settle his headquarters in Liberia’, 
Du Bois stated, ‘but has he asked permission of the Liberian government? Does he presume 
to usurp authority in a land which has successfully withstood England, France and the United 
States—but is expected tamely to submit to Marcus Garvey?’317 During their more heated 
rivalry in the mid-1920s, Du Bois’s remarks about Garvey dispensed with niceties, and 
displayed barely coded attacks on his lower status, boorishness, and sloppy management of 
the UNIA’s affairs.318     
 Garvey criticised Du Bois for his espousal of social equality, which Garvey argued 
only served to ‘subjugate the Negro race’, and Du Bois’s appeals to a larger humanity and 
world civilisation as a distraction from the particular victimhood of blacks and the mission of 
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building a black nation.319 Garvey accused Du Bois of hating his ‘black blood’, and building 
unity between white liberals and middle class blacks to lead blacks into an eternity of 
subjugation. ‘The question is no longer between the white man and the Negro’, Garvey wrote 
in a characteristic front page editorial, ‘but gradually it is becoming one between Negroes 
themselves.’320 Garvey’s comments on Du Bois reflect a consistent mistrust of mixed race 
people, and he would frequently associate mixed race with inauthenticity, race betrayal, and 
chauvinist attitudes towards poorer blacks. There is a high likelihood that this suspicion was 
inculcated in Garvey during his Jamaican upbringing, where admixture of ‘white blood’ was 
often a badge of higher social rank.321 Class resentment might have been present in Garvey’s 
first meeting with Du Bois, where the former took an immediate dislike to the latter based on 
‘his color, his formal education, his expensive clothes, his cultural tastes, his imported 
cigarettes.’322 These class differences became symbolic of Du Bois’s and Garvey’s 
organisations. As one of Garvey’s associates wrote, ‘[t]he NAACP appeals to the Beau 
Brummel, Lord Chesterfield, kid-gloved, silk stocking, creased-trousered, patent leather 
shoe… element, while the UNIA appeals to the… hard-working man… [Du Bois] appeals to 
the ‘talented tenth’ while Garvey appeals to the Hoi Polloi.’323  
 The rivalry between Du Bois and Garvey is indicative of the social fault lines which 
served to divide black (inter)nationalist movements. Despite their differences, the two leaders 
had a lot in common ideologically. Both espoused the redemption of the black race, the 
common enemy of white supremacy and imperialism, and a return to Africa. Both were also 
in thrall to white patrons and the ‘civilising’ ideology which set the parameters for attitudes 
towards racial uplift on a global scale. These ideologies came under scrutiny from radicals 
who began to annunciate a more radical attack on ‘civilisationism.’ 
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3.5.2. ‘Civilisationism’ and its discontents 
 
An early form of anti-imperial globalism is present in the criticism of black imperialism from 
black radicals during the interwar period. Although these criticisms were relatively marginal 
and fell short of demands for revolution, they invoked an image of global progress which was 
not built on the prospect of blacks building imperial hierarchies to reproduce the logics of 
white imperialists. Within these debates grew the tension between white and European 
hegemony on one side, and hierarchy within black societies on the other.  
 The hierarchical structure of a white world order created the need to lure white 
patronage. Whether it was liberals, racist white supremacy groups, or international 
communists, whites held the majority of the political power and finances. Yet, because of this 
dependency, and because of the need to mobilise around racial identity, black leaders and 
movements have often been obliged to deny the importance of white patronage.324 This 
dynamic became particularly evident in the discourse about ‘the Negro Renaissance’ in the 
United States during Jim Crow and the Age of Booker T. Washington. As Adolph Reed Jr. 
writes in a passage worth quoting at length, 
 
For all its advocacy of black primacy over black affairs, the Negro Renaissance was 
dependent upon and reflected its clientage to white patronage. Hence Du Bois often 
was ambivalent in identification of his audiences, alternately and sometimes in a given 
text simultaneously addressing the black elite, which he exhorted to be independent and 
to meet its historic duties, and liberal whites. In the Renaissance case the material 
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condition underlying the ambivalence was ironic because of the assertiveness that 
characterises his praise of the racial spirit.  
  The pursuit of white patronage had been a central feature of Afro-American 
political and intellectual activity at least since the Age of Washington. Washington 
directed his appeal definitively to indigenous white advocates of the New South and 
their eastern capitalist affiliations, and Du Bois’s criticism seems largely directed at that 
same constituency—as, for example, when he exhorted the “Men of America” to make 
the Talented Tenth the leaders of the race. Those “Men” were white elites—
philanthropists and other opinion makers. Notwithstanding its literary merits and other 
substantive accomplishment, herein lies much of the historical significance of the Souls 
of Black Folk: in that volume Du Bois raised more coherently the demand for expanded 
access to the white elite agencies that were or could have been involved in disposition 
of the place of the Afro-American population in the developing order of corporate 
capitalism.325              
  
 Du Bois’s practice of both defending the potential of blacks to be civilised, as well as 
defending traditional African folkways and particularities, stemmed in part from the 
contradictions in engaging these different audiences. Civilisation was to take place with 
respect to inherent group traits – a sentiment which appealed to dominant ideas about African 
difference and autonomy – but ‘postulation of an exotic black particularity’ also 
demonstrated the need for a cultured, educated black elite as ‘spokespersons’, ‘keepers and 
translators of the culture’ with respect to a white constituency. The representation of African 
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exoticism would have also appealed to middle and upper class white audiences during a 
moment when concern with ‘overcivilisation’ was in vogue with affluent urban whites.326  
 Thus, radicals viewed aspiring race leaders with an eye that was sometimes 
constructively critical, and sometimes simply suspicious. More severe claims of race betrayal 
were not always entirely unfounded, but were also somewhat insensitive to the realities of 
attempting to build effective mass movements without white patronage. Hegemony and 
hierarchy created structural effects which could not simply be circumvented with the ‘right’ 
policy. These difficulties were mirrored when radicals attempted to build anti-imperial 
movements with and without the support of organised international communism.327 
 Two important contrapuntal figures to Du Bois and Garvey were the intellectual 
activists Hubert Harrison and Cyril Briggs. Harrison was born in the U.S. Virgin Islands, 
settled in Harlem in his late teens, and went on to become the central figure in the ‘New 
Negro’ movement as founder of the Liberty League and its newspaper the Voice.328  Harrison 
was an important influence on Garvey, who, before meeting Harrison, espoused an ideology 
more in line with his previous mentor, Dusé Mohamed Ali (1866-1945), the London-based 
publisher of Africa Times and Orient Review. Both Mohamed and Harrison advocated the 
advancement of non-white people, but for the former, this advancement was to take place 
within the contours of a more inclusive and benevolent British Empire. Until meeting 
Harrison in 1916, as part of Garvey’s involvement with the Liberty League, Garvey had also 
pledged the UNIA’s patriotic support to the British Empire and its opposition to German 
imperial ambitions in Africa.329 Harrison was a member of the Socialist Party until 1912, 
when he left over its compromises with racist groups and the white establishment, as well as 
                                                          
326 Ibid.: 58 
327 The relationship between black radical anti-imperialists and international communism is analysed in depth 
in the next chapter.  
328 For more on Harrison’s life and thought see, James (1998) and Perry (2009).  
329 Ewing, 2014: 71 
P a g e  | 115 
 
its purge of its own left wing in the early 1910s.330 He consistently expressed anti-imperialist 
views, and was a proponent of a ‘Colored International’ which would present a united front 
against global white supremacy. This was to be an organisation of ‘the downtrodden section 
of the human population of the globe’ based on ‘business, industrial and commercial 
relations.’331 Harrison was also a diligent critic of black leadership. In 1910, he submitted 
letters to the New York Sun branding Booker T. Washington an accomodationist. Washington 
saw the letters and used his connections to get Harrison fired.332 
 Cyril Briggs was born in Nevis, immigrated to the United States sometime in the early 
1900s, and became an editor for the Amsterdam News in 1912. Briggs had already formed 
anti-imperialist views before WWI, and his criticism of the United States’ entry into the war 
brought him into conflict with the publisher of the Amsterdam News.333 He founded his own 
paper, the Crusader, in 1918, and an associated society, the African Blood Brotherhood in 
1919.334 Like Harrison, Briggs saw the struggles of non-white groups as connected, and 
consistently advocated black (inter)nationalism as a necessary stage to the construction of a 
greater amelioration of class and racial hierarchy. Also like Harrison, he supported black 
leaders to a point – especially Garvey – but became critical when they revealed authoritarian, 
imperialist, or accomodationist tendencies.  
 As critic of both white hegemony and black leadership, Harrison articulated one of the 
more potent early condemnations of civilisation ideology in the black Atlantic context. 
Harrison used the concept of civilisation in three senses. First, as a cultural standard, or the 
transferable cultural practices of a more advanced society. He used this meaning, similar to 
Du Bois and Garvey, in the context of black Africa’s past as an important conveyor of 
civilisation. In an October 1919 issue of New Negro, Harrison published a column which 
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advocated the reprint of Herodotus’s histories to be sold at low prices for the benefit of black 
youth. Harrison wrote that Herodotus ‘points out… that many of the Egyptians were black 
and all of them were dark; that the Greeks derived their art and science and religion from 
them; that the black Ethiopians gave civilisation to Egypt and often reigned and ruled over 
them.’335  
 The second sense was deployed as a critique of Western imperialist logics. 
‘Civilisationism’ was a way to justify white material supremacy, conquest, and despotism: 
‘The white race rests its claim to superiority on the frankly materialistic ground that it has the 
guns, soldiers, the money and resources to keep it in the position of the top-dog and to make 
its will go. This is what white men mean by civilisation, disguise it how they may.’336 In this 
sense civilisation was connected to white imperialists’ espousal of ‘democracy’, which had 
nothing to do with the dispensation of political power to the greatest number of people: 
‘”democracy”… is more valuable as a battle-cry than as a real belief to be practised by those 
who profess it.’337 In December 1918, just before the Paris Peace Conference was held, 
Harrison wrote  
 
the Allied governments are making it known that “freedom of the seas” means a 
benevolent naval despotism maintained by them, and that “democracy” means simply 
the transfer of Germany’s African land to England and the others. Africa at the peace 
table constitutes the real stakes which the winners will rake in. We may read in 
headlines the startling item “Negroes Ask For German Colonies,” but Negros of sense 
should not be deluded. They will not get them because they have no battleships, no 
guns, no force, military or financial. They are not a Power.’338 
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Harrison agreed with Du Bois’s assessment of the war as a European fight over Africa, but 
Harrison’s comments here can be read as an acidic rejoinder to anyone who believed, like Du 
Bois, that international administration over German colonies by ‘civilised democracies’ was 
anything but a land grab backed by superior military power. Harrison had earlier launched a 
direct critique of Du Bois, reiterating suspicion about Du Bois’s connection to the War 
Department and his overly friendly relationship with government and military officials.339 
Later he condemned Du Bois for ‘his belated discovery of Wilsonian hypocrisy’ which would 
render him unable ‘to climb back into the saddle of race leadership.’340   
 Harrison’s third meaning of civilisation was used as a defence of contemporaneous 
African societies, both against white imperialism and the chauvinism of new world blacks. In 
an article entitled ‘On “Civilising” Africa’, published in 1920 in Negro World, Harrison 
argued that white people did not understand what civilisation meant if they suggested that 
Africa was uncivilised. ‘[I]t is clear to the instructed’, Harrison wrote, ‘that various 
“civilisations” not only have existed in Africa, but do exist there today, independently of that 
particular brand which white people are taking there in exchange for the untold millions of 
dollars which they take from there.’ Harrison redefined civilisation from a set of particular 
cultural beliefs and practices which could be assessed as superior or inferior to others, to 
simply meaning ‘a stable society which supports itself and maintains a system of government 
and laws, industry and commerce.’341 In what can be read as a response to Garvey’s assertion 
that new world blacks should re-colonise Africa and give them the benefit of their contact 
with Western civilisation, Harrison wrote, ‘let us American Negroes go to Africa, live among 
the natives and LEARN WHAT THEY HAVE TO TEACH US (for they have much to teach 
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us).’342 From 1920 to 1924, during which Garvey was under investigation and later convicted 
for mail fraud, Harrison became more directly critical of Garvey, his person and his 
programme for African redemption. Harrison wrote that Garvey was small of spirituality and 
intellect, petty and self-aggrandising, and ‘knew next to nothing of Africa.’343  
 Compared to Harrison, Du Bois, and Garvey, Briggs employed ‘civilisation’ 
infrequently, although other contributors to the Crusader did. In an October 1919 issue of the 
Crusader, Briggs approvingly reprinted a passage from the Wisconsin Weekly Blade which 
stated, ‘Radicalism is the herald of progress, the handmaiden of reform, a guide to 
civilization.’344 Briggs also occasionally used civilisation in the racial vindicationist sense. In 
a February 1920 issue, he accused whites of misrepresenting the black race as ‘inherently 
inferior to the white race and producing in all its existence no civilisation higher than that of 
the cannibalistic age.’ He added ‘[a]bsolutely ignored is the fact… that the Black man gave 
birth to civilization in Meroe, on the Upper Nile, and later gave the impetus to human 
progress which has resulted in the splendid material achievements of the present day.’345  
 For Briggs, global progress was more clearly articulated to the idea of world 
democracy. Unlike Du Bois’s vision of world democracy, Briggs more firmly stated the 
principle that it was to be driven by labour movements, and that, if not necessary, it was to be 
achieved by the colonised taking up arms and using force. As with Harrison, Briggs’s 
anticolonial nationalist and anti-imperial globalist views were sharpened in the case of white 
administration of the formerly German African colonies after WWI. Briggs challenged the 
allied nations’ professed support for democracy in an article published in January 1919 
entitled ‘Africa and World Democracy.’ Briggs wrote ‘Whether there really exists… a 
genuine attachment to democratic principles will be shown by the manner in which these 
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principles… are applied to African and the African peoples’; and, ‘[i]s the world about to 
witness the long-prophesized universal reign of justice that shall assure universal peace? Or 
must Negroes prepare to use force to realize their just aspirations? Will the end of this war 
see Asia and Africa united against a race of Kaisers?’346 Predictably, Briggs criticised Du 
Bois as ‘one of the leaders who are counselling patience and a surrender, during war time, of 
Negro rights.’347 Brigg’s African Blood Brotherhood would attempt to work with the Pan-
African Congress over the next few years; however, ideological disagreements between the 
groups over whether blacks should join with other anticolonial movements in India and the 
rest of the world led to conflict. Finding the Pan-African Congress too accommodating to 
empire – particularly its Francophone African contingent – the African Blood Brotherhood 
increasingly sought alliances with international communism.348      
 By contrast with Harrison, Du Bois, and Garvey, Briggs’s belief in the importance of 
a popular working class front also led him to not give up on the prospect of black labour 
forming strategic alliances with white labour. Furthermore, his belief in full racial equality 
meant that he did not share Garvey’s, and sometimes Du Bois’s, conservative views on 
preserving racial purity. Briggs argued that the  
 
class-conscious white workers who have spoken out in favor of African liberation and 
have shown a willingness to back with action their expressed sentiments must also be 
considered as actual allies and their friendship further cultivated. The non-class 
conscious white workers who have not yet realized that all workers regardless of race 
or color, have a common interest, must be considered as potential allies at present and 
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everything possible done to awaken their class-consciousness toward the end of 
obtaining their co-operation in our struggle.349  
 
Once a supporter of Garvey, Briggs switched his position when he learned that Garvey’s 
belief in the separation of races led him to cooperate with the KKK. For Briggs, black 
nationalism and anti-imperialism could not mean the separation of black and white people, 
and the preservation of race over racial equality. In one of many rebukes of Garvey in later 
issues of the Crusader, Briggs wrote  
 
Next he [Garvey] speaks of Negroes settling down in communities of white as if there’s 
any “settling down” to be done to put Negroes in communities of whites! Negroes are 
already in such communities, and the need for full racial equality, including social 
equality, etc. would exist even if Negroes were all to go back to Africa. An independent 
Africa would have to have diplomats and commercial agents in white and other 
communities…. Nobody can accuse the Japanese of trying to “settle down in 
communities of whites and by social contact and miscegenation bring about a new 
type.” Yet it is a well-known fact that the Japanese are scrupulous guardians of their 
right to live where they please and to marry whom they choose.350    
   
 At the same time, Briggs was an ardent racial nationalist, and like the others, saw the 
political and economic integration of black societies as the logical fulfilment of a nationalist 
internationalism which could eventually confront hegemonic white world order. Briggs stated 
that black ‘[l]abor organizations’ should be united and a pan-African army formed. In the 
same way as Sinn Fein ‘built up the Irish Republican Army under the very nose of England’, 
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Briggs advocated that ‘modern arms be smuggled into Africa. Men sent into Africa in the 
guise of missionaries, etc. to establish a relations with the Senussi, the various tribes of the 
interior, and to study the topography of the country.’351 This was to be undertaken in parallel 
with the amalgamation of ‘all Negro organizations’ on ‘a Federation basis, thus creating a 
united, centralized Movement.’352                
 Harrison and Briggs disagreed on certain issues, yet, if we take their positions 
together, we can see an early form of the critical problematique and global telos which I 
define as anti-imperial globalism. Without uncritically embracing the logics of Western 
civilisationism, nor rejecting the idea of world civilisation in principle, Harrison and Briggs 
give insight into the value of the concept in strategic worldmaking discourse after WWI. 
Although Harrison’s call to learn from Africa displayed little acknowledgement of class and 
hierarchy within continental African societies, his criticism of new world black chauvinism, 
support for class-consciousness and radical democracy displayed an alternative global vision 
to others who aspired to lead the race. Likewise, Briggs displayed some new world 
chauvinism in his espousal of the right of American blacks to lead the race on a global 
scale,353 yet his belief in world democracy led by labour, and opinion that full racial equality 
was the ultimate aim, demonstrated an early form of anti-imperial world politics which would 
be further developed by intellectual activists in the post-1945 context.           
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Chapter 4 
To unite the many against the few: 




In 1937, a young Nigerian journalist and politician, Benjamin Nnamdi “Zik” Azikiwe wrote 
and published his first book, Renascent Africa. Born in Northern British Nigeria, Azikiwe 
had studied at Howard University and the University of Pennsylvania before travelling back 
to Africa where he founded the African Morning Post in Accra, and later the West African 
Pilot in Lagos. The latter newspaper was to become an important forum for anticolonial and 
pan-African discourse up until Nigeria’s independence, when Azikiwe became Nigeria’s first 
president. In Renascent Africa, Azikiwe surveyed the political spectrum of African opinion 
on empire and colonialism. In his view, ‘rightists’, ‘centrists’, and ‘leftists’ disagreed 
fundamentally on the question of the track record of ‘European civilization’ in Africa. The 
rightist believed that ‘European influences have improved the African people, materially and 
intellectually’; the centrist that Africans should work with Europe but ’eschew the worst 
phases of European civilization and emulate the best ones’; and the leftist that ‘European 
influences have impaired rather than improved the African.’354     
 Azikiwe’s characterisation of the African political spectrum on the colonial issue 
serves as a reminder of the range of interests and opinions which would eventually be 
diminished by dominant historiographies of the post-colonial nation-state. The hierarchical 
structure of imperial society had created classes of loyal clients, critical moderates, and 
revolutionaries. Revolutionaries were rarely subaltern peasants, but a class of educated 
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intellectuals who objected to the injustices of the colonial order, and who drew upon the 
failures of white world order and working class and subaltern unrest to mobilise anticolonial 
sentiment. Some, such as the Trinidadian George Padmore (born Malcolm Nurse) helped to 
establish a broad transcontinental network of revolutionaries and more moderate nationalists. 
Thus, between 1930 and 1960, revolution became a new articulation of anti-imperial world 
politics—not the only, but a new dominant form of counter-hegemonic response to European 
empire.  
 This chapter argues that, instead of being purely for the goal of national sovereignty, 
revolution in this context was about creating lasting egalitarian relations between 
transnational societies and social groups.355 A major challenge and limit for anti-imperial 
revolution was the race, class, and gender divisions already established by imperial society. 
In articulating revolutionary aims, anti-imperial globalists implied a tension between the local 
and the global: between segregation and integration, nationalism and internationalism, the 
demands of a revolutionary multitude and the demands of inter-governmental world politics.          
 Rather than representing a widespread and already existing national consciousness, 
the articulation to revolutionary discourse in the West Indian, North American, and African 
contexts was the product of a particular network of actors, who built revolutionary 
momentum over a relatively brief period of time.356 This discursive transformation was 
brought about partly by the continuance of strike actions and revolts in the colonies, but these 
events were reread and narrated through a new lens of global economic collapse, Gandhism 
and the partition of India, the rise of Fascism in Europe, the Stalinisation of international 
Communism, and the failure of liberal democratic hegemons to intervene on behalf of 
Ethiopia when it was invaded by Mussolini in 1935. Even in the years immediately after 1935 
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and the transnational outcry of racial grievance it elicited, relatively few British and French 
colonial subjects called for a revolution against European empire, fewer still an end to 
imperialism in the abstract. Yet, a small network of theorist activists was able to draw on the 
wider perception of world crisis to mobilise a faster retreat from empire than almost anyone 
had expected. 
 A key component of anti-imperial revolution in this context was the connection of 
white hegemony’s global crisis to imperial social hierarchy. As we saw in the last chapter, 
theorist activists such as Du Bois had previously linked world war to racial hierarchy. But the 
new generation framed crisis as a recurrent feature of an essentially unstable and destructive 
global economy, for which, time and time again, ‘the darker nations’ would be forced to 
shoulder the greatest burden. Revolution as an anti-imperial discourse shared political space 
with more moderate politics with respect to empire. It was with regard to this larger problem-
space that anticolonial nationalists and anti-imperial globalists looked to revolution as a 
means to achieve ‘independence now’ – to reference the slogan of Nkrumah’s Gold Coast 
revolution – but also, and often conflictingly, to more fundamentally transform relations 
between and within different social groups.  
 While the class and racial alliances forged through imperial networks expedited West 
African and West Indian independence, they were always fragile, and eventually fell victim 
to the same social, political, and economic fissures which existed before they were 
assembled. Because of the range of potentially divergent interests within the anti-imperial 
movement, Padmore, Azikiwe, and others such as Claude Mckay, Frantz Fanon, and 
Padmore’s boyhood friend, C.L.R. James, continued to push the critique of imperial society 
to the point where it implied a remade state-society relationship, which would not be 
reducible to territorial or racial sovereignty. 
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 This chapter traces an outline of the pan-African histories leading to West Indian and 
West African independence, but more directly it aims to historicise the relationship between 
the concept of revolution and ‘non-Western thought.’ As with civilisation in the previous 
chapter, I am interested in revolution as an ‘actor’s category’: what was implied by the people 
who used the term. In other words, ‘revolution’ is analysed here in terms of its articulation as 
an anti-imperial counter-discourse, which mobilised a sociohistorically specific public. While 
Eurocentric scholarly memory has largely reduced anticolonial revolution to a rational-
modern pursuit of sovereignty – especially within IR – anti-imperial discourse from 1930 to 
1960 is better characterised by the tension between the dual demand for revolution for 
sovereignty and world revolution. Revolution for sovereignty represented the need to build 
autonomous institutions, which reflected grassroots democratic control, or black leaders and 
black institutions for black constituencies. World revolution represented the interdependence 
of black movements with multi-racial societies, and the interdependence of local struggles 
with transnational struggles, international institutions and international moral opinion. For 
thinkers like Padmore, James, Du Bois, and Fanon, the African and West Indian revolutions 
became metonymic symbols for world revolution: parts representing a whole, which, in terms 
of their ideological scope, encompassed the transformation of world order, states, and even 
individual subjectivities.  
 Against some anti-Eurocentric scholarship, I argue that the range of ideas expressed 
in this period are not reducible to wholesale acceptance of Western universalisms. While 
there was an eventual acceptance of certain premises of rational political authority, power 
taking, and liberal nation-building, there were also conscious efforts to sustain critique and 
work beyond narrow ethno-nationalism and economic reductionism in favour of principles of 
non-conformity and cultural self-determination. Not all anti-imperialists of the interwar 
period accepted that progress could be reduced to nation-building or worldmaking in the form 
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of self-governance. Self-governance was a necessary aspect of self-determination, but the 
definition of the ‘self’ or what constituted ‘self-determination’ were always also expressed in 
terms of social relations and culture. For some, cultural self-determination and social equality 
within the relations of empire mattered more than self-governance. For others, self-
governance either mattered more than cultural self-determination and social equality, or was 
a necessary stage to attain them. Anti-imperial movements were products of the structure of 
imperial social relations, especially of metropolitan contact zones and transnational print 
media, and were thus comprised of plural cultures and interests. The desire for sustained 
solidarity between groups was sometimes expressed as a need to institutionalise cultural 
particularism as a universal principle. This was often articulated as a federal structure with 
democratic authority vested in different culturally-defined groups. 
 The debates which took on particular racial or civilisational characteristics during this 
period continue in the form of critiques of imperial hierarchy. For example, between liberal 
cosmopolitanism and ‘communitarian’ resistance; diasporic outlooks vs. nationalist 
sentiment; or deterministic vs. non-deterministic progress.357 This chapter not only argues 
that earlier versions of these fissures were there before decolonisation, but they help explain 
why a pan-African political consciousness did not survive in a more radically integrative 
institutional form after the early 1960s. This is not a reading based purely on South-South 
relations, because nationalist self-understandings and self-representations were always tied to 
strategic necessity vis-à-vis the imperial powers. This is especially the case with regards to 
the changing sets of relations brought on by the Cold War.    
  
 4.2. ‘Revolution’ as an articulation of anti-imperial world politics 
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4.2.1. Colonial Communism assembles and unravels   
 
The initial world political process which made possible the emergence of a transnational 
revolutionary public was the spread of Leninist anti-imperialism to the colonies, and, after 
Lenin’s death, the reeling in of the COMINTERN under Stalin. Despite the fragility of the 
revolutionary movement in Russia, Lenin’s COMINTERN was a robust franchise, which was 
seen to some as a force for social, economic, and political revolution across the colonised 
world. The COMINTERN was eventually reduced to a shadow of its world revolutionary 
promise due to the failure of the revolution in Western Europe, Stalin’s purges, and détente 
with the Allies. According to George Padmore and C.L.R. James, Stalin had reworked the 
Soviet Union into an autocratic empire with little to offer the colonised apart from a leftist 
alternative to the existing white world order. For some in the diaspora this was nothing to 
scoff at. The actor and activist Paul Robeson (1898-1976) refused to criticise Stalin for this 
reason.358 For others, the anti-imperial promise of international communism would need to 
shift entirely to the colonised themselves.   
 Born in Arouca, Trinidad in 1903, George Padmore’s trajectory is emblematic of the 
convergences and divergences in international communist, diaspora, and colonial nationalist 
organisation which emerged in the late 1920s. In many ways a keystone of Atlantic anti-
imperial activism between 1932 and 1957, and now claimed by both Marxist and 
postcolonial/decolonial scholars, it is difficult to distil Padmore down to a single political 
ideology.359 As a prolific journalist, propagandist, and organiser, he relentlessly opposed the 
British Empire and racial hierarchy, and applied himself and his thought to different 
individuals, organisations, and leftist ideologies, increasingly in the direction of African 
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independence. Until 1933, he was a dedicated agent of the COMINTERN, and he helped 
leverage imperial injustice and the apparent fragility of global capitalism to build 
international support against liberal democratic empires. After he left the party, he continued 
to draw inspiration from Lenin’s colonial policy, but with his own added emphasis on race 
and the revolutionary potential of the colonies.    
 For Padmore this was more a matter of political horizons than partisanship. The ends 
– a sovereign polity which would strengthen and protect democratic pluralism, at least 
politically and racially, if not culturally -- mattered more than ideological partisanship. 
Writing on the eve of the Gold Coast’s independence, an event which he had been an 
important player in expediting, Padmore testified to Lenin’s vision of a pluralist Russian 
polity which would ensure the interests of the peasantry and ‘racial minorities.’ Lenin’s party 
was ‘alone among the anti-autocracy organizations’ in taking ‘a firm, uncompromising 
position on the question of national freedom and self-determination’, but it also organised 
internationally to build a united front against imperialism.360 In a letter written twelve years 
earlier to his publisher, Padmore wished that his own government, the British Empire, could 
be converted into a ‘British Socialist Common Wealth Federation – white and coloured.’361 
Lenin’s policy of offering non-Russian minorities self-determination ‘had a tremendous 
psychological effect upon the backward peoples not only in Asiatic Russian [sic] but 
throughout the Orient.’ In Padmore’s reading, the inclusion of ‘millions of… newly-
emancipated coloured peoples of the Asiatic borderlands’ was crucial in delivering victory 
for the ‘Soviet Government’ against the ‘White Guard aristocrats.’362 In a passage which 
could just as well be read as a characterisation of Padmore himself, Padmore characterised 
Lenin as a ‘faithful disciple of Marx’ who nevertheless ‘disavowed dogmatism.’ Lenin ‘was a 
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realist who refused to follow blindly his master’s theories’, which was why Lenin turned 
away from Western Europe after the revolution was routed in those countries after WWI, and 
towards ‘the coloured peoples of Asia, in particular, the hundreds of millions of China.’363               
 The spread of left anti-imperialism in colonial and diaspora circles before the death of 
Lenin meant that the vision of a global anti-imperial vanguard managed to survive and spread 
despite the retreat of Bolshevism into Stalinist authoritarianism. Asian members like M.N. 
Roy, Sen Katayama (1859-1933), and Qu Quibai (1899-1935) had helped open the 
COMINTERN to new world black radicals like Claude McKay and Otto Huiswoud (1893-
1961).364 Roy in particular sought to open the organisation ideologically as well as racially by 
stressing the revolutionary potential of Indian peasant cultures.365 Some left anti-imperialists 
from the colonies found themselves in high levels of government. Although not a member of 
the Communist Party, Padmore’s ‘distinguished countryman’, the Chinese-Trinidadian 
Eugene Chen (1878-1944), was made Foreign Minister of Sun Yat-sen’s government, where 
he pushed for anti-imperial policies and negotiated the British concession of Hankou.366      
 With the Wall Street Crash, 1929 should have been a shot in the arm for the 
COMINTERN’s activities among colonised populations. By 1921, the revolution had 
stagnated in Europe, resulting mostly in the creation of minority opposition parties. After 
initial success, the Chinese communist vanguard was destroyed after Chiang Kai-shek’s 
(1887-1975) purge of Communists from the Kuomintang-Communist alliance in 1927. 
Similarly disastrous armed insurrections occurred in Bulgaria (1923), Germany (1923), and 
Indonesia (1926).367 The Great Crash had quickly developed into a global depression by 
1931. A fall in US industrial production, which hit one third of the total between 1929 and 
1931, spread to Germany where it did similar damage. From there came a drop in the price of 
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primary goods, which hit several markets throughout the colonised world. This included the 
Gold Coast, the nation that Padmore would eventually help attain formal independence, 
where two thirds of foodstuff imports fell and the peasant-based cocoa market was 
decimated.368  
 By 1931, Padmore was still a member of the party and he used party publications to 
raise the alarm about what the Great Crash and subsequent Great Slump meant for the 
colonised. In the pages of the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers’ 
(ITUCNW) journal, Negro Worker, and his first book entitled the Life and Struggles of Negro 
Toilers, Padmore put the problem thusly,   
 
Since the present crisis of world capitalism begun [sic] the economic, political and 
social status of the Negro toilers are becoming ever worse and worse. The reason for 
this is obvious: the imperialists, whether American, English, French, Belgian, etc., etc., 
are frantically trying to find a way out of their difficulties. In order to do so, they are 
not only intensifying the exploitation of the white workers in the various imperialist 
countries by launching an offensive through mean of rationalisation, wage cuts, 
abolition of social insurance, unemployment, etc., but they are turning their attention 
more and more towards Africa and other black semi-colonies (Haiti, Liberia), which 
represent the last stronghold of world imperialism. In this way the bourgeoisie hope to 
unload the major burden of the crisis on the shoulders of the black colonial and semi-
colonial masses.369  
  
  Ideological coherence within existing membership, as well the potential for the 
COMINTERN to branch out to non-communist colonial nationalists, was severely challenged 
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by the Stalinisation of the COMINTERN. A salient example of the new tension which 
emerged between the party line and colonial nationalism can be seen in the trajectory of the 
League Against Imperialism (LAI), which lasted from 1927 until it was abandoned by the 
Communists in 1936. Vijay Prashad suggests that the first meeting of the LAI in Brussels in 
1927 was where the earliest incarnation of the Third World idea was formed.370 Brussels was 
chosen deliberately as the venue for the conference following the U.S. and Britain’s tepid 
condemnation of Belgium’s predatory reign in the Congo. The name of the organisation was 
itself a repudiation of the imperialism of the League of Nations. The event was funded by the 
COMINTERN, probably with assistance from the Kuomintang and the Mexican government. 
It was largely organised by the Berlin-based communists Willi Münzenberg (1889-1940) and 
Virendranath Chattopadhyaya (1880-1937), the latter of whom was a friend and early 
political influence of Jawaharlal Nehru.371 The LAI congress in Brussels was attended by 
both communists and radical nationalists without formal links to the Soviet government, 
including future national leaders like Sukarno and Nehru. Somewhat slow on the uptake, 
British Intelligence only became convinced that the LAI was a challenge to British imperial 
rule by 1930. This concern was placed on the white, German Münzenberg, who, according to 
British Intelligence was the spider at the centre of the web, and who was prohibited from 
entering Britain in March of 1930.372  
 However, cracks in the LAI were already beginning to show by 1929.373 Despite the 
presence of some Communist Party members from South Africa, as well as a memorable 
critique of French empire from the Senegalese communist and nationalist, Lamine Senghor 
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(1889-1927), Brussels had been under-attended by black Africans. To address this, the Negro 
Bureau of the COMINTERN’s Red International of Labour Unions (RILU), sought to put 
‘the struggle for emancipation of the Negroes in African and America’ as a standalone point 
of order for the upcoming LAI congress in Frankfurt.374 Yet, the invitation to Frankfurt was 
ultimately not extended past the already existing South African connections, and the French 
Sudanese Tiemoko Garan Kouyaté (1902-1942) was the only West African attendee.375 Part 
of the reason for this was the lack and weakness of communication channels between the 
COMINTERN and black Africans, but the party’s hostility to bourgeois nationalists should 
not be understated. James W. Ford (1893-1957), an African-American communist who went 
on to run for Vice President of the United States in 1932, was one of the key organisers of the 
Negro Bureau in Moscow in the late 1920s. Ford launched a critique of the LAI at its 
Executive Committee meeting in Cologne, 1929. Ford’s critique reflected the new ‘Class-
Against-Class’ policy of Stalin’s COMINTERN. Ford believed that the LAI needed to do 
more to encompass and fuel the anti-imperial struggles of Chinese, Indonesian, Arabian, and 
black workers, and in part this meant an openly hostile position on ‘reformists’  who did not 
want to take a militant, vanguardist stance again European empire.376 As Weiss suggests, 
‘reformist’ was actually a way to label all anticolonial movements outside the formal 
organisation of the COMINTERN as the enemy, regardless of shared interests. Ford argued 
that ‘the League [Against Imperialism] is dominated by the reformists. In the future if we are 
to purse and carry out our new line, especially at the World Congress of the League we must 
begin immediately to mobilise our forces and bring large masses of workers and peasants, 
especially of the colonies, who are under our influence, into this congress.’377 In 1931, 
Padmore shared the COMINTERN’s official rhetoric against ‘Garveyism’ and 
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‘Gandhism.’378 After leaving the party his views became much more nuanced, directed 
towards strategic alliance with middle class and elite leadership, white and non-white. 
 It should be acknowledged that the fissures between international communism and 
colonial nationalism were not entirely due to Stalinisation, but the unreliable interest in 
proletarian revolution from bourgeois Africans. Münzenberg and a Hungarian COMINTERN 
agent named Louis Gibarti (1896-1967, born, Lazlo Dobos) wrote to Casely Hayford in 1926 
in order to establish a relationship between the LAI (then, the League Against Colonial 
Oppression), the ARPS, and the Gold Coast Farmers’ Association (GCFA).379 With his links 
to Garvey, Du Bois, and the British government, Casely Hayford was a perhaps the most 
highly positioned West African nationalist at the time, and his leadership of the ARPS saw 
that organisation moving in a more progressive direction as of 1927. With regard to the 
GCFA, Münzenberg and Gibarti likely believed that they were opening channels to a 
labourers’ association, rather than an organisation of middle class merchants and cocoa farm 
owners, which is what it was.380 Casely Hayford appeared to show some initial interest in the 
LAI, but did not attend the 1927 congress in Brussels. It is probable that Casely Hayford saw 
the LAI as a potential forum to find support for an existing conflict in the Gold Coast 
between the British executive and judicial authority and the governing autonomy of local 
chiefs. ARPS intellectuals like Casely Hayford opposed the British jurisdiction which granted 
autonomy to the chiefs. However, Casely Hayford likely lost interest in the LAI when the 
conflict was resolved between 1927 and 1928.381 Thus, the union between Communism and 
colonial nationalism was sometimes only as strong as local, short-term political strategy 
necessitated.   
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 Padmore’s disentanglement from the COMINTERN is usually put down to Stalin’s 
capitulation with Western European empires against rising Fascism. This, for Padmore, 
symbolised an over willingness of white leftist leadership to abandon non-white races when it 
seemed convenient. In 1933, Padmore was ordered to tone down calls for revolution in 
Africa, but he refused Stalin’s realpolitik and published a proposal to stoke revolutionary 
activity in Liberia. The French party objected, and Padmore was expelled from the French, 
American, and British parties.382 Fearing Stalin’s reprisals, Padmore resisted lures to return to 
Moscow. Some analysts take this moment as emblematic of a radical black rejection of white 
involvement, in favour of non-white autonomy over non-white affairs.383 This interpretation 
overplays the narrative of self-emancipation, and overlooks the strategic importance activists 
like Padmore placed on white middle class support. At this moment, the ‘self’ of self-
emancipation and self-determination was in flux. Padmore continued to work closely with 
white socialists after 1933, and he tailored his books and newspaper articles to appeal to the 
British middle classes. He wrote of that group, ‘when all is said and done, they are the ones 
really responsible for all that goes on in Africa, for as voters they control Parliament and 
therefore Whitehall and its officials.’384 Likewise, Padmore’s later collaborations with Du 
Bois and reassessment of Garvey can be read, not as realisations that race is always more 
important than class, but as necessary strategic shifts. Organisation around the idea of an 
international black movement would gain further momentum in 1935, following the failures 
of liberal hegemony to stand up for Ethiopia against Mussolini.       
 
4.2.2. The Italo-Abyssinian War and the politics of intercontinental unity   
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The second world political process which is now widely recognised by historians as 
generative of a black revolutionary public is Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, and 
the subsequent failure of Wilsonian multilateral governance to protect Ethiopian 
sovereignty.385 As Robert Hill writes, the Italo-Abyssinian war ‘marked the turning-point of 
nineteenth-century and post-war Black nationalism and paved the way for the emergence of 
an explicitly political Pan-Africanism.’386 Along with Haiti, which was occupied by the 
United States from 1915 to 1934, and Liberia, which was investigated by the League and 
threatened with occupation from 1929 to 1936, some scholars frame the Italo-Ethiopian War 
as part of a triad of conflicts which threatened the only outposts of black sovereignty, and 
thus gave rise to a black nationalist consciousness.387 One of the earliest groups to frame 
Haiti, Liberia, and Ethiopia this way was the Pan-African Congress itself. Revived by 
Padmore and his London network, and with Du Bois presiding, the 5th Pan-African Congress 
held in Manchester resolved to ‘inform the Imperial powers that we look with jealous pride 
upon these nations [Haiti, Liberia, and Ethiopia] and regard them as symbols of the 
realisation of the political hopes and aspirations of African peoples still under Imperialist 
domination.’388 Following the defeat of Italy in WWII, and in a direct parallel to international 
planning over the future of Germany’s African colonies after WWI, Padmore’s iteration of 
the Pan-African Congress was faced with the possibility that parts of Ethiopia would be 
placed under international administration and subject to ‘conditions of Trusteeship.’389       
 However, the PAC’s 1945 critique of inter-war global order was not a repudiation of 
internationalism or multilateral governance in principle, but a call for greater democratic 
inclusion of racial representatives in burgeoning global governance institutions. Reprinting a 
memorandum written by Du Bois to the United Nations Organisation (UNO), the 5th Pan-
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African Congress called for greater inclusion of black representatives, with an appeal to 
‘democratic methods of government’, and ‘so that the grievances and demands of the 
Africans can be freely expressed.’390 Although they did not entirely reject earlier articulations 
of world civilisation as global cosmopolitan democracy, these calls for a remaking of global 
governance were products of a new revolutionary rejection of colonial rule and the civilising 
mission, spurred in part by the Italo-Abyssinian war, incubated in small groups of metropole-
based radicals, and, when anti-imperial newspapers and books were not successfully banned 
by colonial authorities, disseminated in print.   
 By ‘failure of Wilsonian multilateral governace’ I do not mean a discrepancy between 
principles and practice, which would suggest that the international norms underlying the 
League upheld equal protection of a universal right to sovereignty, but could not be enacted 
in the instance of Ethiopia. Instead I contend, with Getachew, that ‘the invasion appears 
continuous with the unequal integration and racial hierarchy that had structured the league 
since its founding.’391 The resolutions of the 5th Pan-African Congress attest to the fact that 
Padmore, Du Bois, and members of their networks read the Ethiopian situation in this way, as 
internal to the ‘civilising’ logics of European, American, and, to a lesser extent, Japanese, 
imperialism which had shaped the post-WWI context. Mussolini, probably pre-empting the 
League’s objection to the invasion, characterised it as ‘a war of civilization and liberation.’392 
Considering that Churchill had in 1927 stated his admiration for Mussolini, and the broader 
opinion amongst Tories and the British upper-classes about the civilising mission in Africa, 
Mussolini’s words would have been taken by many at the time as in good faith.393 Such 
support from British circles, tacit or otherwise, backfired two years later when Mussolini 
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announced his plan to train 3 million black troops in Africa to supposedly aid in the 
‘liberation’ of British and French colonies.394 
 Du Bois, for his part, retained a belief in world civilisation as global progress, but 
coupled it with a new enthusiasm for international Communism. Du Bois had long taken an 
interest in international Communism, but also rejected the terms whereby black struggles – 
particularly African-American struggles -- would be subsumed under a white-led, white-
focussed movement. The new perception that international Communism represented a global 
struggle led by non-white constituencies as well as white, particularly Mao’s revolution in 
China, helped bring Du Bois around.395 The shift helped to marginalise Du Bois from the 
mainstream of the American Civil Rights movement, as well as get him into trouble with the 
United States government. By the time he made his farewell speech to the NAACP in 1947, 
Du Bois had assimilated his acceptance of Communism into his earlier views about world 
civilisation as global progress. In the address, he championed the United Nations as 
representing ‘the united wisdom and effort of the people of the world… to uplift 
civilization’396 and as ‘the greatest hope of abolishing colonialism and thus abolishing 
poverty.’397 He characterised the airing of ‘grievances of American Negroes’ as ‘a beginning 
of methods by which we can help this parliament of man and federation of the world.’398 He 
also stated that world unity required greater economic literacy, a better understanding of 
‘industrial profit’, and overcoming the ‘fear of being called Communist.’399 
  The International African Friends of Abyssinia (IAFA), an organisation formed in 
1935 in London by Padmore, Amy Ashwood Garvey (Marcus’s second wife), and James 
represented a new, more absolute dismissal of the League and the liberal civilising mission 
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rhetoric. This was in part a direct response to Mussolini’s invasion, but also a reflection of the 
Leninist anti-imperialism which had emerged in the previous decade. This new attitude 
towards white world order is captured in a column by Kingsley Martin, editor of the New 
Statesman and Nation, after he had attended an IAFA meeting in London: 
 
The meeting was not a big affair --  a couple of hundred coloured people, and perhaps 
fifty white. But I have never seen an Albert Hall meeting which impressed me as so 
significant an omen as this little gathering in Farringdon Street, called to enlist support 
for the Emperor of Abyssinia. Mussolini has appealed to the war spirit and declared a 
white crusade against Black barbarism. Naturally, the response is Black defiance of 
white Barbarism. 
 The speakers came from the West Indies, the Gold Coast, Kenya, Somaliland and 
Abyssinia itself. When they expressed a hope that the League of Nations or the British 
Government would see justice done, the audience was silent or ironical. When they 
declared that coloured people everything would fight and die free men rather than 
submit to the subjugation of the last independent native kingdom, the meeting yelled 
with enthusiasm…. You only had to say the word “civilization” to get this meeting 
jeering. Soon it was persuading itself that Abyssinia was the centre of the civilization, 
and Europe of barbarism.400          
          
 In imperial metropoles like London and Paris, and amongst the new generation of 
black radicals influenced by both Leninism and their felt marginalisation within white-led 
movements, the Italo-Abyssinian conflict became an important symbol to rally African, 
diaspora, and anti-imperial colleagues throughout the transatlantic social world. Imperial 
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metropoles served as hubs for people who might have held different political interests back 
home to work together. Metropolitan life also created the perspective amongst colonial 
subjects that there were two Europes – that of the metropole and that of the colony -- 
separated by class and racial hierarchy. Anti-imperialism and colonial nationalism appeared 
in different forms in Paris and London compared to Africa and the West Indies. As 
Padmore’s Guyanese IAFA colleague, Ras Makonnen, remembered in 1973, travel between 
colony and metropole ‘allowed… blacks to feel the contrast between freedom in the 
metropolis and slavery in the colonies.’401 Both capitals were cauldrons of political activity 
and ideas during the interwar period, and each was a site of what the civil rights activist, 
Roger Nash Baldwin (1884-1981), called ‘comradeship in exile’: spaces of interaction in 
which colonial subjects could build opposition to their respective imperial states.402 This 
coincided with what Makonnen called ‘the pressures of the times’, which forced blacks to 
make ‘alliances across boundaries that would have been unthinkable back home.’403 In short, 
the revolutionary politics of black unity were facilitated by the imperial social world itself.    
 However, different interests and loyalties could still determine what greater freedom 
might actually mean. As well as left internationalists like Ho Chi Minh or Padmore, London 
and Paris were also temporary homes to future national elites, studying in the metropole to 
enter middle class jobs back home. For the latter, criticism of empire had little to do with 
uniting the workers of the world, but instead negotiating native elites’ greater control of the 
levers of power. In the British context, this dynamic sometimes reflected latent divides which 
would re-emerge after independence, such as between African pan-Africanists and West 
Indian pan-Africanists. However, the structure of imperial civilising discourse meant that this 
dynamic was sometimes reversed. Within French communist circles, the view that Antilleans 
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were ‘more educated’ led to claims of elitism and exclusion from continental Africans.404 
Antillean and African communists resisted a split into separate subgroups by the French 
Communist Party because, as Goebel writes,  
 
Antilleans’ claim to blackness would have been undermined by a complete breakaway 
from African activists, whereas the latter often relied on Antilleans as mediators with 
French authorities. Since Antilleans were citizens and had a larger share of liberal 
professionals, they had better contacts with the French elite as well as representation in 
the National Assembly. All of this helped to win lawsuits, to prevent expulsions, or to 
attract French support.405   
 
 As well as across nationalities, Caribbean and African anti-imperialists formed 
strategic solidarities with colonial reformers, many of whom were Africans who wanted 
French citizenship to extend to them. Some, such as Kouyaté, veered between a radical anti-
colonial position which would maintain alliances with colonial reformers, to a position which 
sought the endogenous transformation of empire through extended citizenship rights and the 
semi-autonomy of federated colonies. Despite a poor aptitude for each other’s language, 
Kouyaté collaborated with Padmore before and after both men had severed ties with the 
COMINTERN.406 Like Padmore, Kouyaté was a former COMINTERN affiliate who had 
grown disillusioned with the new party line. At one point Kouyaté had collaborated with 
Maurice Satineau (1891-1960), the Guadeloupean editor of the moderate culture journal La 
Dépêche Africaine. By 1927, Kouyaté had split with Satineau and formed the Ligue de 
défense de la race nègre (LDRN) and its newspaper, La race nègre, with the help of 
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Senagalese Lamine Senghor (1889-1927) and the French Communist Party.407 Although 
broadly anti-capitalist, La race nègre once published the Garvey-esque view that ‘the end of 
racial prejudice will arrive when a great black state will be constituted on a modern 
foundation: African Zionism.’408 Following the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, Kouyaté 
was a member of the Agence Metromer, a non-communist news service edited by the 
moderate nationalist author René Maran (1887-1960), and also patronised by the Senegalese 
patriot of France and nationalist Léopold Sédar Senghor (1906-2001).  
 Cultural elites rubbed elbows with communists, anarchists, and nationalists. During 
the late 1920s and early 1930s, Maran and Senghor regularly attended Sunday afternoon 
salons in Montmarte along with a host of African Americans, West Indians, and French 
Africans including Alain Locke, Mercer Cook, Ralph Bunche, Aimé Césaire, Léon Damas, 
and Claude McKay. These salons were hosted by the Martiniquan feminist and journalist, 
Paulette Nardal.409 Nardal and Kouyaté were both organisers of the Institut Negre de Paris, a 
black students union which shared members with Kouyaté’s LDRN. Although the two 
organisations did not share a political orientation in terms of their extremes, both were 
monitored by colonial authorities and attacked in the right wing press.410 In 1929, Kouyaté 
sent a letter to W.E.B. Du Bois stating his position that the ‘national independence of black 
people [peuples nègres]’ was linked to ‘the very human ideal of fraternal understanding and 
collaboration between races’ within a framework of international equality.’411 In 1935, 
Kouyaté argued the case for a ‘Franco-overseas alliance’ which imagined the transformation 
of empire into a ‘federal regime with France as its guide-nation.’ Within this new polity, all 
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colonial subjects would be made the citizens of French dominions, each of which would 
‘define its own civil code corresponding to the traditions and customs of its inhabitants.’412 
 Similar to Paris, and even prior to Padmore’s settling there, London was a home to 
organisations of colonial subjects and black nationalists, journals, and student unions with 
different attitudes and interest regarding the future of empire. As one example, the League of 
Coloured Peoples (LCP) and its journal, the Keys – named to symbolise interracial 
integration, à la piano keys -- collaborated, shared members, and rivalled the more nationalist 
West African Students’ Union and its journal, WASU. The LCP counted prominent West 
Indians amongst its members, like C.L.R. James, the later development economist of the 
Caribbean and Africa, W. Arthur Lewis, and the women’s labour organiser, Audrey Layne 
Jeffers (1898-1968). WASU projected a unified West African identity, and was an early 
forum for the ideas of elite West African national leaders such as Ladipo Solanke, and J.B. 
Danquah, the latter of whom later became a liberal rival of Padmore and Kwame Nkrumah’s 
‘Pan-African Socialism.’ Leaders like Solanke and Danquah did not share the anti-imperial 
globalist vision of nationalism as representing a transformation of global capitalism. Yet, in a 
context where a unified black national identity emerged in response to the League’s 
capitulation with Mussolini, Paul Robeson became a patron of WASU. Neither were the 
editors of WASU inimical to Fascism in principle, and in one issue gave a ‘Hats off to Hitler’ 
for his ‘self-assertion’ and ‘determination to win’ for his people.413 For the national elites of 
WASU, ideological partisanship in this context mattered less than the assertion of a black 
(inter)national identity which would serve instrumentally in countering Wilsonian 
imperialism.     
 Italy-Abyssinia also helped further dissolve Garvey’s dominance, in that it 
represented a deeper pathology of the imperial-colonial order than could be addressed with 
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Garvey’s programme based on racial pride and African redemption. According to Makonnen, 
Garvey’s experiences with upper class Ethiopians had made him hostile to the new 
perception of Emperor Hailie Selassie as race leader. Selassie did not consider himself black, 
and when members of his administration visited the United States they refused to associate 
with African-American organisations. Padmore and Makonnen fought Garvey on the 
resulting public bitterness he showed to Selassie, because, as Makonnen put it ‘Selassie 
symbolized our unity in Europe.’414 This support for Selassie against critics like Garvey was 
not because Padmore and his circle sincerely believed that Selassie and Ethiopia were sterling 
examples of their own anti-imperial values, but because they enabled a politics of 
transnational unity against white world order in both its Fascist and liberal hegemonic 
varieties. For James, to whom Selassie was ‘a feudal reactionary’ and Ethiopia a backwards 
agrarian despotism, critiques of actually existing African polities had to be put to one side for 
the benefit of the larger struggle.415 Addressing an audience of middle class leftists in the 
New Statesman, James characterised the defence of Ethiopia as a stage in the fight for world 
socialism:  
 
There are some amongst our Society [the IAFA], including myself, who believe that the 
only final guarantee for Africa, as for the rest of the world, is the international socialist 
order. There are others who believe that Ethiopia must be supported because God said 
so in the Bible. But whatever our views, we are in this struggle as one, in that we stand 
by Ethiopia, and that we will do all that we can to help her.416  
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 James’s pragmatic forgiveness of authoritarian tendencies in Ethiopia did not come 
naturally, but as a result of his colleague’s insistence that criticism of Selassie’s failings as a 
leader be deferred to a more convenient occasion.417 This was only one example of the 
ideological differences internal to, and temporarily appeased by, the group dynamics of the 
IAFA/IASB. As another example, Makonnen objected to Padmore’s over-familiarity with the 
Independent Labour Party (ILP) and Fenner Brockway. Recounting in 1973 how he ‘took 
some pride in knowing that Brockway probably did not even know my face’ and how he felt 
that ‘the more… George Padmore wrote for this ILP paper, the more I felt we were damaging 
our case to speak for ourselves.’418 Also, Padmore knew that his IASB ally, future Kenyan 
president, Jomo Kenyatta, did not sympathise with his vision of a ‘modern’ Africa without 
tribal culture. Padmore and James tried a number of times to win Kenyatta to the idea of a 
transformed African culture which would takes its place in an international socialist order, 
but Kenyatta was never convinced.419 These divergences over different futures would become 
more pronounced during the Cold War and after formal independence, but they mattered less 
given the world political and social context after 1935.     
 Italy-Abyssinia can thus be read as an example of how the political content of a 
historical conjuncture can enable a certain collective identity, and make it appear more salient 
than other potentially competing identities. The conflict galvanised anti-imperial 
organisations and networks, strengthened the feeling that black struggles throughout the 
world were connected, and temporarily ironed out some ideological differences between 
black societies, which shared the same geographical and political space. However, the Italo-
Abyssinian war attests more to the role that perceived necessity plays in the construction of 
collective identity than it does to a lasting and unified black (inter)nationalism. This 
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distinction is important, because those who take the transhistorical black nationalist position 
are obliged to address Robert Vitalis’s question – pertaining in Vitalis’s case to the Bandung 
conference of 1955 -- what has become of this unity since?420 A more tenable analytical 
position is that ethnic nationalist internationalism arises in opposition to specific perceived 
threats from incumbent global order-keepers; coexists with other potential forms of collective 
identity which perhaps offer different strategic opportunities; and is cultivated in anti-status 
quo groups which are not necessarily representative of more widespread feeling, and which 
reflect historically specific social formations not analytically reducible to territorial or ethno-
cultural forms of collective identity. This does not mean that transnational forms of collective 
identity are not significant—only that strategic necessity determines how significant they are. 
 
4.3. Intersections of anti-imperial revolution – race, gender, class, and culture  
 
4.3.1. Racial sovereignty and interracial unity  
 
While International Communism spoke to the deep injustices at the heart of imperial-colonial 
order, many black and Asian anti-imperialists grew dissatisfied with its white leadership, its 
capitulation with nominally democratic empires, and its reduction of the imperial problem to 
class. While the Italo-Abyssinian War was seen by many in Africa and the diaspora as an 
assault on the idea of black sovereignty itself, and was therefore significant in the 
construction of a black transnational consciousness, it did not sweep away other forms of 
political identity completely. Africans and people of African descent throughout the world 
resided in multinational, multi-racial societies. The ethnic, cultural, and socioeconomic 
composition of these societies reflected the hierarchical imperial-colonial order, but they 
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were also sites of community feeling, aspiration, historical legacy and destiny. As was stated 
in the introduction to this chapter, the articulation to anti-imperial revolution implied a 
tension between the local and the global: between segregation and integration, nationalism 
and internationalism, social relations and governmental institutions. This tension was not 
simply an intellectual puzzle, but a practical political bind created by a dual exigency. On one 
hand, there was a need to perpetually promote the unification of the many against the few: an 
impetus which required the invocation of a transnational public and/or a universal demand for 
freedom and equal inclusion. On the other hand, the movement needed to remain 
representative of, and strategically relevant to, a specific demos situated in a specific society.  
 A key site of this tension in anti-imperial imaginaries was race relations.421 Different 
institutional improvements to racial inequality were posed: imperial federalism, greater 
attention to racial inequality in burgeoning international institutions, the eradication of the 
colour line in Communist and other workers movements, national independence and self-
government. Some intimated a scepticism that blacks and Africans could ever be truly suited 
to these modern institutional forms, and would instead have to cultivate organisations and 
political communities in the interstices. Others argued almost the opposite: that blacks and 
Africans were uniquely suited to lead a world revolution.  
 Although it appeared in different forms, the notion of an essential, exceptional 
relation between black societies and modernity – either positive or negative – ran underneath 
many debates around institutional reform and transformation. The premise that blacks were 
essentially different, not because of traditional African social models, but because of their 
particular relationship with modernity, formed the basis for different claims to the possibility 
of equal inclusion within a federated empire. This had been a feature of imperial discourse 
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even before WWI. In the 1912 inaugural issue of the London-based journal African Times 
and Orient Review, its Egyptian founder and editor, Dusé Mohamed Ali, published a 
symposium between various acquaintances, leaders, and public intellectuals. Dusé Mohamed 
expressed his desire to see a racially egalitarian British Empire in the journal’s opening 
pages: 
 
We feel that lack of understanding the African and Oriental has produced non-
appreciation, and non-appreciation has unleashed the hydro-headed monster of derision, 
contempt, and repression. We, as natives and loyal subjects of the British Empire, hold 
too high an opinion of Anglo-Saxon chivalry to believe other than that African and 
Oriental wrongs have but to be made manifest in order that they may be righted. 
Laudable ambitions have but to be voiced to be appreciated, and that touch of nature 
which makes the whole world kin has only to be brought into operation to establish that 
bond of universal brotherhood between White, Yellow, Brown, and Black under the 
protecting folds of the Grand Old Flag, which will make the name British Citizen 
immeasurably greater than the name of King!422  
 
Annie Besant (1847-1933), the English theosophist who founded the Home Rule League in 
India, and later became the Indian National Congress’s first female president in 1917, 
responded to the symposium by stating her belief that equal inclusion in the British political 
community would only be possible once a race had reached a certain aptitude for modern 
institutions:  
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English liberty is now in danger, in consequence of too sudden and too large 
introductions of masses of ignorant people into the sphere of government, and a similar 
policy in hitherto non-self-governing people would have similar results. The partial 
measure of self-government given lately to India will make possible, ere long, the 
inclusion of all her educated classes in the governing class; but India is capable of 
exceptionally rapid progress, because she already possesses an ancient and splendid 
civilisation, and has merely to adapt herself to new methods. This is a comparatively 
swift and easy task. “Coloured men” is a wide term, and includes very different types, 
and no one system can be applied to all. Some coloured races are the equals of white 
races, while others are far more childish. The best heads and hearts in both races should 
guide, while the more childish follow.423 
 
Note that Besant was not speaking directly in terms of development in modern know-how for 
the purposes of national independence, but also seemed to weigh the potential of colonial 
subjects to share in English governance. Arguments like Besant’s suggested that races should 
only be included in modern institutions once they could produce an intellectual and cultural 
elite. Ironically, this was not very different from Du Bois’s ‘Talented Tenth’ argument, which 
he had published nine years earlier. For his part, Du Bois also contributed a dismissive reply 
to Dusé Mohamed’s symposium.   
 While these attitudes speak to the often chauvinist belief in the universality of 
Western institutions and elite leadership held by many early-20th century thinkers,424 there 
were others who argued at the same time that it was ‘black difference’ which would bring 
about transformation to the capitalist world system. The Fabian social servant and colonial 
administrator, Lord Sydney Olivier (1859-1943), offered a defence of the black race in his 
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1906 book White Capital and Coloured Labour, expanded and reprinted in 1910 and 1929. 
Not only was the African labourer mischaracterised as being lazy and savage, but Olivier 
suggested, possessed cultural aversion to the modes of modern capitalism which might help 
bring about the end of capitalism itself. ‘The African’, he wrote 
 
is an unskilled labourer, but he is strong, and when he is pleased to work he is highly 
efficient within the limits of his capacities. He works best in gangs under social 
impulse: he works with extreme industry on his own small holding, up to the limit of 
his limited wants. There are no bounds to the trouble he will take in service in which 
his goodwill or his affection is engages. The capitalist system of industry has not 
disciplined him into a wage-slave, and I do not believe that it ever will. I think it more 
probable that that system in its attempt to incorporate the African in its wage proletariat 
will, after all, be defeated.425 
 
 As Brent Hayes Edwards shows, another conception of black revolutionary potential 
in terms of ill-suitability for modern institutions can be found in Banjo, a 1929 novel of the 
Jamaican-born Harlem Renaissance writer, Claude Mckay. Edwards writes that Banjo is 
characterised by ‘radical, “doubt”, to use Mckay’s word, that blacks can fit into the logics of 
modern civilization.”426 Mckay had been an early black recruit of the COMINTERN, 
travelling to Moscow in 1922 to speak on ‘the Negro Question.’427 While initially a believer 
that the Negro Communist’s duty was to ‘spread revolutionary ideas among the ignorant 
masses of his own race’, Mckay ultimately turned away from organised communism.428 
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While a contributor and co-editor to the New York socialist magazine Liberator, along with 
the Jewish socialist Max Eastman, Mckay had largely promoted the interracial, class-based 
message of local and international Communist organisations.429 In his Harlem: Negro 
Metropolis, published in 1940, Mckay explained his defection from Communism and his 
colleagues at Liberator in terms of the repeated failure of Communist organisers to make 
room for the specific troubles of black labourers in white-dominated societies. The 
Communists’ crimes went beyond non-acknowledgement to political attacks on organisations 
working for black-specific labour struggles:  
 
The Communists were savage in their opposition. At that time they had been waging a 
national and international campaign for the recognition of the Negro’s right to life. The 
Scottsboro and Angelo Herndon cases were the flaming star around which their 
campaign revolved. The Communists fixed their eyes on the stars and refused to look 
down upon the common ground of community life, where the Negroes were carrying 
on a practical struggle for bread and shelter. Their primary aim has been radically to 
exploit the Negro’s grievances. Therefore they use their influence to destroy any 
movement which might make for a practical amelioration of the Negro’s problems.430              
  
 But rather than turn away from interracial Communism towards black nationalism, 
Edwards shows that Mckay developed something in Banjo more akin to a kind of 
spontaneous cosmopolitan anarchism, what Edwards calls ‘vagabond internationalism.’ 
Influenced by Mckay’s time spent sojourning in Marseilles, vagabond internationalism is 
characterised by both a rejection of civilisation’s top-down racial othering in the form of 
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European colonial policy, and civilisation’s creation of a racist proletariat. Ray, Mckay’s 
avatar in Banjo, says of the ‘proletarian spawn of civilization’ that, ‘as a black man I have 
always been up against them, and I became a revolutionist because I have not only suffered 
with them, but have been victimized by them.’431 Vagabond internationalism, like the 17th 
and 18th century communities of outsiders described by Linebaugh and Rediker, represented 
for Mckay an alternative space of cultural and political expression to civilisation’s 
disciplining structures.432 Expressed through his writing, and informed by music and the 
heated differences of opinion within non-white outsider communities, Mckay characterised 
the vagabond outlook as a non-conformist subjectivity, created as the by-product of ‘the 
civilizing machine’, which, because of its insolubility, might present a challenge to 
civilisation itself.433 As Edwards argues, Mckay posed the vagabond’s ‘primitivism’ as a 
positive term to represent ‘another ethical system, one exterior to the crushing logic of 
“civilization.”’434 However, Mckay could not entirely resist attributing this vagabond non-
conformity to something experienced by a black subject especially, and a black subject 
attuned to some primal essence: ‘a black man, even though educated, was in closer biological 
kinship to the swell of primitive earth life. And maybe his apparent failing under the 
organization of the modern world was the real strength that preserved him from becoming the 
thing that was the common white creature of it.’435   
 Mckay’s aversion to ‘the civilising machine’ and assertion of a dialectically opposed 
black ‘primitive’ subjectivity was partly a reflection of his experiences with the 
COMINTERN and the betrayals of white socialists in Harlem. However, it extended to a 
more constructive political imaginary based on the escape from institutionalised nationhood 
and capitalist modernity through the backdoors of literary imagination and the spontaneous 
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communal feeling fostered by his travels. I raise this example in order to, on one hand, 
present a limit to the extent that alternatives to modern civilisation could be articulated in 
revolutionary counter-discourse, and, on the other, to compare the anarchistic outlook in 
Banjo to the degree that proponents of modern institutions like Padmore, James, and Du Bois 
began to emphasise the importance of actually existing social relations in different colonial 
economies. For Padmore, James, or Du Bois, the looming potentiality of anticolonial 
revolution and sovereignty meant that escape from these debates was not an option. For 
example, developing from the French Empire’s policy of association, the prospect that 
colonial subjects might shun independence to be made formally equal members of the French 
government had become more than a hypothetical debate by the end of WWII. The 
Senegalese poet and politician, Léopold Sédar Senghor, proposed African culture as ‘the 
most powerful means of revolutionary action’, but he sought to renegotiate the terms of 
African membership in the French government along more egalitarian principles rather than 
end them.436 In this way, Senghor sought to extend the terms of indirect rule to involve the 
possibility of equal citizenship, rights, and voice within the French Empire beyond semi-
autonomous clientage.437 Senghor believed that Africans had distinct cultural virtues and 
intellectual traits, which were complementary rather than antagonistic with those of 
Europeans. 438 In a critique resonant with Mckay’s earlier aversion to the ‘the civilising 
machine’, Senghor based his critique of 20th century Marxism on its privileging of institution-
building over street-level culture. He ‘blamed the failure of the Second International on its 
desiccated rationalism’ contrasted with the ‘popular culture’, the ‘élan vital of a people.’439 
This stress on an ethnically-defined cultural expression was a tenet of the political and 
literary movement, Négritude, which Senghor had helped establish. During the Franco-
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Algerian war, Frantz Fanon took aim at Senghor and the ‘bards of Négritude’, who, construct 
an ‘inventory of particularisms’ out of ‘reified’ ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’, and who argued for 
appeasement with the French Empire when others in Africa were fighting and dying to attain 
their political independence.440  One rationale for unity with Europe over sovereignty was the 
avoidance of Africa’s ‘Balkanization’: its potential separation into isolated, weak states. 
However, the other proposition was pan-African unity: the independence of Africa from 
Europe and the integration of African countries into a federated socialist government. This 
disagreement over sovereignty and federation eventually developed into two ‘groups’ during 
the period of pan-African negotiation in the early 1960s: the Casablanca Group and the 
Monrovia Group. 
 In a passage in Dusk of Dawn (1940), Du Bois seemed to explicitly reject the notion 
that the role of black subjectivity was to embody a limit, and an anarchic opposition, to 
modern civilisation. In a chapter entitled ‘Revolution,’ Du Bois characterised his ‘nearest 
white friend’, Joel Springarn’s position as  
 
skeptical of democracy either in industry, politics or art. He was the natural anarchist of 
the spirit. He interest was aroused in the Negro because of discrimination, and not in 
the interest of ideal methods of conducting the state…. He wanted for me and my 
people freedom to live and act; but he did not believe that voting or revolution in 
industry was going to bring the millennium.441    
 
By contrast, Du Bois characterised revolution as the transformation of state and economic 
institutions. Despite its radical trappings, the anarchic opposition to civilisation led in practice 
to a form of quietism. Revolution defined as intellectual and cultural escape worked for those 
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in a position to enjoy the benefits of culture and education, but it did little to negate imperial 
and colonial oppression.  
 The problem in eradicating the structures of oppression was not due to uncritical 
black acceptance of the logics of modernity, but because some blacks consistently accepted 
the scraps from the master’s table. The white working class, on the other hand, accepted their 
own oppression because racial identity with the ruling class served as a consolation prize. As 
Du Bois wrote in Black Reconstruction (1935): 
 
It must be remembered that the white group of laborers, while they received a low 
wage, were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological wage. They were 
given public deference and titles of courtesy because they were white. They were 
admitted freely with all classes of white people to public functions, public parks, and 
the best schools. The police were drawn from their ranks, and the courts, dependent 
upon their votes, treated them with such leniency as to encourage lawlessness. Their 
vote selected public officials, and while this had small effect upon the economic 
situation, it had great effect upon their personal treatment and the deference shown 
them.442  
 
This situation resulted, for Du Bois, in an inescapable limit to the interracial cooperation of 
the American working class. Du Bois argued that this could only be ameliorated through 
sustained efforts on behalf of African-American communities to self-segregate: to build 
racially autonomous political, economic, and cultural institutions. Segregation, for Du Bois, 
was not ‘the final solution of the race problem.’443 On the contrary, the eventual goal was ‘a 
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united humanity and the abolition of all racial distinctions.’444 However, the already existing 
segregation of communities along racial lines in the United States meant that a short term 
policy of segregated institution-building was the only way to achieve long term integration. 
 Du Bois’s diagnostic here is not merely a problem of ‘domestic pluralism’, but 
directly connected to his belief in world revolution, that ‘we black folk are the salvation of 
mankind.’ For Du Bois there was a gap between the potential of non-white populations for 
global revolution and the concrete historical reality of their ‘inferiority’:  
 
[T]here remains the fact that the mass of the colored peoples in Asia and Africa, in 
North America and the West Indies and in South America and in the South Sea Islands 
are in the mass ignorant, diseased, and inefficient; that the governments which they 
have evolved, even allowing for the interested interference of the white world, have 
seldom reached the degree of efficiency of modern European Governments. [Du Bois, 
2014 [1940]: 88]   
 
 The gap between potential and reality was not a problem to be solved with racial 
development as an end in itself, but had to come from a challenge to the existing economic 
order and the strengthening of global democracy. This could not be confronted with appeals 
to ethnic recognition alone, but was primarily a matter for political strategy, of building new 
political and economic organisations fit to represent multiracial societies on more egalitarian 
terms.  Revising his earlier ‘panacea’ that racial development should come from a ‘Talented 
Tenth’ of cultural and intellectual elites, Du Bois argued that ‘the whole economic trend of 
the world has changed’ and that ‘mass and class must unite for the world’s salvation’ (Du 
Bois, 2014 [1940]: 109). In this historical moment Du Bois saw the potential for unity in 
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developing institutions, ‘consumers’ groups’ and other organisations where coalitions could 
build advocacy for ‘industrial and cultural democracy’ on a global scale (Du Bois, 2014 
[1940]: 110). 
 National sovereignty as necessary, but insufficient, when it came to the problems of 
multinational, multi-racial societies was also expressed by Padmore and Azikiwe in the same 
period. Azikiwe and Padmore were friends, and worked together on African independence 
initiatives from as early as 1927.445 Neither Padmore nor Azikiwe initially saw the promise of 
‘nation’ in purely negative or ‘communitarian’ terms, as in the gaining of territorial 
sovereignty for self-identifying groups to protect themselves from ‘the outside.’ Instead, the 
problem of domination and subjugation was rooted in a transnational conception of nation – 
African and European for Azikiwe, black and white intersecting with labour and capital for 
Padmore. The primary corrective was to achieve a conception of political community which 
creates social and political equality without fragmentation into the cultural nationalisms 
which enable imperialistic chauvinism. But despite shared goals, Padmore was a Marxist-
Leninist whose ambition did not end with the attainment of African political independence. In 
Padmore’s writing throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the desire for liberation does not appear 
as the desire for Africa to join in the world system of national states, but rather to address the 
international structures, rationales, and sentiments which enabled national states to embark on 
imperialistic programmes. Chiefly, those which enable capitalist expansion, inequality, and 
national-racial identity politics.  
  During the 1930s, Azikiwe and Padmore also differed in their political affiliations. By 
contrast with Padmore, Azikiwe was friendly with members of the Colonial Office (CO), in 
conversations with whom he would denounce ‘Bolshies’ and any movement which sought to 
take power by force. Though he also denounced imperialism’s tendencies to expand and 
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exploit without limits, and he would occasionally publish radical opinions in his West African 
Morning Post and West African Pilot that would make colonial authorities nervous, he was 
more often considered a moderate and a gradual reformer who would help the British 
Empire’s colonial representatives ‘manage nationalism.’446 However, the critique at the heart 
of both Azikiwe and Padmore’s writing is that ethnic and cultural chauvinism, when aligned 
with the state, and combined with a rationalised need to clear blockages to the flows of global 
production and trade, were the main sources of imperialism and war. 
 In August, 1941, colonial subjects were dealt a fresh blow when Winston Churchill 
announced that the Atlantic Charter, which he had just produced with President Roosevelt, 
did not represent a principle of sovereignty or self-determination for the colonised world. 
This had the effect of threatening to radicalise new segments of the colonised masses, 
including moderate nationalists like Azikiwe.447 In a 1945 pamphlet published by Padmore 
with his friend, the white British socialite and activist, Nancy Cunard (1896-1965), Padmore 
quoted Churchill as saying,  
 
At the Atlantic meeting we had in mind, primarily, the restoration of the sovereignty, 
self-government and national life of the states and nations of Europe now under the 
Nazi yoke… so that it is quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of 
self-governing institutions in the regions and among the peoples which owe allegiance 
to the British Crown. 
 
This, despite Clement Atlee having spoken previously at a meeting of the West African 
Students’ Union in London, where he declared that the Atlantic Charter represented the 
Western commitment to the ‘freedom and social security’ of ‘mankind.’ Following 
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Churchill’s caveat, as Padmore put it, ‘all the Africans and Indians and Cingalese and 
Burmans and West Indians, and all the rest of the Colonial peoples whose hopes had been 
raised by the announcement of the Atlantic Charter and the explicitness of Mr. Atlee’s 
statement, were dumbfounded.’448  
 Despite the new grievance represented by Churchill’s interpretation of the Atlantic 
Charter, Padmore did not make an absolute demand for sovereign independence from the 
British Empire immediately after WWII. In fact his 1946 book, co-authored with his life 
partner, Dorothy Pizer (c. 1906-1964), How Russia Transformed Her Colonial Empire: a 
Challenge to the Imperialist Powers, reads almost as a frustrated plea to the British to extend 
the framework of egalitarian commonwealth to the subject peoples of Africa and Asia. 
However, Padmore was not read this way by the British Foreign and Colonial Office. 
Padmore’s praise for the Soviet Union was read as a threat to ‘Britishness’, and an 
inconvenient spotlight on the racism of British colonial policy at a time when the Soviet 
Union challenged the British Empire’s colonialism at the United Nations. After years of 
limiting the distribution of Padmore’s work to the colonies, along with others tagged as 
communists and colonial agitators, this culminated in the British government banning 
Padmore’s next book Africa: Britain’s Third Empire (1949). The banning was subsequently 
protested by Padmore’s friend, Fenner Brockway, and others affiliated with the anticolonial 
movement in Britain.449       
 By contrast with the British Empire, Padmore posed the Soviet Union as a federation 
of diverse nationalities, races, cultures, and religions, which had the right to secede at any 
time, but were unwilling to do so because of the equality and share in industry which they all 
enjoyed. The Soviet Union under Stalin had committed “blunders”, Padmore argued -- most 
importantly, its invasion of Finland in 1940 – but this was not an argument against its 
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principles.450 Padmore’s promotion of the multi-ethnic Soviet model was complemented by 
his opposition to independence in the form of Wilsonian national sovereignty:  
  
The Wilsonian conception was based upon the capitalistic economic system and 
conflicting class relations. It is the same conception as that embodied in the Atlantic 
Charter. Thus it merely fed national exclusiveness. The sovereign States [sic] which 
came into existence at the end of the last World War became an end in themselves. The 
victorious Allied Powers, Britain and France, exploited Wilson’s political conception of 
Self-Determination to create in Europe a number of small States [sic] carved out of the 
old Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires. These States very soon became vassals of 
France and Britain and were employed as pawns in Imperialist power politics against 
the Soviet Union. 
 The tendency to exclusiveness inherent in bourgeois nationalism has become the 
greatest obstacle to any solution of the burning economic and social problems of 
Europe, and this in turn has enabled the Great Powers to intervene and so aggravate 
between themselves the nascent Imperialist [sic] rivalries over markets and colonies in 
Africa, Asia, and the Pacific.451 
      
Padmore saw nationalism as “ineradicable from human nature”; therefore, it was not a 
question of rejecting nationalism, but promoting non-exclusive, non-chauvinistic forms of 
nationalism which could also engender multiracial, multi-national union.452 With the creation 
of a world socialist federation of nations not yet feasible, Padmore championed what he saw 
as movement in this direction at the regional level, while describing national separation as 
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failure. In a front-page story published in Azikiwe’s West African Pilot, Padmore celebrated 
Burma’s independence as the creation of a new ’sovereign republic within which all the 
different religious communities and races… are all united under one centralised federation, 
each enjoying full local self-government and cultural autonomy.’ The situation was different 
in India, ‘where the British succeeded in dividing the country into two Dominions, leaving a 
legacy of hatred and bitterness between Hindu and Moslem.’ 453 
 Aside from any specific colonial policy, Padmore saw the more diffuse problem of 
white dominance in colonised societies as an obstruction to the formation of egalitarian 
multi-racial unions in Africa and the West Indies. Comparing the South African situation 
unfavourably to the American, Padmore wrote in How Britain Rules Africa (1936) that ‘the 
fundamental barrier which stands in the way of realizing the united front between black and 
white workers in South Africa’ was white workers’ fear of blacks gaining a right to collective 
bargaining. While the United States had labour movements which would admit blacks, it was 
‘easier for the proverbial camel to pass through the eye of needle, than for an African to enter 
a European trade union.’454 In the same year, Padmore argued in a pamphlet produced for the 
IASB that the dominant class of whites in the West Indies stood in the way of the islands 
becoming a post-racial society. Despite a general ‘cordiality’ in the relations of all races in 
the West Indies, the ‘overlordship of white men’ gave ‘rise to considerable racial feeling.’ 
This was smoothed, however, through ‘long association’ and ‘the fact that children of all 
races go (in most places) to the same schools.’ Moreover, ‘the recent labour disturbances 
which have struck the islands have been a tremendous factor in drawing the coloured races 
together in the common struggle for improved conditions’, and ‘if whites did not rule’ it is 
quite safe to say that race would not play much part in West Indian affairs.’455  
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 The labour disturbances Padmore mentioned referred to the extended strike actions – 
or ‘Butler riots’ -- carried out by the oil workers’ union in Trinidad throughout the second 
half of the 1930s.456 These strike actions were a major precipitating factor in the movement 
towards the West Indies Federation. Different versions of a unified West Indies were 
eventually articulated by several different groups: labour organizations, pan-Africanists, 
Indo-Caribbean groups, and colonial administrators. Although the idea of West Indies 
federation had been ‘in the air since 1867’,457 the multiracial federalism from below, 
represented by the Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC), was born out of the organising of 
trade unionists, like the Afro-Guyanian Hubert Nathaniel Critchlow (1884-1958), from the 
mid-1920 to the mid-1940s. After attending the First British Commonwealth Labour 
Conference in London, where he was the only delegate from the Caribbean, Critchlow 
returned to host the First British Guiana and West Indies Labour Conference in 1926, which 
provided an early initiative for regional workers’ unity. 458 Organising labour across the 
different islands was facilitated by the collective grievances of the impoverished West Indian 
working class and peasantry, as well as the relative ease of travel and contact between the 
islands. The idea that ‘federation was the logical development of working class unity’ was 
also expressed by Indo-Caribbeans, such as the labour organiser Adrian Cola Rienzi (1905-
1972, born Krishna Denarine), and later, the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) leader, Stephen 
Maharaj.459 In 1927, the Crisis, urged ‘the peoples of the West Indies to begin an earnest 
movement for the federation of these islands.’460 Five years later, provoked by clashes over 
the empire’s exploitation of Trinidadian oil, the labour organiser A.A. Cipriani (1875-1945) 
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argued that the ‘movement towards Federation… like the incoming tide, has gathered 
strength at every turn. It may now be regarded as inevitable.’461   
 British colonial administrators of the West Indies and Africa sometimes planned 
federation for similar reasons, but for different purposes. Federation would help streamline 
bureaucracy and better orchestrate the dispensation of labour and inputs across a region. This 
enabled some to denounce federation as an imperialist ploy. A 1953 editorial in the Trinidad 
and Tobago labour newspaper, The People, credited to ‘Rip van Winkle’ expressed a distrust 
in federation as motivated by empire’s racist social engineering: 
 
The latest imperialist claptrap, Federation of the British Caribbean Islands plus 
Continental British Guiana and British Honduras, lands wherein “natives” have no right 
because acquired by conquest has become the sport of professional hirelings whose 
knowledge and experience of federation came into their lips from imperialist 
mechanical inspiration. Federation, they quacked, would solve the problem of 
overpopulation and cure all economic ills. They have never been told that certain 
proposed areas to be federated are thinly populated; but the overpopulation spoken of 
comprises “niggers” and “coolies” not wanted in the vacant domains.462  
 
In 1954, only four years before the West Indies Federation was established, Trinidad’s Home 
Rule Party (HRP), which had grown out of the oil workers’ strikes of the 1930s, voted against 
the proposed ‘London Plan’ for federation because it did not guarantee eventual 
independence from the empire, an aim which by then had become associated with the 
protection of local labour and economic interests.463  
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 Even after it had ended in 1962, the WIF remained an important symbol in pan-
African circles – not, I argue, simply because colonised black subjects believed they needed 
their own large nation-state to engage in liberal world politics – but because a post-racial, 
radically democratic state was seen as the next stage in a world revolutionary struggle for 
democratic control of the global economy. This next stage was envisaged as something which 
only colonised societies could deliver. The WIF was not needed for liberal recognition, but 
for transformation of the international social, political, and economic order. As early as 1933, 
C.L.R. James wrote in favour of the Colonial Office Commission’s plan to unite the islands, 
but this was only with a view to imminent self-government.464 As we will see in the next 
chapter, James became a stalwart supporter of the WIF, urging the leaders of newly 
independent Caribbean nations to promote the federation in the face of a referendum to rip it 
apart. Congruent with Du Bois and Padmore, the WIF represented for James a colonised 
people’s ability to serve as the ‘vanguard of the progressive forces of modern society.’465 
This is a clear through-line in his thought between 1938, when he published the Black 
Jacobins, and his promotion of Black Power in the 1960s. James had grown uneasy with 
organised Communism – both Trotskyist and Stalinist -- by 1950, and completely denounced 
it by 1956, when the Soviet Union sent tanks to crush the democratic revolution in 
Hungary.466 The same year, any slim hope of salvaging an egalitarian, multiracial British 
Empire had been eradicated by the brutal and highly public response to the ‘Mau Mau’ crisis 
in Kenya. For James, this was all part and parcel of ‘the breakdown of the system of 
capitalism and the national bourgeois state.’467  
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 However, for James, the breakdown was global, and did not belong to any particular 
race. James argued that just as colonised populations would lead a global vanguard, European 
standing armies were no longer fighting in imperial wars. This was evidenced by the war in 
Indo-China, which had not been fought by the French Army, but by ‘volunteers and the 
French Foreign Legion, including many of Hitler’s soldiers who had nothing to do in 
Germany and were prepared to go fighting and see what they could get out of it.’468  
 The idea that colonial independence was a global revolution, not limited to the 
received benefit of any particular race or nation, was also reflected in the rhetoric of higher 
profile world politics. Despite its frequent characterisation as a union of Asian and African 
races against white supremacy, several speakers at the Bandung Conference of 1955 
emphasised that any prospective cooperation would be based on political and economic 
interests, and not race.469 This was reflected in Sukarno’s opening addressing on 18 April:      
 
 We are of many different nations, we are of many different social backgrounds and 
cultural patterns. Our ways of life are different. Our national characters, or colours or 
motifs - call it what you will - are different. Our racial stock is different, and even the 
colour of our skin is different. But what does that matter? Mankind is united or divided 
by considerations other than these. Conflict comes not from variety of skins, nor from 
variety of religion, but from variety of desires.470 
 
As his promotion of strategic segregation grew in the US context, Du Bois’s pronouncements 
on world affairs began to take on a post-racial character by the 1940s. In Dusk of Dawn Du 
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Bois wrote that ‘physical’ kinship is ‘least’ significant, and ‘the badge of color relatively 
unimportant save as a badge.’ ‘The real essence’ of racial kinship, he wrote, ‘is its social 
heritage of slavery; the discrimination and insult; and this heritage binds together not simply 
the children of Africa, but extends through yellow Asia and into the South Seas.’471  
 However, ‘the social heritage of slavery’ was not an invitation to promote an 
exclusively black or non-white revolution. Following Japan’s defeat in the Second World 
War, Du Bois pointed to Japan’s imperialism in Asia as the cause of its downfall. He stressed 
the ‘structural limitations of racialist and nationalist opinion’ as giving oxygen to Japan’s 
imperialism.472  His advocacy of transnational and interracial solidarity based on anti-
imperial democracy deepened following a visit to communist China in 1959. In his preface to 
the Chinese translation of the Souls of Black Folk in 1959, Du Bois intimated that ‘the color 
line was now less important than class consciousness.’473 This was not exclusively a clarion 
call to non-white multitudes, but promotion of a strategic alliance of anti-imperial forces. 
During his visit, Du Bois also called on China to align itself with the United States and 
Russia: states he saw as being forces for anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in world 
politics. That a closer or more detached assessment might have proved the United States and 
Russia unworthy of Du Bois’s endorsement is beside the point: political goals, at least in the 
current conjuncture, mattered more than racial identity.474 
 The need to build multi-racial egalitarian polities out of unequal multi-racial colonial 
societies was also expressed by leaders on the African continent. Again, this was not only for 
the purpose of state building or liberal institution building, but to demonstrate colonial 
people’s ability to lead a world revolution based on democratic principles. This is not entirely 
surprising considering that many of the most influential of Africa’s new leaders – including 
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Nkrumah, Kenyatta, and Azikiwe – were all part of Padmore’s circle.475 Nkrumah’s early 
vision for a United States of Africa drew a direct link between the union of African polities 
and the end of race prejudice. Speaking just after Ghana’s independence at a Conference of 
Independent African States in 1958, Nkrumah argued 
 
We, the Independent States of Africa, seek to eliminate Racialism [sic] by our own 
example of a tolerant, multi-racial community reflecting the freely expressed will of the 
people based upon universal adult suffrage…. In this way, we who in the past have had 
unhappy experiences with Racialism, will be in a position to make a new positive 
contribution to the elimination of Racialism based on tolerance and goodwill, which 
can serve as an example to other parts of Africa and of the world.476  
 
Even Fanon, sometimes characterised as an indiscriminate enemy of whites in Africa, stated 
at the 1958 All-Africa People’s Conference in Ghana, ‘the concept of Africa for the Africans 
does not mean that other races are excluded…. We struggle for the future of humanity and it 
is a most important struggle.’477  
 
4.3.2. Gender emancipation and anti-imperial revolution  
          
The revolutionary transformation of the modern state into a hub of global egalitarian 
democracy was also promoted in the name of gender emancipation. As in the case of racial 
equality or global progress, distinctions within black anti-imperial discourse on gender and 
sex can be characterised along a continuum, in terms of different counter-hegemonic 
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arguments with respect to difference, autonomy, inclusion, and transformation. This included 
views which were resonant with materialist diagnoses of gendered work in a capitalist nation-
state, as well as views arguing for an essentially African or black conception of men’s and 
women’s respective roles in society.478 Anti-imperial globalist critiques which helped bring 
about formal decolonisation took intersectionality as a matter of course. This was because the 
form that post-colonial polities and international institutions should take was a conversation 
which presumed promotion of social equality in general.   
 As with race and class, gender roles were often products of imperial ordering, or 
exaggerated forms of pre-colonial social formations, rather than totally endogenous to pre-
colonial culture. Justification for the British civilising mission was often premised on the 
notion that Asian and African women needed protection from their ‘degraded’ civilisation’s 
promotion of ‘child marriage and prostitution, polygamy, female infanticide, and genital 
mutilation.’479 Of course, the policies of Victorian and Edwardian empire lobbies around 
women’s salvation were rarely about emancipation and equality. Instead they reflected 
Victorian and Edwardian social imaginaries based on the image of women as idealised 
domestic creatures, who needed protection from the harsh realities of toil and male predation. 
This project was often the province of Christian missionaries. In both Africa and Asia, gender 
norms based on the proper husband and protected woman, consigned to ‘the domestic 
sphere’, were promoted by colonial dioceses in collaboration with ‘secular allies in the 
imperial administration.’480  
 However, discourses of civilised African and Asian gender norms were often totally 
at odds with the imperial economic order. The imperial economic system necessitated the 
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work – often unpaid -- of most colonial women. In the Edwardian era, high taxes in Southern 
and Eastern Africa drove men out of their communities in search of work, leaving women at 
home to take care of agricultural and domestic duties. Other African men were driven out of 
pre-colonial economic arrangements based on the acquisition of land and livestock – a system 
nearly eradicated by settler land seizures – towards waged labour in mining and farming. 
Colonial capital kept these wages low partly on the premise that African women supplied 
unpaid labour at home. In fewer cases, some African women, especially cocoa growers in 
West Africa, ascended to wealthy entrepreneur status if they were able to transition from food 
production to cash crops.481   
      Also at odds with civilising rhetoric based on the promise of modern gender 
norms, subject women were frequently placed in positions of social subordination through the 
imperial economy of sex. African chiefs and elders would reinterpret tribal law in order to 
marry multiple wives and raise the price of bridewealth. This was to monopolize ‘access to 
fertile women’, partly as a way to assert dominance over younger men in the tribe. British 
district officers would support these practices in order to bolster the authority of their ‘chiefly 
partners.’ African tribal women were therefore caught in the politics of indirect rule. In the 
towns and cities of the Edwardian empire, a ‘two-tiered system of brothels to ensure that 
perceptibly “white” women would only have commercial sex with European men’ was 
established.482 However, this system, meant to protect imperial racial hierarchy, was rarely 
honoured by European men stationed in the colonies. Relatively high profile cases of British 
officials caught in sex scandals with subject women and children led to the Colonial Office 
issuing a ban in 1909 on ‘sexual contact with non-Westerners’ because it ‘diminished 
European prestige and status.’483 
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While the image of the civilised qua Westernised colonial woman was often a mirage 
in Asia and Africa, it was a subject of fascination for counter-imperial and anti-imperial 
writers of the diaspora and metropole during the interwar period. As it was for elites of the 
earlier period, such as Adelaide Casely Hayford, the intersection of gender and race relations 
in revolutionary discourse reflected anxiety over how deeper social inequality and alienation 
might actually be addressed by attaining national autonomy from European dominance. 
Claude McKay’s novel of 1933, Banana Bottom, speaks to this question of what is required 
for emancipation through the journey of cultural rediscovery for a young black woman in 
Jamaica. Unlike the black female protagonist of Zora Neale Hurston’s more famous, Their 
Eyes Were Watching God (1937), Mckay’s protagonist, Bita Plant, can be read as both a 
product and eventual fugitive – metaphorically -- of colonial race and gender hierarchy.484 
Born to well-to-do farmers in the Jamaican village of Banana Bottom, Bita has a scandalous 
sexual experience with a young musician while still a girl, and then is adopted by an English 
missionary family to be given a Western education in Britain. Bita later returns to Jamaica 
where she is expected to make a decent life for herself. Through her attraction to the folk and 
culture of her homeland, Bita comes to reject the expectation of her English guardians to 
grow into ‘a good Christian—like a little heathen to be brought up in the doctrine of 
salvation’.485 Bita becomes further alienated from her European education via conflict with 
her guardian, Mrs. Craig, who is revealed to harbour terror and revulsion for ‘black culture.’ 
Thus, Mckay places imperial gender norms directly at the heart of the anti-imperial project: 
characterising these norms as products of ‘the civilising machine’, and women’s 
emancipation as achievable through a revolutionary embrace of ethnic folk culture, defined in 
opposition to a racist, patriarchal civilising mission. 
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By at least the 1930s, black women were also at the centre of the revolutionary anti-
imperial project, as organisers and writers living in imperial metropoles, as well as colonial 
peripheries. Reminiscent of Du Bois’s earlier auto-ethnographic ‘double consciousness’ 
concept, but decades ahead of Frantz Fanon or George Lamming’s accounts of racial 
alienation in the city, Paulette Nardal, published an article entitled ‘Eveil de la conscience de 
race’ (‘Awakening of Race Consciousness’) in 1932. Along with her sister, Jane, and other 
Franco-Caribbean and Franco-African writers in Paris, Paulette edited the political and 
cultural journal La Revue du monde noir/The Review of the Black World, which promoted 
‘black internationalism, race consciousness, solidarity, and pride.’486 As well as a meeting 
ground for anti-imperial nationalists, and new social networks based on the crossings of 
subjects from different colonies, interwar imperial metropoles, such as Paris, offered colonial 
migrant women ‘unprecedented access’ to social and cultural freedom.487 The insights Nardal 
expressed in ‘Awakening of Race Consciousness’ grew out of her analysis of colonial gender 
and race relations in the metropole. Nardal argued that black women had a unique insight into 
these relations, because of the relative ease of black men to assimilate into city life through 
their relationships with white women.488 Meanwhile, ‘coloured women living alone in the 
metropolis’ could not form similar relationships with white men, and thus turned to the 
‘racial solidarity’ offered by black social networks. This ‘feeling of uprooting’ inspired a race 
consciousness, which engendered an international black solidarity. 489 As Imaobong Umoren 
argues, Nardal’s analysis of black women’s relationships with white men is missing, probably 
because they were ‘less prevalent or perhaps too taboo to address.’490 Like her colleague, 
Léopold Senghor, Nardal’s solution to the problem of racial hierarchy was not segregation. 
However, more so than Senghor, she suggested a conscious merger based on the synthesis of 
                                                          
486 Umoren, 2018: 18 
487 Boittin, 2010 
488 Umoren, 2018: 19 
489 Quoted in ibid. 
490 Ibid.: 20 
P a g e  | 171 
 
black and white cultural elements. Nardal argued for recognition of ‘our debts to the Latin 
culture, but also ‘to go beyond this culture, in order to give to our brethren, with the help of 
the white scientists and friends of the Negroes, the pride of being the members of a race 
which is perhaps the oldest in the world.’491  
Nardal’s analysis, if not her politics, held true in London. In the British capital, Amy 
Ashwood Garvey served as a hostess and organiser for anti-imperial activists who met in 
nightclubs after days protesting at Speaker’s Corner in Hyde Park. As Ras Makonnen 
recounted, ‘One of the most famous [clubs] was the Florence Mill Club, manned by Amy 
Ashwood Garvey (Garvey’s second wife); you could go there after you’d been slugging it out 
for two or three hours at Hyde Park or some other meeting, and get a lovely meal, dance and 
enjoy yourself.’492 Makonnen sold Ashwood Garvey somewhat short here, as she was not 
only the patron of the club where the IASB relaxed, but also one of the anti-imperial 
organisation’s founders and key organisers. Ashwood Garvey had also previously been an 
associate of the anti-imperial activist, Sylvia Pankhurst (1882-1960), and had helped found 
London’s Nigerian Progress Union in 1924.493  
The analytical and political contributions of individual women reflected a greater 
overture to women’s participation and leadership in counter-hegemonic struggles more 
broadly, at least in the ‘new world.’ Before WWII, Garveyism and Pan-Africanist movements 
largely reproduced the Victorian gender norms of the imperial-colonial order.494 Female 
leadership of critical and radical political movements was facilitated by ‘both the greater 
space that opened for women during WWII and the broad conception of rights that dominated 
the liberal and left politics of the 1930 and 1940s.’495 Leaders like the African-American, 
Charlotta Bass (1874-1969), rose to prominence in this period. Straddling three black 
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internationalist movements, Bass served as a co-president of the Los Angeles chapter of 
Garvey’s UNIA, director of the Youth Movement of the NAACP, and was later nominated 
for American Vice President as a member of the Progressive Party. Challenges to patriarchy 
in burgeoning nationalist organisations also took place in the Caribbean. In Trinidad, Audrey 
Layne Jeffers, an alumnus of the League of Coloured Peoples in London, drew on the broader 
rights discourse to build political power for working women’s organisations throughout the 
1930s.496 Her contemporary, Beatrice Greig (1869-?), was the daughter of Scottish-Canadian 
missionaries, and fought for the political rights of Indo-Caribbean women and girls, helping 
to establish the Trinidad Association of Girls’ Clubs.  
As we will see in the concluding chapter, the legacy of women’s rights in anticolonial 
nationalist projects was to become ambivalent. Revolutionary anti-imperial discourse placed 
gender norms and women’s rights as central to the aims of nationalism and global 
democracy. This culminated in the thought and politics of later figures, like Claudia Jones, 
who saw the creation of large federalist states as linked to, if not requisite for, full gender 
emancipation. After the dissolution of federalism in Africa and the Caribbean, nationalism 
became characterised as a masculinist project: as authoritarian nation-building, which buried 
the experiences and aims of women and women’s movements. However, this interpretation is 
too limiting. The critique of masculinist nationalism speaks to the reduction of revolution to 
sovereignty, not to some inherent failure of revolution as a wider discourse and set of 
worldmaking aims. Without organised movements towards remade states and state-society 
relations – perhaps favouring instead Mckay’s artist’s anarchism – it is difficult to imagine 
the progress that was made, or even to imagine the end of formal empire.  
           
4.3.3. Building unity and cultural pluralism  
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Anti-imperial globalist critique also implied an aversion to reduction of revolution to 
sovereignty when it came to cultural pluralism within transatlantic black internationalist 
politics. The challenges in holding together the plural cultural interests of black 
internationalism were to become particularly salient after the independence of African and 
Caribbean nations after 1957; thus, this topic will be addressed in greater detail in the next 
chapter. However, for now it is worth briefly outlining how these challenges were foreseen in 
the lead-up to independence. In the sense that I mean it here, cultural pluralist debates 
concerned the issues of tribalism and ethnic particularism in the practical construction of a 
multinational state.497 A tension and fundamental disagreement underpinned these debates: 
were tribe and ethnicity foundational aspects of African and Caribbean society, or were they 
constructed devices of imperial divide and rule?  
 In terms of a historical analysis of this problem, there is now little question that, 
whatever aspects of patrilineal society and indigenous religion might have survived into the 
20th century, ‘traditional’ African social, political, and cultural models were modified, 
transformed, and reinterpreted through social intercourse with other societies. Interpretations 
of tribal culture were deployed both by tribal elites and colonial administrators to serve 
colonial regimes of power. For example, ‘detribalization’ was a term used by colonial 
authorities to negatively explain the strike actions of African and Caribbean labourers. 
Miners striking in Rhodesia in 1935 had been ‘detribalized’ according to colonial 
administrators. Likewise, the West Indies Moyne Commission Report, meant to account for 
the oil workers riots throughout the 1930s, put the unrest down to ‘detribalized’ and ‘de-
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cultured’ West Indians, who had lost their traditional thought systems in an embrace of 
modernity.498  
 However, the question of fundamental vs. constructed culture was neither academic 
nor easily dismissed. Its salience had far more to do with the actually existing institutional 
infrastructure of cultural pluralism: the role of cultural pluralism as a political and social 
‘fact.’ Different answers to this question shaped the proposed paths of revolutionary anti-
imperial projects. Could tribe and ethnicity act as handmaidens of revolution, or were they 
aspects of political and social division which revolution needed to overcome? 
 The extent to which cultural pluralism should be a constitutive part of the 
administrative structure of African colonies was a debate which predated the momentum 
towards independence in the 1940s and 1950s. An early 1937 issue of Azikiwe’s West 
African Pilot, reported the events of a conference wherein it was debated whether ‘Native 
Adminstration’ and indirect rule should be incorporated into the national constitution of 
Nigeria. Doctor Henry Carr (1863-1944), a Nigerian administrator and former member of the 
legislative council argued in favour: citing, in particular, the desire for vernacular education 
and the use of vernacular in the transcripts of ‘Native Court’ proceedings. Doctor Crispin 
Adeniyi-Jones (1876-1957), a medical doctor, legislative councillor, and financier, argued 
against. Adeniyi-Jones suggested that further extension of ‘Native Administration’ was 
undesirable for its ‘inefficiencies.’ He argued further against the category ‘native’, in 
principle, as ‘derogatory’, pointing out that Englishmen are not referred to as ‘native.’499 In 
Renascent Africa (1937), Azikiwe himself had proposed that building a ‘New Africa’ meant 
that Africans ‘must hurdle over barriers of race or tribe.’ Particularist ties needed to be 
relegated for the sake of ‘mental emancipation’, material development, and to reinvent Africa 
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as an emergent nation.500 By 1964 Azikiwe had nuanced his position, arguing that tribalism 
‘was a reality’, which could not simply be rejected. Furthermore, he gave Switzerland, the 
USA, and the Soviet Union as examples of successful federated nations constituted by 
multiple ‘tribes.’ Tribalism, he argued, could thus serve as ‘a pragmatic instrument for 
national unity.’501 
 In his final writings before his death, Azikiwe’s old friend, George Padmore, 
disagreed. Padmore argued in 1955 that tribalism was ‘the biggest obstacle in creating a 
modern democratic State.’502 Colonial chiefs were ‘merely pawns in the hands of the Colonial 
Administration’;503 and, while ‘colonizing European powers did not create Tribalism’, they 
‘[kept] it alive’ through indirect rule and by arresting industrial development.504 Padmore’s 
views on tribalism and development of the nation took on a particular salience in the last few 
years of his life. As a non-African advisor to Kwame Nkrumah in the lead-up to and after 
independence, Padmore was attacked by Nkrumah’s opposition in the Ghanaian press. In a 
series of editorials published in Daily Echo in 1955 by K.Y, Attoh, Padmore was described as 
‘completely detribalised and without moral scruples.’505 Attoh’s credibility might have been 
suspect as a political opponent of Nkrumah, but the ‘detribalised’ slur would have been 
effective in conveying the supposed loss of African values that the diaspora had undergone in 
their transportation to the New World.506  
 This can be seen as part of the longer standing mistrust of the diaspora by African 
conservatives. Nkrumah had been an active participant in transatlantic anti-imperial politics 
before returning to the Gold Coast after WWII. Nkrumah had studied in the United States and 
London in the 1930s and 1940s. By 1944, he was a ‘participating sponsor’ of the Council on 
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African Affairs (CAA), an American organisation which promoted, among other policies, 
anti-colonialism as a necessary feature of US economic expansion. Co-led by Du Bois and 
the African-American radicals, Paul Robeson and Max Yergan (1892-1975), the CAA drew 
on the framework of the Atlantic Charter to ensure ‘speedy advancement toward complete 
self-government for the African peoples.’507 In April 1944, a CAA conference resolved to 
promote the welfare of Africans and other dependence peoples as ‘an integral part of the 
projected international order.’508 The organisation also called for any international 
commission within Africa to ‘be held accountable to the United Nations organization for the 
abolition of all forms of political discrimination based on race, creed, or color.’509 However, 
the CAA also premised prospective unity between African-Americans and Africans on 
asymmetrical foundations of ‘reciprocal dependence.’ The presumption was ‘Africa needs 
our skills and services’ and ‘we need Africa’s resources.’510 As the driving force of a United 
States of Africa, as part of broader black internationalism and Third World leftist solidarities, 
Nkrumah’s opposition did not always see him as someone whose first loyalty was to local, 
tribal, and African interests. Kobina Sekyi, the Fante cultural conservative opposed to 
Western socialism and party politics, refused a role in Nkrumah’s government after Nkrumah 
came to power. This was unsurprising, considering that, in 1922, Sekyi had written  
 
All the present talk about the return of our brethren from beyond the seas and the 
foundation of black republics is rash and nonsensical. Our brethren beyond the seas 
have become black white men, and black Americans at that, so that if they were to 
come here amongst us, they would assist in the general demoralisation and unsettlement 
that the Europeans have caused in their contact with us. By their acquaintance with 
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European methods and thus their greater capacity to disseminate ideas, digested and 
undigested and undigestible [sic], indiscriminately by means of newspapers, they would 
soon destroy what little balance we may have succeeded in restoring among our 
peoples.511    
     
 Opposition to the ‘detribalization’ promoted by nation-builders was, on one hand, an 
elite discourse meant to preserve the power of local authorities against outward-facing 
unification and integration. The unification of the many against the few implied the necessity 
of opening culture towards the possibility of its own transformation. On the other hand, 
revolution needed to reflect the interests of the people it purported to benefit. Without this 
responsibility to locate democratic pluralism within an actually existing demos, international 
worldmaking risked becoming empire with a black complexion. As already stated in Chapter 
Two, a principle of international non-domination built on the domination of ethnic and 
cultural minorities was seen to reproduce the logics of empire and undermine the moral upper 
hand and strategic alliances between oppressed groups pushing for greater democratic 
controls on global capitalism.512 This bind was to become even more pronounced after 1957, 
when the necessities of state-building, economic development, and Cold War allegiances 
were drawn in sharp relief by the end of empire and the formal transference of power.      
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Chapter Five 
Development and Liberation: 




From May 22 to May 25, 1963, thirty African heads of state and government met in Addis 
Ababa and signed the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). During the 
conference, a principle resolution was included: the African leaders were ‘determined to 
safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of our States, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms.’513 This 
was the most unqualified and univocal affirmation of territorial sovereignty for each separate 
sovereign state hitherto. Coinciding with this assertion of sovereignty as alignment – more or 
less – with colonial territorial boundaries, scholars of African politics began to narrate away 
the world revolutionary aims of the previous generation of pan-African and black Atlantic 
intellectual activists. One of the first African academic theorists of African international 
relations, the Kenyan Ali A. Mazrui, argued in Towards a Pax Africana (1967), ‘In the 
history of colonial liberation movements it was more often the ethnic conception of ‘majority 
rule’, rather than the orthodox liberal one, which had pride of place in African nationalistic 
thought.’514 Although he went on to recognise that ‘liberal’ conceptions had played a part as 
well, Mazrui’s account of colonial liberation as being predominantly for racial sovereignty, 
heralded a new moment when elite voices of African affairs began to reduce the anti-imperial 
globalist horizon of these movements to the concerns of the particular. The OAU’s protection 
of territorial sovereignty followed the breakup of the West Indies Federation into territorial 
                                                          
513 Wallerstein, 2005: 64-65 
514 Mazrui, 1967: 23 
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units by about a year. As we will see in the next chapter, both of these events coincided with 
new debates about racial segregation in the United States, revivified by the Civil Rights and 
Black Power movements of the 1960s.  
 I return to these histories, somewhat well-known at least by historians of African and 
Caribbean politics, in order to better situate our own contemporary analysis about modernity, 
development, and non-Western difference in the political struggles which animated earlier 
debates. Particularly it revives conversations around development, liberation, and how anti-
imperial leaders and intellectual activists understood the relationship between these two 
concepts. Liberation, more than ‘freedom’ or ‘revolution’, refers to the quest for a kind of 
pure self-determination. While freedom could simply refer to formal independence, and 
revolution to the speed in which independence was attained, liberation sometimes suggested a 
permanent revolution, a need to address every aspect of colonial domination and its legacies. 
Liberation in this sense can also be denoted with the Swahili word, uhuru, which is usually 
translated as ‘freedom’, but in context, refers to this deeper meaning of freedom as liberation. 
 Contemporary critical scholars, especially of the ‘decolonial’ school, tend to frame 
the developmental programmes of federal socialists and Third Worldists of the mid to late 
20th century as either struggling to subvert colonial logics in small and incremental ways, or 
as ‘fallen natives’, duped by colonial logics. By contrast, I argue that development 
programmes – especially the post-colonial development state – were intimately intermingled 
with the concept of liberation. The post-colonial development state could gain no legitimacy 
as merely derivative of the Western liberal state model, and was therefore understood as an 
evolution and an improvement on this model in at least two ways. First, as a model which 
would be derived immediately from principles organic to African and Caribbean societies, 
rather than imported. ‘Democracy’, ‘liberalism’, and ‘socialism’ were thus re-appropriated, 
not as Western legitimation scripts, but as concepts which also had roots in African tradition, 
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or the ultra-modern cosmopolitan societies of the West Indies. Second, the post-colonial 
development state was not understood as another sovereign political unit amongst sovereign 
political units, but as a vehicle for global progress: a new kind of state, which would move 
the world nearer to global socialism. Alternative, anti-imperial globalist visions for the post-
colonial West Indies and Africa can be gleaned, in part, from traditions of world political 
thought evident in the work of CLR James, Frantz Fanon, Claudia Jones, or Amilcar Cabral. 
CLR James and Frantz Fanon are two of the most cited anticolonial nationalist theorists in IR, 
and even in this, aspects of their thought are often neglected. IR engagements with these 
thinkers usually address their positions on violence, modernity, and the denial of black and 
colonial agency and subjecthood, which result from imperial racism and exclusion.515 Less 
addressed are their global visions for world decolonisation and political and cultural 
liberation.516  
 This chapter also argues that the loss of the anti-imperial globalist rationales of post-
colonial development must be understood in terms of the continuing relations of hierarchy, 
political allegiance, and liberal self-interest, which, perhaps inevitably, were the destination 
of anticolonial nationalism. Thus, this chapter also asks: how did the strategic possibilities of 
the post-war period delimit and determine certain constructions of national, ethnic, or cultural 
identity for fledgling African and Caribbean states, as well as the wider, black Atlantic 
discourse? First, imperial suppression of colonial insurgency, revolt, and unrest had 
intensified the demand for independence, which, in turn, intensified the demand for unity 
between colonies. The basis for imperial suppression was understood by anti-imperial 
intellectual activists, on one hand, as the systemic pressure and anti-democratic drive to 
protect access to colonial capital, and, on the other, as a continuation of the racist logics of 
                                                          
515 See, for example, Sabaratnam, 2011; Shilliam, 2008; 2009; 2012; 2015, Frazer and Hutchings, 2007; 
Agathangelou, 2011; 2016; Jabri, 2014.   
516 For partial exceptions, which discuss Fanon’s ‘postcolonial cosmopolitanism’, see Rao, 2010; Rao, 2017; Go, 
2013. 
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empire, which continuously relegated colonial subjects to ‘the waiting room of history.’517 
Thus, anticolonial leaders and thinkers sometimes asserted national, ethnic, and cultural 
difference to argue against the imperial imposition of institutional and governance standards. 
However, the need to build development states after independence remained, provoking the 
articulation of ‘colonial socialisms’; for example, ‘African Socialism’, as a merger of nation-
building and development programmes with particular cultural expressions. Anticolonial 
nationalists increasingly fought these various freedom struggles both through guerrilla 
warfare, and through the international political pressure offered by the UN forum. In these 
different but connected economies, federalism came to have two distinct but partially 
overlapping meanings: one associated with the interracial solidarity of colonial labourers, and 
one associated with racial nationalism, cultural tradition, and the world politics of self-
determination and sovereignty.  
 Second, and however, differentiated economic and ideological relations between 
empire and colony – as well as the USA’s emergence as Western hegemon and ‘anticolonial 
empire’518 -- heavily determined the extent and possibility of integration between colony and 
colony. The need to court or retain international capital elicited arguments that colonial 
peoples were essentially modern in their demands for freedom, democracy, and economic 
rationality. Colonies could represent themselves as sharing the ideological principles of the 
West, sharing the stage of history, whereupon the Cold War was being fought, and could 
therefore serve as partners in strategic and development cooperation. This was not always 
successful, as in the case of North Vietnam, where Ho Chi Minh’s public appeal to American 
principles of freedom and democracy did not prevent US military involvement. ‘Neo-
colonialism’, as identified by Nkrumah,519 was neither always an unsolicited imposition of 
                                                          
517 Chakrabarty, 2000: 8 
518 See Smith, 2003 
519 Nkrumah, 1965 
P a g e  | 182 
 
Western economic and political intervention, nor an instance of free choice, where new 
nations chose to court imperial capital amidst a menu of other options. Rather, it was the 
result of hierarchical and differentiated relations between actors with different historical ties 
to one another, and different opportunities to leverage Cold War alliances.520         
 Third, the potential of allegiance to the Soviet Union served as a motivation for 
Western powers to quell radicalism and secure the loyalty of anticolonial nationalists. 
However, in some instances, it served anticolonial nationalist leaders, who either pursued 
Soviet support for ideological and strategic purposes, or played both sides in order to win 
greater political independence. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the African and Caribbean leaders 
who most unambiguously sided with the Communists were usually the long-term losers of 
this game. Early Communist allies, like Cheddi Jagan (1918-1997), democratically-elected 
leader of British Guiana in 1953, was one of the first victims of the Truman Doctrine and 
Churchill’s Commonwealth policy to ‘not tolerate the establishment of communist states in 
the British Commonwealth.’521   
 Cold War geopolitics, imperial suppression, and anticolonial nationalism eventually 
became mutually-reinforcing in their constitution of a process whereby anti-imperial 
globalism was reduced to more limited and localised visions. Long-held political imaginaries, 
which saw the transformation of imperial world order as a transnational process of social 
equalisation and radical democratic unity, were more or less totally domesticated to the 
nation-state container within the space of a decade. Imperial suppression in French Indo-
China, Algeria, and Kenya, amongst a host of other colonies, fed more radical forms of 
                                                          
520 My argument thus differs, in terms of emphasis, with the argument of Arjun Chowdhury’s excellent book 
The Myth of International Order (2018). Chowdhury offers a broadly convincing argument, which explains the 
inability of post-colonial states to build larger capacity in terms of changes to the international system. 
Chowdhury argues that new states could no longer levy taxes on their populations to wage winnable wars, as 
Western states previously could. While true, this argument under-emphasises the continuing importance of 
neo-colonial political and economic ties. Chowdhury’s work can thus be read as symptomatic of a larger trend 
in neglecting interdependency between states qua differentiated sectors of a globalised and hierarchical 
economy.   
521 Jagan, 1989: 1 
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anticolonial nationalism. Anticolonial nationalism, which had the potential to serve as a 
foundation for globalist politics based on integration and transformation, became reduced to a 
more rigidly territorialised framework of sovereignty. Cold War geopolitics and old imperial-
colonial relations disciplined away much of the emancipatory potential of pan-African, pan-
Caribbean, and black Atlantic politics. Rather than institutionalising radical new political and 
economic alliances to challenge liberal hegemony, the possibility of any such alliance was 
delimited by its ability to be assimilated into the post-war liberal world order. However, this 
was not always entirely deleterious to hopes of greater racial equality. The apartheid state in 
South Africa, for example, was severely tested by the post-war liberal order, even as it 
managed to hang on until after the easing of Cold War tensions.    
 Finally, I conclude that recovery of the debate and tension between development and 
liberation is what is required in our own scholarly analysis of these histories. This means, in 
part, resistance to the notion that we must or can choose between the two as a binary choice. 
Development and liberation are both exigencies of post-colonial order. Those who argue that 
we can bracket off the exigency of development in order to find an epistemic zone of pure 
non-Western-ness must at some point confront the political efficacy and intellectual 
reliability of this stance. Likewise, those who would dismiss cultural difference and racism in 
the pursuit of new articulations of universal progress must also account for how social 
alienation, segregation, and inequality, set in train by imperial racial hierarchies, are re-
articulated so as to bedevil the possibility for transnational and interracial alliances going 
forward.      
 
5.2. Global visions and the ideology of the federal development state  
 
5.2.1. The emergence of federal socialism  
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During WWII and its aftermath, the entry of black populations into the global economy and 
international order on their own terms were viewed as transformative and emancipatory 
projects by moderates and radicals. From the founding conference of the United Nations held 
on April 25, 1945, activists who represented black Atlantic and pan-African politics viewed 
the organisation as a prospective tool for colonial freedom, racial equality, and a greater unity 
of democratic forces throughout the world. Metz T.P. Lochard (1896-1984), the Haitian-born 
editor-in-chief of the African-American newspaper, the Chicago Defender, wrote of the UN’s 
potential to unite the political struggles of black populations throughout the world: ‘the 
World Security Conference in San Francisco has but one meaning to the Negro people--- that 
is, how far democratic principles shall be stretched to embrace the rights of our brothers in 
the colonies and to what extent the American Negro’s own security at home shall be 
guaranteed.’522 Attendees of the San Francisco conference from all over the global South 
sought to address the previous omissions of the Dumbarton Oak conference, questions related 
to fundamental social and politics freedoms ‘without distinctions as to race, sex, language or 
religion.’523 This discourse around international organisation and the establishment of human 
rights thus predated the chain of political decolonisation, which would begin in earnest with 
Indian independence on August 15, 1947.  
 Even in 1947, the notion that the British and French Empires would unravel over the 
following fifteen years into a host of new independent nation-states was viewed as unlikely 
and undesirable by both imperial authorities and colonial subjects. The lessons of 
‘Balkanization’ after WWI were widely learned, and after WWII, the predominant question 
was whether African and Caribbean colonies would renegotiate for better terms in their 
existing imperial relations, leave to form new alliances with formerly colonised nations, or 
some combination of the two. Far less in question for many in the colonies was that the crises 
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of international capitalist order -- which had now produced two world wars -- meant some 
drastic reformulation of that system along more egalitarian and democratic lines was now a 
necessity. In its first few decades, many looked to the UN as the main forum where these 
reforms would take place, while at home they sought greater unity and integration through 
federated development states.              
         For a few national leaders, who attained independence early, questions of 
independence quickly turned to the necessity of the development state. Jawaharlal Nehru 
initiated a programme of state-led development for India immediately after independence. 
Combining the Soviet economic model with a vision of global colonial emancipation and 
rationalisations derived from Hindu scriptures and cosmology, Nehru created a blueprint for 
several Third World development states to follow.524 Nehru’s merger of Hindu religious 
elements with ultra-modern economic and political rationales came after an extended period 
of collaboration with Gandhi. Gandhi had built a mass movement through the promotion of 
religious teaching, engagement with peasant villages, and the deployment of anti-modern 
sentiment. Nehru capitalised on Gandhi’s following, even as he jettisoned his more insoluble 
ideological opposition to nation-building. While Gandhi’s principled resistance to modernism 
earned him worldwide scorn and admiration, it was always built on foundations which were 
not autonomous from global capital. In fact, Gandhi’s links to Indian business magnates, who 
saw him as a useful instrument of Indian nationalism, recently led novelist Arundhati Roy 
(1961-) to describe him as India’s ‘first corporate sponsored NGO.’525  
 However, it was not India’s dependence on global capital that post-colonial federalists 
hoped to avoid, but its failure to hold together as a multicultural, multinational state with 
Pakistan. As we saw at the end of the last chapter, the challenge of building federal states was 
understood partly in terms of the incorporation of different ‘tribal’ – ethnic and cultural – 
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interests. While Azikiwe, looking to Switzerland or the United States, initially saw nothing 
inherently problematic in a polity constituted by multiple ‘tribes’, others, like Padmore, saw 
tribalism as a formidable obstacle to unity. Tribalism, or the politicisation of ethnic identity 
more generally, had been a potent tool of imperial divide and rule. Imperial hierarchy in 
Africa, the Caribbean, and elsewhere across the world was built with white supremacy at the 
top, and other races and cultures portioned out degrees of autonomous authority underneath. 
This created social divisions based on race and culture, and as a consequence, ethnicities 
tended to associate with their own ‘kind.’ More relevantly to the looming post-colonial 
polity, different ethnicities and cultures tended to understand their political and economic 
interests in ethnic and cultural terms, and tended to vote in ethno-cultural blocs.526    
 Federation as a model for the post-colonial development state appeared as a kind of 
panacea for such post-colonial predicaments. As Getachew shows, Nkrumah and Trinidad 
and Tobago’s president, Eric Williams, proffered the United States’ federal constitution in 
1787 as the reason the USA was able to cast off the ‘economic fetters characteristic of the 
colonial relations and political dominance of European empires.’527 Williams, like Padmore 
and Nkrumah, emphasised the ‘international dimensions of the American constitution.’ 
Rather than a polity built on ethnic and cultural homogeneity, the United States was united by 
the political aims of independence and freedom. Federation ‘allowed for the preservation of 
political plurality within a new federal body while also creating a union government capable 
of securing the states’ independence.’528 While Getachew is correct that Nkrumah and 
Williams looked to ‘Anglo-American’ political models, and failed to an extent to ‘engage 
alternative models’, she misses the extent to which Nkrumah and other African and 
Caribbean leaders understood their federal projects as expressions of a uniquely African, 
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black, and colonial mission to advance world civilisation.529 Perhaps because she is writing 
from the American university, and wants to emphasise the importance of the United States to 
anticolonial political imaginaries, Getachew heavily downplays the importance of socialist 
frameworks of world historical development to post-colonial worldmakers, as well as to the 
other models – the Soviet Union especially – to which anticolonial leaders looked. As a 
consequence, the politics of anticolonial worldmaking are reduced to a negative conception 
of sovereignty as non-domination, and the globalist, vanguard politics of progressive 
liberation are neglected.  
 Missing from narratives of African and Caribbean emulation of Western political 
models are the politics and context of vanguard socialism, which were prevalent in the anti-
imperial imaginaries of the time. The influence of radical thinkers like Padmore, James, or 
Fanon on national development leaders like Nkrumah, Williams, or Ahmed Ben Bella (1916-
2012) cannot be understated here. Few imagined at the time of Indian independence that the 
Gold Coast (Ghana), the ‘very model of a well-run tropical colony’, would become the first 
in Africa to secede from the British Empire and begin building a development state.530 
Padmore’s pan-African socialism and his influence on Nkrumah are a key explanation. 
Nkrumah returned to the Gold Coast after WWII, joined J.B. Danquah’s United Gold Coast 
Convention Party (UGCC), and, in 1948, helped lead a strike on imported European goods. 
The strike had been driven by a strengthened demand for greater devolution of governance to 
the colony. Danquah and the UGCC represented a more gradualist, moderate version of the 
demand for eventual independence and West African unification. The strike ended with the 
arrest of six UGCC leaders, including Danquah and Nkrumah, which resulted in their being 
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made ‘national heroes’ and the rapid rise of UGCC membership.531 Skyrocketing mass 
support forced the British to begin negotiations for independence.   
Nkrumah’s vision for Ghanaian independence was initially influenced by Padmore, 
and, to lesser extents, Du Bois and Garvey. As we saw in the previous chapter, Padmore’s 
support for African freedom was founded on the internationalist aims of Lenin’s 1917 
revolution. In particular, the idea that revolution against capitalism and imperialism should 
gradually bring about a unity of equal nations. Padmore opposed Woodrow Wilson’s 
advocacy of national self-determination as a capitalist ploy to delimit workers’ and colonial 
revolution, and freedom for any one colony as only as start. Nkrumah formed a friendship 
with Padmore while studying at the London School of Economics in the mid-1940s. Padmore 
instilled in Nkrumah the idea that African freedom meant institutional pan-Africanism led by 
a socialist vanguard state, while Nkrumah was soon seen as the great hope of a circle of 
London-based pan-Africanists. Padmore (1953) would later write a hagiographical account of 
the young leader’s rise to power. Du Bois, by now a committed Marxist and proponent of 
world revolution, wrote to Nkrumah at the time of Nkrumah’s election to premier:  
 
I hereby put into your hands, Mr. Prime Minister, my empty but still significant title of 
President of the Pan-African Congress to be bestowed on my duly-elected successor 
who will preside over a Pan-African Congress due, I trust, to meet soon and for the first 
time on African soil, at the call of the independent state of Ghana.532  
 
James visited Ghana in July, 1960 and gave a speech declaring that ‘the centre of the world 
revolutionary struggle is here in Accra, Ghana’ and that Ghana’s ‘national sovereignty which 
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has been fought for and for which so many have suffered will be given up in the interest of a 
United States of Africa.’533 These comments, the transcript notes, were met with applause.   
 Some, including James, questioned the private sincerity of Nkrumah’s commitment to 
international socialism, but it was nevertheless the running ideological theme of his 
leadership.534 His increasingly authoritarian commitment to a revolutionary socialist 
programme led him to imprison J.B. Danquah, drew suspicion from MI5, who had his phone 
tapped until at least 1957, and also inspired opposition from Akan elites who resisted his 
moves to establish a one-party state. 
 Yet, this was vanguard socialism which understood itself as a rupture from, and 
evolution of, the international Communist projects of the past. Nkrumah and Padmore framed 
the liberation of black and colonial subjects as the next phase of a radically democrat project, 
which ultimately encompassed the transformation of international society and global race 
relations. Nkrumah conceptualised socialism and its relation to existing African societies in a 
heterodox and contradictory fashion, which attempted to appeal to socialist and authentically 
African sentiment, while at the same time denouncing opposition to his leadership as 
‘doctrinaire communism’ or evidence of a ‘backward-looking intellectual elite.’535 In 1959, 
the year of his death from a sudden illness, Padmore began the composition of ‘A Guide to 
Pan-African Socialism.’ The manuscript details Padmore’s vision for a unique African role in 
the global project to transform the world through socialism. ‘The great mistake which so 
many so-called Marxists have made’, Padmore wrote, ‘is to turn their master’s teachings into 
dogma instead of using it as an intellectual instrument for understanding the evolution of 
human society and a guide to chart the course of future social development.’536 For Padmore, 
it was the task of Africans’ to ‘subject Marxism to our own critical examination and see what 
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there is in it which can be usefully applied to the conditions facing us in Africa.’537 
Specifically, this meant rejecting the Stalinist political model and the lure of the ‘one-party 
system’, which ‘is not inherent in socialism.’538 ‘Under true Socialism’, the people ‘are 
supposed to be not less but much more free than under the rule of capitalism.’539 Padmore 
argued instead that Africa should emulate Russia’s plan to secure an ‘abundance of cheap 
power’ gained through the expansion of its electrical grid.540 Rapid economic development 
through public ownership of the means of production would lead to a revolution in society 
and liberation on the world stage, with ‘[e]qual opportunity given to all, regardless of race, 
tribe, color, class, or creed.’541              
 After Padmore’s death, Nkrumah turned Ghana’s small association of traditional 
Marxist Communists into a mouthpiece for his brand of African Socialism. Officially, the 
communist Bureau of African Affairs, and its journal, the Spark, opposed a return to 
‘traditional’ African tribal life, declaring traditional African society ‘a feudal system based on 
the hegemony of a few big families lording it over less privileged ones and even serfs.’542 
However, the Spark soon became an affiliated organ of Nkrumah’s Convention People’s 
Party (CPP), and began favourably promoting Nkrumah’s political philosophy, 
‘Consciencism’, as well as a new image of the man as the ‘Lenin of Africa.’543 With 
Consciencism (1964), Nkrumah departed from the Communist hostility to traditional African 
social models, and argued that a classless society could (must even) be built from the 
foundations of African ‘communalism’: ‘In socialism the principles underlying communalism 
are given expression in modern circumstances…. [F]rom the ancestral line of communalism, 
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the passage to socialism lies in reform, because the underlying principles are the same.’544 
For Nkrumah, socialist revolution was homologous with African traditional society, in that it 
was a more modern version of the principles underlying Africa’s essential communalism. 
Thus, Nkrumah’s African Socialism required a return to the pre-colonial forms of African 
society before ‘their social evolution was “ravaged by colonialism.”545 However, the ultimate 
goal was the creation of a ‘single mass party for the entire continent’, including a continental 
military, and an image of Africa on the world stage as a leading force in the project of global 
freedom and democracy.546     
 Nkrumah’s counterpart in Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere, espoused a similar message: 
the need to build out from traditional African society towards the global arena. Nyerere 
promoted a return to an idea of the traditional African ‘community’, first through a rejection 
of private property and nationalisation of land.547 The basis for Nyerere’s African Socialism 
was ‘ujamaa’, a Swahili word translated as ‘familyhood.’ Ujamaa is ‘opposed to capitalism, 
which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is 
equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a 
philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man.’ For Nyerere, as for Nkrumah, the 
socialist development state was not a foreign import, because the social and intellectual tools 
to build such a state were already present in Africa’s pre-colonial history: 
 
We, in Africa, have no more need of being “converted” to socialism than we have of 
being “taught” democracy. Both are rooted in our own past—in the traditional society 
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which produced us. Modern African Socialism can draw from its traditional heritage 
the recognition of “society” as an extension of the basic family unit.548        
 
It was this traditional heritage – now unfettered by colonial rule – which made Africans 
particularly suitable to lead a global mission for democracy and egalitarianism. Modern 
African Socialism could  
 
No longer confine the idea of the social family within the limits of the tribe, or, indeed, 
of the nation. For no true African Socialist can look at a line drawn on a map and say, 
“The people on this side of that line are my brothers, but those who happen to live on 
the other side of it can have no claim on me”; every individual on this continent is his 
brother.549  
 
But the recovery of Africa’s innate socialism was not only for the sake of Africans: ‘Our 
recognition of the family to which we all belong must be extended yet further — beyond the 
tribe, the community, the nation, or even the continent – to embrace the whole society of 
mankind. This is the only logical conclusion for true Socialism.’550 In a public rally in 
Zanzibar in 1959, Nyerere stated that an ‘African is anyone who has made Africa his or her 
home and fights for the rights of the country and equality.’551 Nyerere’s pan-Africanism was 
founded on the need to ‘fight white racialism and black chauvinism.’552    
 Like Nkrumah, Nyerere built his case for federation on the grounds that such a unity 
represented the authentic will of a native Africa demos in its struggle for world 
decolonisation. However, this was a will which would achieve expression through national 
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representatives. Nyerere presented a case for an East African Federation of independent states 
– Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Zanzibar -- at the Conference of Independent Africa 
States in June 1960. Similar to proposed federations in West Africa, the Pan-African 
Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) would be a stepping stone to 
greater continental unity. Nyerere stated that federation ‘cannot and must not be imposed 
upon the people of these territories’, but ‘must be a decision of the people expressed through 
their elected representatives.’553 However, Nyerere did not believe that ‘the wishes of the 
people of East Africa [for federation]’ had ‘to wait until these countries are completely 
independent.’554 Nyerere also emphasised the difficulties in the construction of such an 
organisation: not least, the hard won sovereignty attained by these separate colonies would 
need to be forfeited. ‘[O]nce the four nations each have their own representative at the United 
Nations, have their own national flag and foreign representatives we shall have established 
centres of vested interests against unity.’555 However, even if such an eventuality came to 
pass, the need to achieve unity against ‘the balkanization of Africa’ and the threat of neo-
colonialism would remain.556  
 The other impetus to establish a native African unity was the threat of imperial 
retrenchment, which had as one manifestation the Central African Federation (Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland), established to maintain Crown government in the region. That 
‘voluntary Federation’ would ‘destroy any chance of maintaining an imposed Federation in 
Central Africa’ meant that London would be hostile to African nationalists forming their own 
united political organisation. ‘This is no conjecture,’ Nyerere stated. ‘When I was in London 
recently many intelligent people remarked that the success of an East African Federation 
voluntarily created by the African leaders themselves would spell the end of the unpopular 
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Central African Federation. It was even bluntly said that I had gone to London to sabotage 
the Central African Federation.’557  
 We will return to the point about imperial hostility to nationalist federation in the next 
section, but for now it is worth emphasising that pan-African socialists like Nyerere sought 
legitimacy for federal projects on the assumption that they represented dual – and potentially 
contradictory -- demands for: 1.) a democratic desire for federation, and 2.) a need for it, 
based on the assumption that African sovereignty would not survive Balkanization. 
Therefore, the claim to legitimacy of top-down anticolonial worldmaking rested on a 
rationale for the need of economic development, but also for a state monopolisation on the 
meaning of racial and cultural authenticity. The claimed organic socialism of African 
traditional society and its amenability to modern reform was less an invitation to invite the 
democratic participation – including criticism -- of different ethnic and social groups, than a 
national narrative meant to grant legitimacy to the post-colonial development state.558 This 
does not mean that there was some pure, authentic cultural and intellectual space ready and 
waiting to serve as an alternative source of national development. However, there did exist a 
different vision of liberation based on an awareness that anti-imperialism necessitated both a 
class struggle and the transformation of ethnicity and culture. 
 
5.2.2. Federalism from below 
 
Alternative, anti-imperial globalist politics can be derived from a reading of James, Fanon, 
and Cabral which takes two elements as central to their strategic theorising. The first is 
James’s particular interpretation of Marx’s theory of ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’, 
applied to anti-imperial strategy. The second is a non-deterministic dialectics, which emerges 
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from Fanon’s and Cabral’s analysis of imperial social hierarchy, and the dynamic 
transformation of cultural identity as necessary for liberation after formal decolonisation. The 
next two sub-sections take each of these concepts in turn, paying particular attention to their 
place within the perceived necessity of creating an African and Caribbean federation from 
below. Together they engage with a specific question of anti-imperial revolution: how to 
prevent the elite capture of the revolution – partly through its monopolisation of ethnic and 
cultural identity -- and its continued cliental relationship with imperial capital?  
 By the early 1950s, James had abandoned Soviet Marxism and its particular vision of 
world revolution for a non-deterministic dialectics based in the need for direct democracy.  
Although a Marxist throughout his life, James stated in 1960 that he ‘was very hostile to the 
particular brand of Marxism that is dominant today.’ He complained that ‘in the 
contemporary world today we have Russia with two hundred million people and carrying on 
a tyrannical rule over I don’t know how many. We have China with six hundred million 
claiming to be Marxists.’559 For James, Marx’s conception of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat meant something quite specific, and it did not mean ‘the establishment of a 
socialist society would have to pass through a stage of dictatorship in the usual sense of that 
term.’560 It meant, ‘that at all critical moments the will of the class which dominates the 
economic system, i.e., the proletariat, will prevail. That is all.’561 In the same lecture, this 
time drawing on Rousseau’s analysis of the citizen in the Greek polis, James stated that 
‘much of our study of modern politics is going to be concerned with this tremendous battle to 
find a form of government which reproduces, on a more highly developed economic level, 
the relationship between the individual and the community, that was established so 
wonderfully in the Greek City-State.’562 
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 For James, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, this form of government was the post-
colonial multi-national and multi-racial federation. This was not simply to be a facsimile of 
the United States of America, which failed, for James, in its systemic preservation of the 
dominance of capital, but a new kind of state intentionally constructed to navigate a more 
radically democratic world order. James’s plan for this new kind of state is laid out in a 
number of his publications from this period, produced while he was personally active in the 
political processes of Ghana and the West Indies. On returning to Trinidad and Tobago in 
1958, he learned that the fledgling West Indies Federation was already entering a state of 
crisis. I will unpack the WIF’s problems further in the next section, but suffice to say for now 
that perceived differences of economic and political interest led to a conflict, wherein 
Norman Manley of Jamaica held a public referendum on whether the federation should 
continue. Manley wrote to James personally on June 6, 1960 to tell him of the decision to 
hold the referendum.563 Jamaica voted to leave, and Eric Williams, having personally lost 
sight of the federation’s value for Trinidad and Tobago, took this as an excuse to also 
withdraw. Writing in a pamphlet produced after the WIF had dissolved, entitled Federation: 
‘We failed miserably’, how and why, James blamed the failure on the new national 
leadership, a people ‘so crippled by Western education (based on Western experience) that 
they are unable to understand what is going on around them, and see themselves and act as 
nothing else but the inheritors of the imperialist power, which they vainly seek to dignify as 
nationalism and independence.’564 
 In works such as State Capitalism and World Revolution (1950), Facing Reality 
(1958), and later in Notes on Dialectics (1969), James wrote against the bureaucratic capture 
of revolutionary movements, which had most recently taken place with the Stalinisation of 
the Soviet Union. After the revolutionary overthrow of a state apparatus by a proletariat, not 
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only does the revolutionary vanguard consolidate a new state apparatus – often, 
stereotypically, in a manner which reproduces the tyrannical authority of the old guard 
(‘Bonapartism’) – but the background assumptions about revolutionary progress are reduced 
to questions of good or bad bureaucratic management of the revolution. The consequence is 
that intra-leadership conflict becomes the ground on which the future of the revolution is 
fought, and the masses lose authorisation of the means and direction of the revolution. The 
new state apparatus might maintain control, but the revolution has lost its radical democratic 
purpose. This is not simply a result of bad, top-down decision making, but the socialisation of 
states into a global economy and hierarchical political order. A further result of this is that 
further resistance to the state can take the form of ethnic and cultural grievance. Because the 
new state has failed to grant institutional representation to the actually existing pluralism of 
the polity, conflict takes the form of radical assertions of ethno-cultural difference, apathy to 
politics due to lack of relation with the new authorities, and/or attempts to build syndicalist 
alternatives to state hegemony.  
 For James, federation was the means to address the deep-seated pathologies created 
by imperial-colonial order. First was the economic weakness of the West Indies. This 
condition necessitated a state plan for economic growth, which required a federal government 
to orchestrate the different sectors of the economy. However, James qualified the necessity of 
the centralised development state with the criterion that a state plan needed to have the 
authorisation of the masses. To achieve this, the federal plan needed to account for the 
concrete social needs of the people right from the beginning:     
 
There has to be a set plan, in which the State, taking all needs into consideration, not 
merely the ordinary economic demands but the social necessities of the population, will 
decide on a programme, aiming by stages to try to raise the general level, to satisfy the 
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urgent needs of the people and, this is very important because this is the political issue, 
to make an impatient people understand that some serious, tremendous, new and 
sustained effort is being made to satisfy the demands which are increasing every day.565  
 
 Second, James saw the potential for class and racial conflict in the West Indies as a 
threat to its existence after independence. Although race relations were generally harmonious 
before independence, the political parties of Trinidad and Tobago, as well as the political 
parties of other islands, aligned with the racial identities of their constituencies. Eric 
Williams’s Peoples National Movement (PNM) was understood to represent an Afro-
Trinidadian constituency, with the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) representing the Indo-
Trinidadian constituency. This dynamic was reflected between islands as well: British Guana 
was an island dominated in demographics and politics by an Indian diaspora, and Trinidad 
and Jamaica by an African diaspora. The threat was that West Indian independence would 
chiefly become an exercise in black or Asian sovereignty. These fears reached a particular 
state of tension as the WIF unravelled in 1962. Stephen Maharaj, a representative of the DLP 
rose in parliament on January 12, 1962 and said 
 
before 1956 there was no question of what racial stock you belonged . It was no 
question of who was Indian and who was Negro. The little flare up of racialism here 
and there had died down, but now it is a question that the P.N.M hooligans, if you do 
not subscribe to their point of view, and you belong to the Indian race or the White 
race, or if you happened to be a Negro supporting the D.L.P, then it is even worse. You 
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are called all kinds of names in this territory…. I throw that sort of disorder in this 
country directly in the laps of the P.N.M. Government.566   
   
 James saw federation as necessary to building a multiracial national consciousness, 
but also the vehicle whereby the West Indies could take an active role in global 
decolonisation and world revolution. In a speech given in Trinidad in 1959, James stated, 
‘Federation is the means and the only mean whereby the West Indies and British Guiana can 
accomplish the transition from colonialism to national independence, can create the basis of a 
new nation; and by the reorganisation of the economic system and the national life, give us 
our place in the modern community of nations.’567  
 Federation was therefore central to James’s rationale of global progress, wherein 
society, the state, and the state-society relationship would be remade in the process of world 
revolution. James also applied principles of his revolutionary federalism to Nkrumah’s 
development state in Ghana, especially in terms of the state’s role in facilitating ethno-
cultural pluralism and gender emancipation. James’s travels in the United States between 
1938 and 1953 shaped his turn away from conventional Marxism and revolution in its 
Stalinist and Trotskyite forms. Despite their reluctance to join nominally socialist parties and 
associations, James noted that American workers were revolutionary ‘in the most important 
sense.’ The ‘instinctual grasping for the Universal – no mere change in the form of property, 
but rather in the social relations of production – could be seen in the actions of 1940s workers 
urgently seeking the negation of existing relations.’568 Therefore, even without an 
institutionalised bureaucracy – perhaps even because of, and not despite, this lack – 
American workers represented a significant challenge to global capitalism through their 
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grassroots resistance to the advanced contradictions already on display in American capitalist 
society. James’s work at this time also evinced his view that ‘the American woman’ was 
‘symbolic of the freedom in the [American] civilization.’569 In a major repudiation of 
international Communist doctrine, James observed that capitalism was not necessarily a 
threat to cultural advancement; in fact, the ultra-capitalist United States had managed to 
foster robust cultural formations – such as gender emancipation and great literature – which 
were both the impetus and promise of a truly free and revolutionary society.  
 This notion of a grassroots revolutionary public, unconstrained by the bureaucratic 
capture represented by the Soviet Union, informed James’s evolving assessment of 
Nkrumah’s revolution, and his continuous desire for federation in the West Indies. James’s 
initial admiring assessment of ‘the Ghana revolution’ was premised on Nkrumah’s strategy of 
uniting several disparate social sectors together with the goal of ejecting the British. 
Demonstrating his belief that tribalism was not necessarily a reactionary force, James noted 
that, in contemporary Africa, the tribe tended to form the basis for ‘unions and associations of 
all kinds, mutual benefit associations, religious groupings, literary associations, a vast 
number of sports clubs, semi-political associations or associations which provide in one way 
or another for one or some or all of these activities.’570 However, this was a feature of urban 
African life, which, although it did not erase the tribe, it made ‘of the city a meeting place 
and solvent of the ancient tribal differences.’571 Thus, while ‘the tribe’ could be manipulated 
for the purposes of divide and rule, it could also be a ‘source of unity’, supposing that tribes 
were allowed or encouraged to come together over shared goals and interests.572  The strength 
of Nkrumah’s leadership campaign had been to focus on these united grassroots social 
formations and build his support from below. Especially Nkrumah’s practice of building 
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support amongst thousands of female market traders, who eventually filled Accra’s streets 
singing and chanting for Nkrumah’s election.  
 For James, now writing after Nkrumah’s death, Nkrumah had erred when he had 
abandoned the revolutionary grassroots pluralism of his initial support and established a one-
party state.573 Underpinning this notion was the idea that the African one-party leader tended 
to promote their own particular tribalism, while simultaneously denouncing other tribalisms 
as neo-colonialism:  
 
It is the practice of the contemporary African politician in power to denounce tribalism 
as the chief enemy of progress in Africa. By that he is usually defending the centralised 
power he wields (this he identifies with the nation) against trivial and unscrupulous 
politicians who, defeated at the elections, i.e. the struggle for the centralised power, 
find in their own tribe a basis for immediate and partial and possible complete power. 
These quite unprincipled tribalists are not helped to see the error of their ways by a 
similar unscrupulous use of tribal connections, associations and rivalries by the very 
government which is denouncing tribalism. These unsavoury practices are a 
commonplace of African politics, and their superficies are quite often repeated by the 
liberal and socialist supporters and apologists of African self-government.574   
            
 Resistance to the post-colonial development state’s reduction to masculinist and 
cultural chauvinist logics of liberal recognition also formed the bedrock of Claudia Jones’s 
life’s work. Also from Trinidad and Tobago, Jones gained notoriety in 1958 as the founder of 
the London-based West Indian Gazette (WIG). Although usually referenced as a theorist of 
intersectional oppression, Jones was also an active analyst of world politics, particularly as a 
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Communist, pan-Africanist, and supporter of West Indies Federation. Really Jones should be 
seen as part of a tradition of women and men who recognised that imperialism, as well as in 
the arena of world politics, gained expression in quotidian social life. As Carole Boyce 
Davies notes, Jones saw that ‘imperialism did not reside solely in its economic-based and 
international manifestations but in the way it manifested at the domestic and local levels in 
which black women were the most vulnerable.’575 While Jones used the WIG to advocate for 
federation in the West Indies, she did not see it as a panacea against ‘necolonial 
leadership.’576 Jones’s essay ‘American Imperialism and British West Indies’ warned of US 
and British business interests in the Caribbean, and stated that the WIF needed to protect the 
‘rights of minorities’ as well as ‘cultural and other forms of development’ in order to 
authentically represent a politics of liberation.577 In a March 1958 issue of the WIG, Jones 
compared ‘the birth of the nation of Ghana to the birth of a West Indian Federation as 
“another new nation”; “Federation in the Caribbean is the first of a series of great steps 
required to ensure full national independence as a whole and self government for its units.”578  
 As we have seen, anti-imperial globalism suggested a push towards an international 
system which was post-racial and post-class simultaneously. This intersectional focus meant 
that anti-imperial globalist politics were characterised by: 1.) the orientation of its theories of 
the international towards practical programs for balancing the power of the colonised against 
the imperial powers, and 2.) its insistence that social inequality and material inequality must 
be addressed in tandem at the local and international levels. These two tenets of anti-imperial 
globalism necessitated that class, cultural, gender, and racial identities serve as tools of the 
global liberation struggle. However, for Fanon and Cabral, two theorists particularly attuned 
to the ways in which the cultural nationalisms of an Nkrumah, Nyerere, or Senghor could 
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reproduce the ethno-nationalism which authorised imperialism, culture was a weapon which 
would need to be transformed through its use. 
               
5.2.3. Liberation as cultural transformation and non-deterministic dialectics 
 
As a general practice, empires maintained a hierarchy of cultures within and across colonies 
as a key instrument of denying democratic power to the colonised. The mobilisation and 
assertion of cultures which had been diminished by Europeans was therefore a potent tool to 
reclaim power in colonised countries. However, in turning culture outward, the danger was 
that it become an inert celebration of itself and not drive towards its own transformation and 
that of the wider world.579 Central to this perspective is the idea that culture is an expression 
of material conditions. Furthermore, the material conditions fostered and sustained by 
colonialism continued to preserve dominant and oppressive forms of cultural representation 
‘invented’ by imperial divide-and-rule.580 This did not mean that all ‘native’ cultures should 
be absolutely rejected, but neither should they be taken as essential, fixed, nor exempt from 
criticism. It is through the process of organised resistance against dominant culture – both 
imperial and native – that new emancipatory identities emerge. In a 1972 speech at 
UNESCO, Cabral noted that the internal transformation of culture is particular to a certain 
alliance of class interests—a minority of the ‘native petite bourgeoisie’ and the ‘popular 
masses.’581 Native bourgeois intellectuals, like himself, sought out the indigenous cultures 
which had best held out against foreign domination, either through the ferocity of their 
resistance or the remoteness of their location.582 These masses were least susceptible to 
cultural domination, which proved a challenge to the bourgeois leaders who had only 
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intellectual resources from the Western canon to relate to them. However, the ‘everyday 
efforts and sacrifices of the struggle itself’ produced an ‘organized political expression of 
culture’: a new, emergent identity, which was a product of class collaboration and struggle.583 
Cabral also emphasised that it was only a minority of the native bourgeoisie who sought this 
transformation. This was because another minority benefitted from incumbent forms of 
dominant cultural representation, and because ‘the majority, silent, wallows in indecision.’584 
 Although many scholars have focussed on Fanon’s espousal of colonial violence and 
violent anticolonial resistance, Fanon was neither an indiscriminate proponent of violence nor 
did he reject ethical commitments to cultural difference. Fanon held any rightful course of 
political action to be internal to particular sociohistorical formations, where no external 
ideology or ethical duty could presume to hold sway.585 Fanon’s analysis of the colonised 
world came from his training as a psychologist, his experience as a member of the Algerian 
revolutionary party Front de libération nationale (FLN), and also his experience as a 
colonised subject born and raised in French Martinique. He argued that anticolonial struggle 
was driven by the absolute exigency of liberation, but there was no universal, morally 
sanctioned means to achieve liberation removed from the context of a particular colonial life 
and psychology. Fanon made a distinction between the politics of difference meant to cast off 
the yoke of colonialism, and the politics of difference which could concretise the power of 
post-colonial rulers and destroy the transnational solidarity between revolutionaries. For 
Fanon, unity, solidarity, and difference were not meant as context-distant moral imperatives, 
but components of an anticolonial power politics derived from the concrete experience of 
insurgency. The antithesis to colonialism is to turn its violence against empire, and continue 
until there has been a fundamental transformation of both national and international society.  
                                                          
583 Ibid.: 172 
584 Ibid.: 171 
585 See Maldonado-Torres, 2008: ch. 2  
P a g e  | 205 
 
 Speaking at a conference in Accra in 1960, and just after Kwame Nkrumah had taken 
the podium to denounce violence as part of the African independence struggle, Fanon 
differentiated between the context in Kenya – which had improved since the Mau Mau 
insurgency officially ended -- and Algeria:  
 
A European was recently sentenced to death in Kenya for having killed an African. 
Well, in Algeria such a thing is impossible. On the contrary, I think they would 
congratulate a European who did something like that and they would give him a medal 
for pacification.586 
 
He also stated that ‘international moral pressure is a major asset’ in the struggle against the 
apartheid government in South Africa.587 Algeria, on the other hand, represented a type of 
struggle where violence has become the last inescapable option of a desperate people. ‘In 
certain colonies,’ he said,  
 
the violence of the colonised is the last gesture of the hunted man…. In 1954, the 
Algerian people took up arms because at that point the colonial prison became so 
oppressive that it was no longer tolerable…. It was no longer a question for the 
Algerian of giving a meaning to his life but rather of giving one to his death.588   
 
 As I have argued elsewhere, the imperial division of the world was assisted by the 
notion that different ideas, epistemes, and thought systems rightfully belong to different 
regions of the world. I call this analytical assumption epistemic mapping.589 Anti-imperial 
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globalists like Fanon and Cabral associated the claim of rightful cultural ownership with 
either tribalism, which was often a conservative obstacle against the end of colonisation, or 
the imperialist idea that natives were not fully capable of grasping supposedly ‘Western’ 
ideas and institutions. The problem was that intellectual ownership can turn stagnant, 
chauvinistic, and can be used by certain groups of people to lord power over others. For 
Fanon and Cabral, there was nothing essentially different about ‘non-Western’ ideas in this 
regard. Their answer to this problem was to promote new, emergent thought systems and 
cultural institutions which would emerge from the processes of global decolonisation. 
Although they argued that these new knowledge formations could form the basis of a more 
peaceful, humane world in the future, it would be a mistake to try to disentangle their 
speculative articulations of a ‘new humanity’ from the power political impetus to build post-
colonial federalisms which could compete in the realm of world politics. 
 Central to global liberation is the theoretical wager and political claim that intellectual 
discoveries seen to be for the benefit of all humanity rightfully belong to all of humanity. The 
problem is not to do with some essential difference between foreign and local ideas, but with 
the imposition of foreign or local ideas by the powerful on the weak. This is why, for Cabral, 
‘cultural resistance’ is simultaneously emergent, novel, and organic to the social intercourse 
of the revolutionary movement. Cabral, more so than Fanon, both recognised and valued the 
epistemic diversity of the African masses. However, like Fanon, he saw their potential to 
establish ossified forms of hierarchical power which could dismantle the revolutionary 
movement. Speaking to the PAIGC in 1969, Cabral argued that intellectual diversity reflected 
differentiated relations with nature. This was not unique to Africa, but the same all over the 
world, and with similar and comparable traits in societies of a certain relation to nature. 
Those who are ‘afraid of lightning, floods, and thunder have songs and dances that are of a 
P a g e  | 207 
 
certain type. There might be one or another difference, but they’re similar.’590 African 
folklore and customs are notably different from Western Europe, which is ‘ultramodern’, but 
similar to those of Eastern Europe.591 This did not mean that Western Europe was 
intellectually superior in absolute terms, by virtue of being ‘more advanced.’ On the contrary, 
its claim to superiority was a ‘colonial mentality’, which had to be rejected.592 On the other 
hand, the negative aspects of ‘African culture’, such as the superstitious practice of child 
sacrifice, also had to be rejected.593 Cabral argued neither for a total embrace of European or 
African ideas, but a synthesis of African tradition and the shared intellectual inheritance of 
humanity: ‘we have to create a new culture, also based on our traditions, but respecting 
everything that the world has won today for serving people.’594 
 The claim of a right of ownership to the shared economic and intellectual 
commonwealth of humanity was also expressed by Padmore before his death. For Padmore, 
modernisation was unavoidable in view of the centuries of racial oppression that had come 
before. Padmore once told his fellow pan-Africanist, Peter Abrahams (1919-2017), that ‘it 
was a matter of power’; ‘the moment the Africans and Asians and Jews had political power, 
the world would respect them.’595 This was in part a question of racial vindication, but it was 
also international power politics: the balance of power viewed in racial terms. Development 
was imperative, but this was not mere mimicry of a Western modernisation program. This 
was development with African characteristics, and in view of Africa’s right to a fair share of 
the material inheritance of global modernity:   
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[I]t is only by liberating themselves from colonialism and imperialism that there will be 
any chance at all for [the colonial masses] to assert their own African personality and 
their right to share in the abundance which the present level of economic and 
technological development has made possible for all to enjoy.596  
  
The threat of imperial retrenchment or sustained dependency made development necessary. It 
also made continental federation necessary: ‘some form of regional unity as the forerunner of 
a United States of Africa.’597 This required a challenge to tribalism, which was a legacy of 
imperial divide-and-rule, and now an obstruction to unity and state-led development. 
 For Fanon, too, ethnic and cultural identity is critical to the struggle against empire, 
but it is secondary to the political struggle which creates other forms of identity and 
solidarity. ‘My black skin is not the wrapping of specific values’, Fanon wrote.598 ‘Every 
time a man has contributed to the victory of the dignity of the spirit, every time a man has 
said no to an attempt to subjugate his fellows, I have felt solidarity with his act.’599 ‘I am a 
man, and in this sense the Peloponnesian War is as much mine as the invention of the 
compass.’600   
 Fanon saw racial difference as a social fact, but also as a social formation to be 
transformed through decolonisation and the establishment of African and West Indian 
federations. Fanon first awoke to race politics through the representation of white heroism 
displayed in a monument to Victor Schoelcher (1804-1893), the white abolitionist who had 
helped abolish slavery in the French colonies.601 The ten year-old Fanon saw the monument 
on a school trip, where the reverence for Schoelcher covered over any reference to the lives 
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or actions of the slaves themselves. Yet, writing seventeen years later, he explicitly denied 
any ambition to redeem this history characterised by the marginalisation of his race: 
 
In no way should I derive my basic purpose from the past of the peoples of color. In no 
way should I dedicate myself to the revival of an unjustly unrecognised Negro 
civilisation. I will not make myself the man of any past. I do not want to exalt the past 
at the expense of my present and of my future.602             
 
This present and future are each represented in Fanon’s dialectics, both in linear, 
programmatic terms, and in terms more cyclical and non-deterministic. In the course of 
decolonisation, the individual/national/particular is a necessary access point to the 
human/international/universal.603 Colonial rule alienates its subjects from each other. For its 
negation, the colonised population has to seize and define its communal identity, but then 
turn this outwards towards the wider transformation of (international) society. This is 
fundamentally an internationalist project, to which national consciousness is a necessary 
stage, and nationalism is a stumbling block.604 Fanon’s conception of decolonisation as a 
stadial process can be seen in a discussion of the West Indies Federation written in 1958. ‘A 
Caribbean national consciousness has been born’, he wrote. However, it is  
 
wiser that each people begins to gain independence within the framework of its 
situation so that the federation of all the Caribbean is not a rapid, artificial and fragile 
construction, but a confederation of mature states, determined to help each other and to 
defend each other’s freedom.605       
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 Decolonisation is at the same time an opening to the potential for innumerable 
struggles to come. Although these intellectual activists wrote as if transformation of 
international order was imminent, their politics were not stamped with a ‘use before’ date. A 
mistaken but very common reading of this history overlooks the openings created by the 
politics of liberation and takes its failures as more real and more final. Even though Fanon’s 
politics were necessarily imbedded in time and place, they also invoked a general solidarity 
in struggle. The future for these politics is not expressed by a demand for recognition, but a 
demand for a different world.                 
 
5.3. Hierarchy strikes back: shifting allegiances in the age of dual hegemony and 
development 
 
5.3.1 Hierarchy and divergence 
 
The post-War context and the growing imminence of sovereign independence from European 
empires cast previous imaginaries of political identity and unity into contention. There were 
three interconnected reasons for this: economic dependency, different experiences of armed 
conflict, and reconfigured political allegiances with respect to the Cold War, imperial historic 
ties, and the rise of US hegemony.  
 As we have seen, many African, African-American, and Afro-Caribbean politicians 
and intellectual activists had espoused the idea of federation for decades before WWII. Now, 
with anti-imperial momentum growing, West Indian and African politicians needed to 
seriously consider how to fund these political enterprises. W. Arthur Lewis, the St. Lucian 
development economist, who became a Nobel laureate in 1979, drew up development plans 
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for both Ghana and the West Indies in the late-1950s.606 Lewis had been a member of the 
League of Coloured Peoples in London along with C.L.R. James and others, and was part of 
the cadre of colonial intellectuals who saw the development and independence of Africa and 
the West Indies as part of a larger struggle over racial equality. He was also seen by The 
Bank of England and the Commonwealth Relations Office as a ‘safe pair of hands’, who, in 
the Ghanaian context, was described as a ‘moderating influence’ on Ghana’s more ‘wild’ 
finance minister, Komla Gbedemah (1912-1998).607 Lewis found that Crown Agents of 
London had mismanaged the sterling surpluses of Nigeria, Malaya, Ghana, and other colonial 
territories through a bad investment record in long-term securities.608 This was part of a larger 
practice of the British Labour government to continue to extract sterling reserves and unpaid 
imports from colonial territories to aid in its financial troubles after WWII.609 The effect was 
to drain colonial treasuries, as well as create the possibility for a currency crisis if the 
mismanagement was heavily publicised. However, rather than risk such a crisis – an outcome 
which would not help Ghana or any other colony – Lewis did not publicise the 
mismanagement, and instead got to work on a solution.       
 The new administrators of Ghana and the West Indies wanted to see short-term 
economic results, and Lewis recommended top-down state planning, and a ‘general 
atmosphere’ of ‘welcoming “know-how” and capital overseas’ to achieve them.610 Lewis 
imagined an ‘agricultural revolution’ in Ghana’s economy, particularly its centuries-old 
cocoa sector.611 This would involve reform of the indigenous systems of property rights, 
which were ‘obstacles to economic development.’612 The WIF, by the time it was formally 
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inaugurated in 1958, also had no treasury surplus, and all of its revenue had been dependent 
on imperial trade circuits and taxation. Furthermore, the different island colonies which 
constituted the WIF specialised to varying degrees in different primary commodities. As with 
many postcolonial economies, this made the constituent units of the WIF more competitive 
than complementary, and still heavily dependent on their historical ties with the British 
Commonwealth.613 Lewis recommended a centralised fiscal, monetary, and trade policy for 
the federation: an arrangement which meant that the individual member states would lose 
revenue, but might subsequently be compensated with government grants.614  
 What this meant was that national and transnational consciousness built on racial 
oppression within white world order was now subject to the highly asymmetrical global 
economy. Trinidad and Tobago was the WIF’s oldest and largest oil exporter, but now that 
Jamaica had also built an oil refinery, Norman Manley pressed for trade protections for the 
burgeoning industry. While solidarity between Africans and West Indians had once formed a 
robust anti-imperial black Atlanticism, Trinidad and Tobago and Ghana were now 
competitors for global cocoa revenues. Still moving within the assumption of federal 
integration, the government of Trinidad and Tobago continued to build trade partnerships 
with the Western powers as an independent unit. The United States had leased certain regions 
of Trinidad and Tobago from the British for 99 years. Eric Williams made the renegotiation 
of this lease a cornerstone of his anti-imperial platform; particularly, the release of the 
Chaguaramas port, which the US had occupied in order to build a naval base. Williams 
stridently opposed the lease, led a march to Chaguaramas, and demanded that it be released in 
order to serve as the WIF’s capital. In 1959, Sir Edward Beetham (1905-1979) was helping to 
oversee the transition of Trinidad and Tobago to an independent state. At the opening of a 
legislative council meeting in that year, on side with William’s government, Beetham made 
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reference to the contested lease, but also to Trinidad and Tobago’s ongoing relations with the 
United States and Canada. Specifically, the ‘steady inflow of capital’ from ‘United States 
investors, led by Texaco (Trinidad) Inc.’ which were ‘actively expanding our oil industry’ 
and ‘economic prospects.’615 After Jamaican exit and the looming disintegration of the WIF, 
Williams did a volte-face and agreed to share Chaguaramas with the US military, in exchange 
for ongoing economic relations, and the US agreeing to build quarters for Trinidadian 
marines.616 James and Maharaj, who had championed Williams’s march on Chaguaramas, 
were horrified, and split to form a new anti-imperial socialist party, the Workers and Farmers 
Party, with oil workers’ trade union leaders, including George Weekes (1921-1995). 
 It is likely that James saw Williams’s temptation to resume colonial economic 
relations with the West as a threat to the WIF even before its disintegration. Early 
parliamentary debate of the WIF included awareness that Britain was about to join a federal 
arrangement with Europe. Some, including Williams, argued that this was a reason to resume 
and even strengthen Trinidad and Tobago’s colonial economic ties with Britain, in order to 
benefit from the new European common market. In a personal letter of 1961 to Carl La 
Corbiniere, James suggested that a way to narrate this for the benefit of the WIF, was to 
inform the people that British entry into the common market was the primary reason for a 
recent curtailment of migration from the colonies into Britain. Britain was now looking away 
from the Commonwealth and towards Europe, which meant that the West Indies needed to 
stick together and not rely on its historic ties with Britain.617 
 In Africa, political and ideological divisions, as well as economic, opened up between 
Nkrumah, other heads of state – especially Azikiwe – and Nkrumah’s own cabinet. As Robert 
Tignor shows in his economic history of late colonial Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, 
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decolonisation was not a clean process, but ‘a tumultuous series of events’, often 
characterised by the racist and pessimistic attitudes of the British, French, and American 
governors meant to help facilitate the process.618 These processes can also be generally – but 
not totally -- characterised by imperial powers, and transnational, Western-based businesses, 
attempting to establish stable business ties with a more moderate national elite at the expense 
of more radical political and labour interests.619  
 The power of these interests, and the general consensus in Africa around the 
importance of foreign capital for the federal development state, coincided with opinions on 
African unity, which were already heterogeneous. While Nkrumah called for maximal 
integration of African territories, Azikiwe and others disagreed. Azikiwe argued in the Future 
of Pan-Africanism, that Nkrumah’s plan exacerbated ‘deep-seated fears in the minds of 
certain African leaders’ that unity would undermine Africans’ hard-fought sovereignty.620 
Furthermore, Azikiwe argued for ‘the right of African states to equality of sovereignty 
irrespective of size and population; the right of each African state to self-determination and 
existence… and the principle of non-intervention’ be established as principles within any 
African union.621 An African union, Azikiwe suggested, should not be one large state, but a 
‘miniature United Nations.’622 However, it should be noted that the Nigeria Azikiwe now led 
was not really seen at the time as a unitary nation-state, but a multi-national federation, which 
was going through its own considerable struggles holding together as a single entity. 
 Aside from his Padmore-inspired support for immediate, maximal unity, Nkrumah 
practiced or put forward other policies which were either controversial, or resented by other 
member nations of the newly establish Organisation for African Unity (OAU). In 1965, a 
French-speaking union of African states, the Afro-Malagasy Common Organisation, accused 
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Nkrumah of intervention in their member states’ affairs, particularly of subverting the 
leadership and harbouring political exiles from other African states.623 This was part of a 
suite of policies which led many to believe (probably correctly) that Nkrumah wanted to 
centralise the mission for African unity on Accra and his regime. The rationale for 
intervention in other OAU member states’ affairs was often to do with the real threat of 
armed conflict throughout the high period of decolonisation.624 Yet, African leaders disagreed 
on the degree of African military involvement in international affairs. During the Congo 
crisis of 1960, following Patrice Lumumba’s (1925-1961) removal from power by Joseph 
Kasa-Vubu (1915-1969), several African heads of state voted at the UN against the seating of 
Kasa-Vubu’s delegation. Once only a vaguely anticolonial voice on the world stage, the 
Congo crisis also lured the United States into African affairs to a far great extent than 
hitherto. When their vote failed, a cadre of African heads of state decided to withdraw their 
troops from the United Nations Command in the Congo. Nkrumah was a rare voice in this 
process arguing against this decision as a retreat and a concession.625 In 1963, Nkrumah also 
proposed that each African state pledge 30, 000 GBP to support ‘the freedom fighters’ in 
Algeria as part of a pan-African ‘liberation committee.’626   
 As well as other African heads of state, few members of Nkrumah’s own cabinet 
shared his particular internationalist vision.627 Bad blood in Nkrumah’s cabinet predated the 
OAU, when Nkrumah’s internationalist project clashed with those of other Ghanaian 
politicians. For example, the liberal internationalism of UGCC leader, Danquah. Before the 
strike action of 1948, Danquah had been an important African member of the colonial 
government. On the UGCC leaders’ release from prison following the strike, Danquah began 
                                                          
623 Wolfers, 1976: 150-155 
624 I do not have the space to give the complex internal politics of African unity its due. For primers on this 
subject, see Wolfers, 1976; Wallerstein, 2005; Davidson, 1992; Cooper, 2014; Dunn and Englebert, 2019. 
625 Wallerstein, 2005: 47-48 
626 Wolfers, 1976: 167 
627 See Marable, 1987: ch. 2 
P a g e  | 216 
 
negotiations with the British for a gradual process of devolution. Nkrumah was able to use 
Danquah’s caution, old ties with the British, and his own mass support, which he had 
cultivated through campaigning in the Gold Coast’s peasant communities, farms, markets, 
and various workers’ organisations, to mount a counter-movement, represented by the slogan, 
‘Self-Government now.’628 Nkrumah’s split from the UGCC led to the creation of his 
Convention People’s Party (CPP), which brought about a relatively rapid separation from the 
British Empire. Nkrumah’s leadership eventually became a cult of personality, and Nkrumah 
used his power to chase political rivals into exile, such as the sociologist, Kofi Busia (1913-
1978), as well as imprison Danquah.  
 Writing to Nkrumah during the time when he had been made a political pariah and 
imprisoned, Danquah denounced both African ujamaa – the form of African communal 
socialism advocated by Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere – and the ‘German-made thalidomide 
tranquilizer called socialism.’629 Instead he advocated liberalism, that the rights of the 
individual were held above the interests of the state, pan-African political integration, and the 
progressive move towards a world government and world parliament.630 He held all this in 
parallel with the idea that Ghanaian culture and Ghanaian values, understood to represent a 
syncretic merger of Christian and traditional Akan components, should form the basis of the 
independent nation. Liberalism, for Danquah, was not a European import, for ‘the African… 
is, at heart, a liberal’ and ‘the Ghanaian in particular’ is ‘a greater liberal even than the 
Englishman.’631 
 As was the case with Eric Williams, Nkrumah was also divided between loyalty to the 
emergent political organisations of former colonies, and historic ties to the British 
Commonwealth. As Mélanie Torrent shows (2016), Nkrumah’s prospective post-colonial ties 
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with Asia and other African territories were less demanded than negotiated with the oversight 
of British and French colonial authorities. Despite employing a rhetorical stance to the 
Commonwealth, which underscored its neo-colonial character, Nkrumah sought pan-African 
arrangements, initially with Guinea specifically, and Afro-Asian allegiance with India within 
the framework of the reformed post-colonial British Commonwealth. In the early 1950s, 
visits of Indian officials to the Gold Coast, accompanied by potential promises of financial 
and institutional support and cooperation, stimulated concern from British officials hostile to 
prospective African and Indian cooperation. As has already been established, British and 
French African territories were the subjects of constant surveillance, usually within the 
rationale of monitoring potential Communist infiltration. With respect to India, British 
officials worried that the ‘Indian Government would encourage African movements to 
embrace more fully Gandhian Satyagraha in their opposition to British rule, even where 
some devolution of power had already occurred.’632 The predominant rationale was therefore 
that ‘Indian activity in British Africa, at all stages of constitutional evolution, should… be 
monitored closely.’633 Britain’s colonial policy was also hostile to Nkrumahian pan-
Africanism, on one hand, because it represented a threat to its influence in Africa, and, on the 
other, because prospective ties between French and British African colonies threatened 
British relations with France. The Conference of Independent African States and the All 
African People’s Conference, held in Accra between 1951, and, after Ghana’s independence 
in 1958, were closely monitored by British colonial officials. However, their general state of 
alarm was periodically assuaged by the conciliatory tone struck by Nkrumah, particularly of 
the Ghanaian leader’s denunciation of violence. British officials eventually came around to 
the opinion that Nkrumah’s politics were pragmatic, and not necessarily a threat to Britain’s 
international interests. This was evidenced, in particular, by Nkrumah’s positive ‘attitude to 
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the US government and business as a source of aid and investment.’634 As a result, pan-
African and Afro-Asian allegiances suffered in relation to ongoing political and economic 
ties with Britain and the United States. The evidence suggests that Nkrumah sought to 
strategically pursue both kinds of alliance, but hierarchical relations with Britain ultimately 
persuaded – if not pressured – him to limit the extent of South-South cooperation. Nkrumah’s 
relationship with the West would ultimately sour as he sought strengthened ties with the 
Communist world. However, by the time this occurred, Nyerere’s prediction that inert 
nationalism would quickly foreclose paths to greater South-South unity had already come to 
pass.             
  
5.3.2. The Cold War frame 
 
As was broached in the previous section, the political processes meant to build South-South 
unity were negotiated under scrutiny by Western officials: through covert surveillance, 
promises of greater devolved powers, and through the interpersonal relationships of officials 
and new national leaders. This scrutiny was inseparable from the Cold War context, and 
longer global Cold War animosity between the political forces of global Communism and 
global liberalism. From the interwar period, and through to the post-war period, international 
Communist parties had built support amongst black populations through an emphasis on 
‘Negro liberation’ in general, and the espousal of a transnational ‘Negro Nationhood’ in 
particular.635 While a patchy history of commitment to black-particular politics had gradually 
weakened black support for the international Communist project, the exigency to establish 
lasting development ties with the West was even more deleterious. This did not happen 
overnight, and protracted anti-capitalist revolutions, such as Cuba (1953-1959), continued to 
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fuel radical politics and insurgencies throughout the black world. However, while Cold War 
politics did not eradicate left radicalism, they by and large dealt a deathblow to the political 
projects of federal socialism.636       
 The Western axis’s association of national federalism, South-South international 
integration, and other pan-nationalist movements with Leninist vanguard anti-imperialism 
profoundly shaped the rhetoric and direction of these movements. As several studies have 
now made clear, not least Westad’s formulation of a ‘global Cold War’ between the Western 
‘empire of liberty’ and the Soviet ‘empire of equality’, the perceived threat of Communist 
expansion to every corner of the colonised and formerly colonised world was central to 
Western foreign policy since, at least, 1945.637 The ‘red menace’ justified continued growth 
in the surveillance apparatus, intelligence gathering, and military intervention of Britain, 
France, and the United States from the end of WWII throughout the high period of 
decolonisation, approximately 1947-1975.638 Of course, this was the rationale behind major 
conflicts in Cuba, Vietnam, and Korea. Escalating crises throughout Africa in the late 1960s 
and 1970s created US fear of an ‘internationalization of the guerrilla war… from which the 
Soviet Union might profit.’639     
 The threat of Communism’s spread sometimes provided cover, if not a blank cheque, 
to one of the most violent periods of imperial suppression of colonial unrest. The British 
suppression of Kikuyu resistance in Kenya from 1952 to 1956 – or so-called ‘Mau-Mau’ 
insurgency – had little to no connection to international Communism, but nevertheless gained 
some international credibility under the more widespread anti-Communist policy.640 Jomo 
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Kenyatta, the perceived leader of the insurgency, was the subject of an MI5 investigation on 
his links to Communism since 1930.641 By the end of the insurgency, about 20, 000 Africans 
had been killed by British forces, with scores more held and tortured in Gulag-like detention 
camps.642 In other cases, the perceived suspicion of solidarity and collaboration between 
radical anticolonial movements had more merit. For example, after 1959, representatives of 
l’Armée de libération nationale of Algeria (ALN) attended meetings in Hanoi on the 
operational and ideological facets of revolutionary war, hosted by General Vo Nguyn Giap 
(1911-2013), the hero of Dien Bien Phu (1954) amongst other important anticolonial 
battles.643 
 As stated in the introduction, the incumbency of Cheddi Jagan to the premiership of 
British Guyana was an early target of Western Cold War policy. Although elected 
overwhelmingly in 1953, Jagan’s electoral victory needed to be ratified by London. The USA 
‘went to extraordinary lengths’ to pressure Britain into postponing the withdrawal it had 
planned from the colony, and called on Britain not to recognise Jagan’s victory. The US State 
Department believed that Jagan and his People’s Progressive Party (PPP) would “’ruin’ the 
colony and establish a Marxist-communist beach-head in America’s back yard.’644 The 
Colonial Office, succumbing to US pressure and with Churchill’s support, cancelled the 
election and used Jagan’s ‘communism’ as an excuse. Really, Jagan was a progressive and a 
socialist, whose American Jewish wife, Janet (born Rosenberg, 1920-2009), had made some 
inroads to the British Communist Party without establishing strong links with political 
communism. MI5 intelligence on the Jagans more or less cleared them of suspicion, but 
Britain and the United States feared that Jagan’s nationalist policies would block them from 
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access to British Guyana’s large aluminium and bauxite deposits.645 On October 19, 1953, 
Time Magazine published a sexist and racist article about the Jagans, defending their removal 
from power. A blond American Jew married to an Indo-Guianese man – and an eminent 
political thinker in her own right, who would eventually become Guiana’s president – Janet 
Jagan was smeared as a middle-class Communist agitator who apparently could not find a 
white man to marry. The British ‘had hoped by the example of good manners and 
management to cool off the hot-headed East Indian and Negro leaders elected in backward 
Guiana’, until the US State Department made them see sense.646      
 For good reason, US involvement reflected by the Jagan incident had a chilling effect 
on socialist vanguard projects in the West Indies and West Africa. By 1966, James had found 
himself an enemy of Eric Williams. Trinidad’s Evening News printed a story on October 5 of 
that year, relating Williams’s policy to ‘crush any Marxist movement in the country.’ The 
front page story depicted James, and two other members of the Farmers and Workers 
movement, above the headline ‘Williams: I’ll Crush the Marxists.’ James was called out as a 
self-described Marxist, inspired by the Cuban Revolution to overthrow Williams’s 
government. James was now a pariah of mainstream politics in Trinidad, a development 
which signalled the end of any prospective West Indies Federation as a radical socialist 
project. 
 The Cold War dynamic in Nkrumah’s Ghana was less straightforward. Nkrumah’s 
reputation as an ‘LSE communist’ with links to known anti-imperialist, George Padmore, 
made him a target of MI5 intelligence, especially after he gained political prominence after 
1951.647 The Colonial Official, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke (1898-1962), formed a friendly 
relationship with Nkrumah, and at the same time initiated an inquiry into his political views 
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and ties. Arden-Clarke made an early assessment of Nkrumah as a socialist moderate, and 
Padmore as a heterodox Marxist with no real ties to the Soviet Union. Yet, the Special 
Branch continued to read Nkrumah’s mail and keep him under close surveillance throughout 
his rise to power. In 1956, one year before Ghanaian independence, and after the Special 
Branch had decided on Nkrumah as a ‘pragmatist’ and moderate, an MI5 agent revealed 
himself as MI5 to Nkrumah. The agent suggested to Nkrumah that the Ghanaian leader invite 
the Special Branch to stay in the country, so as to keep an eye on suspected subversives, 
including Nkrumah’s rival in pan-African leadership, Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970). 
Nkrumah agreed, and MI5 stayed with Nkrumah’s consent until 1960. MI5’s recruitment of 
new national leaders to spy on communists became a wide practice, and soon other African 
leaders, including Nyerere, were acquired as assets.648 Nyerere was one of the most consistent 
critics of neo-colonialism, and he likely resented having to keep an eye on communism for 
the West, though he had little choice.649  
 After independence, Nkrumah began to seek closer ties with the Eastern bloc. He was 
awarded the Lenin Peace Prize from the Soviet Union in 1962, and established cooperative 
agreements with Mao Zedong in the same year. While this shift has been read as an 
ideological ‘lurch to the left’ by historians of Nkrumah’s rule, my reading suggests that it is 
more likely that Nkrumah simply drew from Padmore’s pan-African realism.650 Neither 
Padmore nor Nkrumah were strict ideological loyalists to Western or Eastern governments, 
and rather played both sides in the pursuit of their ultimate aim: pan-African unity. As a 
result of forged KGB documents, Nkrumah became increasingly convinced that the West was 
planning to withdraw support, if not topple, his leadership. His paranoia at this time is 
reflected in an exchange of letters with C.L.R. James. James wrote to Nkrumah several times 
                                                          
648 See Walton, 2013: 283 
649 Shivji, 2008: 243 
650 Cf. Walton, 2013; 232 
P a g e  | 223 
 
between 1959 and 1962.651 On June 4th, 1960 and in July 1962, James asked his old London 
friend to help ‘establish the West Indian-African connection’ and to promote the WIF any 
way he could. During the period of the WIF’s collapse, James asked Nkrumah to give his 
public support for the WIF, as Nkrumah’s testimonial would mean so much to the West 
Indian people. Nkrumah wrote back about the WIF in August, 1962, and stated ‘I shall never 
fail to take an active interest in the future welfare of the West Indies people, for their destiny 
is linked up with ours.’ But then in a subsequent letter, seemed to ignore James’s request, and 
instead wrote, ‘it is not a very pleasant thing to know that people are plotting to do away with 
you, but when you become a revolutionary, you have to expect assassination plots, traitors, 
and so forth…. The imperialists are not asleep and we must be vigilant.’ J.K. Harley, the head 
of Special Branch in Ghana, became convinced that Nkrumah planned to turn Ghana into a 
Soviet satellite, and initiated a successful coup against him on February 24, 1966.652    
 Cold War politics worked against anti-imperial globalism in different ways in other 
moments of (inter)nationalist struggle. Following Algeria’s independence from France, 
Ahmed Ben Bella and Mohamed Khemisti (1930-1963) spearheaded diplomatic missions to 
other African states with a socialist vanguard rationale. Directly informed by Fanon’s 
pragmatic anti-imperial globalism, the Algerian diplomats sought to lead ‘the fight against 
imperialism by supporting national liberation movements to their utmost, leading the struggle 
against neo-imperialism by propagating socialist revolution.’653 In practice, Ben Bella and 
Khemisti put aside ideological difference by initiating peacekeeping campaigns, reaching out 
to Western-backed states like Cote d’Ivoire, and helping to establish the OAU. These policies 
initiated the spread of new alliances against imperialism within and beyond Africa over the 
next year. Although initially on good terms with President Kennedy and the Unites States, 
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Ben Bella opposed US support for Portugal in Cabo Verde and Angola, and began to support 
left wing opposition movements in Morocco, Niger, and Zanzibar. This led to acrimony with 
Washington, and a consensus that Ben Bella was hostile to Western interests. The beginning 
of the end of Algeria’s globalist ambitions came as a result of the Sands War with Morocco, 
October-November 1963. A dispute over colonial borders led to conflict between Algeria and 
Morocco. Each saw the other as guilty of subversion: Ben Bella was convinced that Rabat 
was propping up his opposition; Rabat saw Ben Bella’s socialist revolution as a threat to its 
conservative monarchical government. Eventually, King Hassan of Morocco (1929-1999) 
attempted to convince Washington that Maghreb had ‘become a new front in the Cold 
War.’654 Kennedy wanted to resist further conspicuous involvement in such conflicts in 
Africa, yet, the USA and France continued to secretly deliver armaments and munitions to 
Morocco during the conflict. Eventually Cuba and Egypt were drawn into the skirmish. 
Although the Sands War ended in diplomatic détente, it fuelled nationalism and state-
centrism in Algeria, drew hard demarcations between Cold War camps, and helped further 
dismantle the idea that Africa was united.              
 While Western involvement and liberal internationalism helped scupper federal 
socialism, this does not mean that it never provided an outlet for racial and cultural equality 
struggles, at least in a more limited sense. A notable example of this is the period in the 1960s 
during which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) brought a case against South Africa’s 
apartheid state. With the backing of Lyndon B. Johnson’s government, the UN’s African 
Group launched a series of actions against South Africa in the early to mid-1960s. Made up 
of a large constellation of African governments – the largest advocacy group of its kind at the 
UN -- the African Group represented the political potential of a united Africa working in 
concert at the international level. Initially the African Group argued that South Africa was a 
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danger to ‘the maintenance of international peace and security’, which meant that the 
Security Council ‘would be obliged to take action under the provisions of chapter VII.’655 
When this failed to sway the United States and Great Britain, who had ‘sizeable economic 
investments’ in South Africa, the African Group brought litigation against South Africa 
through the ICJ.656 While the African Group was ultimately unsuccessful in ending apartheid 
through international law, the ICJ effectively put longstanding colonial rationales on trial: the 
notion that whites had an international mandate to rule over other races, and that non-whites 
were on their own (inferior) path of development which made integration impossible.657  
 The ideological backbone of the African Group’s case was that the modernization 
represented by international organisations like the UN necessarily implied ‘nonracialism.’658 
The purpose of modernization was not to perpetually provide upgraded rationales for empire 
to lord standards and conditions over weaker and poorer nations, but the establishment of 
normalised pathways for the gradual attainment of radical democracy and equality. But, 
through the continuous struggles of African leaders to navigate the waters of Cold War 
clientalism, the global economy, and the persistence of global racial hierarchy, the resolve to 
fight for these pathways was worn down. As Ryan Irwin writes, ‘the fight against Afrikaner 
nationalism hardened how African leaders talked about territoriality, development, and race.’ 
While the African Group was successful in bringing about the ‘delegitimization of racial 
discrimination and the creation of a new discourse of autonomy’, it also engendered a 
realisation that ‘encouraged the Third World’s collective turn away from the United Nations 
and toward the economic nationalism and dependency theories of the early 1970s.’659 
 Yet, like many historical narratives of decolonisation, Irwin’s explanation creates a 
foreclosure through the construction of hard discursive epochs. While it is true that Cold War 
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politics and the failed struggle for rights at the UN demonstrated the persistence of hierarchy, 
it is a massive overstatement to suggest that counter-hegemonic anti-imperialism was 
diverted entirely to inert national autonomy. Such a framing underemphasises the ongoing 
evolution of globalisation, and the political rationalisations which facilitate the different 
forms in which global hegemony crystallises. The dual exigencies of development and 
liberation continue to this day in different forms, and they continue to necessitate a social and 
political imaginary which can accommodate a global and transnational scale.                   
 
5.4. Post-Cold War developments 
 
In a 1984 issue of the London Review of Books, C.L.R. James, now 83-years old, gave his 
assessment of Maurice Bishop’s (1944-1983) recently-failed New Jewel revolution in 
Grenada, alongside his review of a book which offered an account of it, Grenada: Revolution 
and Invasion. The ‘three English academics’ who wrote the book, James decided, came ‘to a 
particularly old-fashioned conclusion.’ While they rightfully acknowledged that 
revolutionary societies in the global South could not merely copy ‘Western parliamentary 
democracy’, they then made the mistake of plunging ‘headlong into another popular 
miasma’: the need for a ‘Marxist Leninist Vanguard Party.’ James summed up: ‘It is curious 
that those who put forward this battered recipe never give a single example of a society in 
which that type of party has been successful. They do not give it because they cannot give 
it.’660  
 Grenada was just the latest failed attempt to mount a counter-hegemonic response to 
Western and neo-colonial hegemony that James had witnessed. There had been others since 
Nkrumah’s pan-African revolution and the WIF had ended. Perhaps most notably, Nyerere’s 
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dual disaster of, on one hand, village collectivisation (ujamaa) in Tanzania – a project James 
had once described as the most radical socialist project ever attempted – and, on the other, 
Nyerere’s failure to establish a New International Economic Order (NIEO) with other post-
colonial leaders, including Norman Manley. Ujamaa had been built on the notion that ‘pre-
colonial African societies were inherently democratic and practiced a form of “primitive 
communism” that could lay the groundwork for modern socialism.’661 While ujamaa did 
produce some benefits, the project was characterised by widespread denial of democratic 
accountability, and ultimately ended in food shortages and Tanzania’s dependency on 
international aid.662  
 The NIEO had been inspired by the success of the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in gaining leverage over Western economies. Its political 
rationale followed principles put forward by development economists such as Raúl Prebisch 
(1901-1986) and Gunnar Myrdal (1898-1987) that Third World states were at a permanent 
disadvantage in the global economy due to the inelastic price of primary commodities. The 
NIEO sought to band post-colonial nations in the global South together, and for each state to 
seize ‘full permanent sovereignty… over its natural resources.’663 The NIEO was ultimately 
shattered due to the rise of oil prices in the early-1970s, and the rise of sovereign debt in non-
oil producing countries. Anti-imperial common purpose had once unified leaders politically 
throughout Africa, the West Indies, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Now the creation of new 
economic alliances around sovereign control of resources, and the differentiated ability of 
different states to benefit from or withstand price fluctuations, largely ended the Third World 
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project. The notion that post-colonial international organisations might be a mechanism for 
global redistribution would ‘unravel beyond repair’ by 1975.664  
 Neoliberal structural adjustment programmes, imposed by imperial powers through 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IM), came soon after. These programmes 
often put political conditions on international aid. Eurocentric standards of liberal democracy 
and economic rationality were imposed on new nation-states. Imperial legitimation scripts of 
‘civilisation’ had come full circle. Western academics, with little or no grounding in the anti-
imperial histories which came before, facilitated this project by demarcating different 
civilisations as disconnected spheres of essentially different values. Or, as one scholar of 
international ethics classified them in 1992: ‘Western tradition[s] of thought’ and ‘Asian and 
African traditions.’665  
 As with the empire-backed chiefs of indirect rule, new national elites played on this 
international imaginary of essentially different values and culture to earn support and 
legitimacy at home and overseas. Nevertheless, visions of federal unity from above and 
below continued in new forms. While many Western liberal analysts came to see the failures 
of the more utopian institutional visions of pan-Africanism and black internationalism as 
proof of the territorial nation-state’s global applicability, ‘nation-statism’ and dependency (or 
neo-colonialism) were met with a variety of viewpoints from left academics and 
commentators. In the 1960s, white observers of African politics like Michael Wolfers, Basil 
Davidson, and Immanuel Wallerstein generally viewed the OAU as a necessarily difficult 
prospect, but still an evolution of the interwar ‘social movements’ to which they were 
favourably inclined. James continued to search for progressive internationalist alternatives to 
the post-colonial state until his death in 1989. For some, such as the Egyptian scholar, Samir 
Amin (1989; 1990), autonomous state socialism came to be seen as a necessary progression 
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of the armed anticolonial revolutions, which had erupted in colonies such as Vietnam, 
Algeria, Kenya, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Cuba.  
 Different ideological fissures over the direction of African unity came to renewed 
prominence in the late-1960s and 1970s, and again in the 2000s. Oginga Odinga (1911-1994) 
was a Kenyan Luo tribal chief who renounced his chieftaincy in 1957 to take a more active 
role in the anti-imperial political struggle. Initially on the side of the president, Jomo 
Kenyatta, Odinga ultimately opposed Kenyatta over the latter’s pursuit of US and Western 
capital. In his political autobiography, which has a title that became a political slogan, Not Yet 
Uhuru (1967), Odinga diagnosed Kenya’s post-colonial problems as due to Kenyatta’s 
government privileging Western capital over the demands of workers’ struggles. For Odinga, 
uhuru meant pan-African unity, but this had to come from the creation of an international 
organisation of democratic workers’ movements and the ejection of Western powers from the 
continent. ‘Imperial tactics in southern, central and east Africa are clear,’ Odinga wrote. 
‘They are to hold back the assault on the southern strongholds of colonialism and White 
domination for as long as possible; to protect and preserve strategic and economic interests in 
the Congo; and in East Africa, using Kenya as a base, to keep a careful watch on and if 
necessary to isolate and undermine the new state of Tanzania.’666 Within the last fifteen 
years, Mbeki of South Africa, Mummar Gaddafi, and Museveni of Uganda have all 
announced Pan-African institution-building projects to gain legitimacy for weakly democratic 
regimes. 
 The conception of anti-imperial pan-Africanism from below would take different 
forms, for example, in the fiction and political essays of the Kenyan nationalist writer and 
academic, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o. Ngũgĩ’s last novel in English, Petals of Blood (1977), depicts 
a post-colonial Kenya dominated by Western capital, as well as a national elite which uses 
                                                          
666 Odinga, 1967: 312-313 
P a g e  | 230 
 
traditional culture as a tool to wield sectarian authority on one hand, and to oppose political 
intervention from the West on the other. In terms reminiscent of Fanon, the protagonists in 
this struggle are those who demand ‘a different world’ through class struggle and grassroots 
opposition. Kenyatta’s administration imprisoned Ngũgĩ in the late-1970s for expressing his 
revolutionary Marxist views in Petals of Blood, and other works. In his published prison 
diaries, originally released under the title, Detained (1981), Ngũgĩ took aim at Kenyatta for 
using his cultural nationalism as a substitute for emancipatory politics. Kenyatta ‘was a 
graduate of Malinowski’s school of anthropology at London University, a cultural nationalist 
(he had written Facing Mount Kenya in which politics was deliberately cut out).’ He was also 
‘a petty bourgeois to the core, who never consciously rejected that class base…. As a leader 
of an anti-imperialist alliance of classes, he kept on shifting his position, depending on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the two mortally contending classes: workers and peasants, and 
the imperialist bourgeoisie.’667 Negatively comparing Kenyatta with Cabral, Ngũgĩ wrote 
that, once in power, petty bourgeois leaders would tend to betray the people’s struggle. 
‘[L]ike Cabral’, he wrote, they must ‘recognize this reality if [they are] going to transcend it, 
by consciously rejecting [their] class to find a true and permanent, regenerative link with the 
people.’668 Ngũgĩ remains an advocate of African culture and language to this day, but he has 
never been a narrow nationalist, and has always framed different imperial and anti-imperial 
strategies as linked through globally connected processes and practices. He even spoke at the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in 2009 to argue in favour of limited Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P) interventions, as long as they were not used as subterfuge for imperialism.669   
       Continuing to reflect the transnational political sociology of black experiences with 
white world order, similar evolutions in anti-imperial discourse came from African-American 
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and Caribbean writers over the same period. One of the more interesting thinkers to emerge 
from the African-American context was Harold Cruse. In the Crisis of the Negro Intellectual 
(1967), Cruse gave a provocative critique of counter-hegemonic African-American politics in 
the first three-quarters of the 20th century. He argued that African-Americans were an 
internally colonised population, whose politics had always taken place at the junction of 
‘nationalism’ and ‘integrationism.’ Pointing to the Black Power and Civil Rights movements 
exemplified by Malcolm X (1925-1965) or James Baldwin (1924-1987), Cruse argued that 
contemporary black nationalists were characterised by romantic and abstract notions that all 
black people were united and strong in a common stance against oppression. Meanwhile, 
integrationists sought recognition and inclusion in white-dominated political, economic, and 
cultural institutions, and turned away from struggles being waged by the black populace at 
large. Cruse’s prescription was to argue for a more rigorous sociohistorical analysis, for black 
intellectuals to produce a programme for how segregated, already existing black institutions 
could be built and developed for the eventual aim of social, political, and economic equality 
with whites. Probably influenced to an extent by the anti-internationalist imaginary of the 
Cold War, Cruse argued for a rejection of old pan-African and black Atlantic politics to the 
benefit of a primary focus on African-American struggles.670 
 Maybe somewhat ironically, Cruse’s rejection of globalist and internationalist politics 
were really evolutions of ideas expressed by global dialectical thinkers like Du Bois and 
Fanon. As we have seen, Du Bois and Fanon both also (ultimately) rejected abstract and 
romantic conceptions of black subjectivity, when they saw these as ineffective or deleterious 
to their anti-imperial strategies. The difference was to do with the strategic content of the 
times. Du Bois and Fanon could both articulate international collective identities because the 
relational networks of empire imbued these collective identities with concrete political 
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content and opportunity. As Cedric Johnson (2007) argues, Cruse was to the Black Power 
movement what Herbert Marcuse was to European Marxism: an intellectual trying to 
diagnose the mass stagnation of the workers’ revolutionary movement in the face of new and 
powerful allegiances to capital.671 Marcuse argued that labour movements in the United 
States no longer represented a contradiction to capital because of these allegiances. Instead, 
the contradiction needed to come from ‘black Americans, inhabitants of the Third World, the 
unemployed, and the dispossessed’: those Fanon had once described as the wretched of the 
earth.672 Marcuse’s diagnosis made him the European critical theorist of choice for the Black 
Power movement. However, compared to Cruse’s analysis, which recognised that black 
America was also classed, and therefore counted amongst its number people with their own 
allegiances to capital, Marcuse’s was relatively essentialist and romantic. 
 Other attempts to articulate new futures for anti-imperial politics continued to reach 
for the universal, but looked inward to locate alternative sources of universalism. For 
example, the Martiniquan philosopher and poet, Édouard Glissant, produced an alternative 
dialectics based on his conception of radically heterogeneous Caribbean society. Contributing 
to the créolité literary movement, Glissant characterised ‘creolizations’ as the formation of a 
‘complex mix’ of endlessly emergent forms of ‘humanity’s Being’ through ‘an interplay of 
relations.’673 Really Glissant advocated an anti-universalist universalism: an ethical 
commitment to the multifarious forms of society and social being, and the ways in which 
these are constantly becoming something else, evolving through ‘mutual mutations.’674 
However, this, for Glissant, was not a substitute for politics – or even an alternative to anti-
imperial armed struggle – but an intellectual disposition to an alternative global ontology, 
which resisted imperialism’s fixed, essentialist definitions.        
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 Although Glissant himself was not entirely guilty of conflating culture with politics, 
the organisation he once worked for, UNESCO, eventually became a site for cultural politics. 
Another outcome of the histories I have related in this thesis was the emergence of a 
discourse which presents cultural categories of thought as a final frontier of transnational 
anti-imperial conflict. By this, I do not mean that military engagement ceased between liberal 
order-keepers and ‘anti-status quo’ groups in the global South. Such military engagement, of 
course, continues to this day. Rather, categories of thought, such as knowledge and culture, 
emerged as aspects of the politics of globalisation, which could still be contested on a global 
scale, when, for example, the nation-state form, could no longer be. With the failure of anti-
imperial movements to transform the hierarchical structures of political and economic 
institutions, categories of thought, through the post-colonial university and organisations like 
UNESCO, became one of the few remaining bastions of transnational counter-hegemonic 
struggle.  
 For example, in 1984, the US threatened to withdraw from UNESCO because it had 
good reason to believe that Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow (1921-), the Senagalese director-general 
of the organisation and Glissant’s colleague, was turning the organisation into an anti-
Western Third World political front and ally of the Soviet Bloc.675 This conflict can be seen 
as a continuation of ‘the culture wars’ carried over from the Global Cold War, to a time when 
political international institutions were no longer seen by Third World leaders as possible 
sites for the promotion of radical democracy and redistribution.676   
 some of the most radical insights in anti-imperial globalist discourse and politics came 
from women. Although sometimes expressed tacitly or unsystematically, a central idea in 
much of this discourse throughout the 20th century was that political unity driven from below 
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would advance the position of women in the world by giving networks of grassroots women’s 
movements greater access to the international political sphere. As we saw in Chapter Three, 
Adelaide Casely Hayford, developed a combination of pan-African and feminist views prior 
to the First World War. After working for Garvey’s UNIA, she attempted to start a girls’ 
vocational school based on a combination of these principles. In 1932, French Martiniquan 
writer Paulette Nardal presented a theory of black women’s racial consciousness, and 
envisaged a teleology of liberation based on the synthesis of black and white cultural 
elements. Amílcar Cabral would espouse similar ideas at UNESCO four decades later. 
Trinidadian journalist Claudia Jones was an advocate of pan-Africanism, Communism, and 
the West Indies Federation, who prefigured black feminists like Audre Lorde (1934-1992), 
Angela Davis (1944-), and Sylvia Wynter (1928-). These generations of radical women, to 
varying extents, located the dehumanisation of the (post-)colonial subject at the level of 
capitalist world order, and its related masculinist conceptions of political authority and 
subjectivity. 
 Audre Lorde (1984), in particular, presented a radical plea for the right to self-define 
against imperial impositions of social normalisation. Characterising decolonisation as an 
aspect of the social, Lorde demanded to be recognised in terms of a complex social identity, 
not reducible to any constituent category: ‘As a Black lesbian feminist comfortable with the 
many different ingredients of my identity, and a woman committed to racial and sexual 
freedom from oppression, I find I am constantly being encouraged to pluck out some one 
aspect of myself and present this as the meaningful whole, eclipsing or denying the other 
parts of self.’677 This threat to self comes from all sides: white men, heterosexuals, white 
women, and black men. Lorde understood her subjectivity in terms of structures of power 
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shared by ‘Black and Third World people’, and thus in terms of a social identity directly 
linked to histories of anti-imperial world politics.678      
 I want to suggest that we can read Lorde as, in some ways, most characteristic of the 
context defined by the decline of the Third World project. The demand for self-definition, for 
an understanding and representation of self which does not rely on the acceptance of others, 
is perhaps the purest example of the turn to autonomy after the failure of anti-imperial 
globalism to revolutionise (international) society. As scholars such as Tadiar (2009) have 
shown, Claudia Jones’s fears that the deeper meaning of anti-imperial revolution would be 
overshadowed by masculinist nation-building projects has largely come to pass. While I am 
sceptical about the political efficacy implied by Lorde’s pure spurning of ‘the oppressor’, and 
the reliability of her claim that Black and Third World people experience the same 
oppression, it must be acknowledged that imperial hierarchies which remain in society are 
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This thesis has given an answer to why transnational visions were dominant, and then were 
marginalised, in the black anti-imperial politics of the early to late 20th century. Departing 
from other readings of these transnational histories, I have argued that African and diasporic 
critics of empire were neither passive recipients of ‘Western’ political forms, nor were they 
representative of an autonomous black or African genre of political thought. Instead, these 
politics were shaped through their necessary interaction with a dominant global discourse, 
which understood the problems of the 20th century as requiring large-scale forms of political 
organisation and integration. The dominant global discourse was determining in that it 
delimited the possibilities of what pathways out of empire might entail. Yet, what is most 
notable, is how consistently and to what extent colonial activists and leaders pushed against 
the parameters of what a nation-state or an international institution was supposed to be. 
Rejecting the ethnic chauvinism and aggressive expansionist logics of imperial nation-
statism, some argued that the modern state, and even world government, could be remade as 
servants of social justice: as socially, politically, and economically progressive forces. In 
addition to serving a ‘bigger is better’ security rationale, inter-racialism, and workers’ 
interests, the vision of post-colonial federation represented the capability of non-white, non-
European people to join and surpass their former rulers on the shared terrain of global 
progress.  
 Anti-imperial globalism was also determined by a discourse of race. While not the 
only factor, racialisation placed limits on the ability of anti-imperial politics to sustain 
momentum across ethnic divides. From 1919 to 1975, colonial subjects who struggled against 
empire negotiated different identities and allegiances alongside different visions of a post-
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colonial world. Empire’s politics of difference engendered a fundamental tension between the 
self-understanding of particular anticolonial groups and a commitment to global progress 
defined as liberation. This tension defined the anti-imperial globalist relationship to the idea 
of international order, international cooperation, and modernity itself. Disagreements between 
anticolonial activists and leaders were expressed as racialialised identities, with a view to 
how these identities would come to be represented within an international system which was 
becoming increasingly formalised through the project of liberal world order.  
 However, these disagreements were not always counter-productive or debilitating to 
goals of sovereignty and self-determination. Fissures could sometimes be ignored or ironed 
out in favour of the common cause depending on the historical conjuncture. Race 
discrimination and injustice often served as the initial impetus for social change. Black anti-
imperial politics overlap, but are not reducible to, other anti-imperial politics, because their 
agents consistently pursued strategies which were seen to benefit the race, and rejected those 
that would elide race in favour of other solidarities, such as class. Still, the notion that the end 
of empire was ultimately for the purpose of benefitting any one race was broadly rejected by 
progressive black anti-imperialists.  
 This changed after independence, when racialisation played a role in delimiting 
national, let alone transnational, cohesion. Sovereignty, though seen as a necessity by many, 
had a sting in the tail. The colonial socioeconomic divisions based in race – but where ‘race’ 
also stood in for the social meanings denoting hierarchical cultural and class categories – 
served as the basis for neo-colonial relations with the Great Powers during the Cold War, and 
as a way of excluding minority voices and interests from democratic decision-making in 
fragile post-colonial states. In these new national and international contexts, the idea of a 
Third World socialist federation driving global progress had little oxygen to survive.         
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 Throughout this study I have demonstrated how analysis of anti-imperial globalism 
from ‘above and below’ allows us to foreground plural and contested visions of the post-
colonial state and political community to world politics. This framework provides more than 
more nuanced history. It provides a critical response to the notion that the post-colonial 
nation-state in its post-1945 form was the only or most desired form of political organisation 
after empire; while at the same time, a better understanding of the structural constraints of 
those who pursued a more progressive and inclusive state as the means to end colonial rule. 
Anti-imperial globalism from above can be seen to represent all the lessons that mainstream 
IR has traditionally wrung from decolonisation: struggles for sovereignty and recognition, the 
assertion of ‘non-Western values’, the construction of regional inter-governmental orders. 
However, rather than reproduce a unitary actor ontology, I have shown how these politics 
were shaped through their relational co-implication with other political discourses and 
visions. Anti-imperial globalism from below was also a part of the world politics which 
helped shape the post-1945 order. These politics stressed the dialectical relationship between 
global racial disparity and domestic social injustice: two ‘levels of analysis’ traditionally kept 
as distinct by mainstream IR.  
 Sovereignty and recognition were only worth pursuing to the extent that they would 
remake imperial-colonial power relations at state and international levels, and not reproduce 
them in a new form. Likewise, ‘non-Western’ culture and knowledge were valued to the 
extent that they could bring about a more modern politics, and could form the basis for class 
collaboration in political organising. Global order was necessary only to the extent that it 
could provide fairer and more peaceable relations between societies. Throughout the anti-
imperial struggles of the 20th century, we can see the relationship between different anti-
imperial globalisms from above and below at work. This does not mean political uniformity 
across a seamless global transition from empire to nation-state. Instead it reveals a plurality 
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of different ideas about resistance, reform, and progress, which were connected through their 
reaction to more prevalent events and racialised structures.   
 International and transnational solidarities were a prevalent feature of activist and 
ethnic minority nationalist politics after WWI. They arose in response to the global crises of 
the Great War and the subsequent crises and great power conflicts left in its wake. WWI 
provided a global demonstration for many colonial subjects that the emperor had no clothes 
when it came to world civilization’s deeper promise of democracy, progress, peace, and 
prosperity. This feeling was underpinned by the demonstration of black and Asian colonial 
forces fighting for the integrity and expansion of imperial territory. Race leaders, like Marcus 
Garvey, W.E.B. Du Bois, and J.E. Casely Hayford, were indicative of a rising transatlantic 
black power and a growing intolerance for the colour line. For some, their politics also 
demonstrated the limit to which essential representations of ‘blackness’ could be used to 
argue for greater inclusion of black populations into the liberal capitalist order, without a 
more fundamental reform of that order. Radical thinkers like Hubert Harrison and Cyril 
Briggs, suggested an alternative politics through their critiques of these race leaders. Each 
argued that global transformation would need to come from colonised populations on the 
ground: harnessing the actually existing potential for ethno-cultural and class collaboration 
within communities on both sides of the Atlantic. This included a rejection of imperial 
‘civilisationism’, but not globalism, inter-racialism, or federalism. Harrison and Briggs show 
that, historically, it has not been the idea of ‘world civilisation’ itself that is imperial, but 
white societies’ claim of ownership to it, and their claim of the right to lord its standards over 
other societies. 
 The various political mobilisations spurred by the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and 
the expansion and decline of the COMINTERN showed a connected and galvanised black 
internationalism. Yet, they also reveal divergences in the way that ‘revolution’ could be 
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articulated rhetorically by different black intellectual activists in different social milieu. 
Revolutionary politics were not like an instruction manual passed down from the 
Enlightenment as a way to show non-European people the road to sovereign statehood. 
Rather, ideological texts, like Marxist-Leninism, were one part of a larger pool of resources 
used, in a selective and creative fashion, to guide and mobilise anti-imperial struggles. These 
struggles were directly precipitated by the colonial encroachments and racism experienced by 
people throughout the empire, and they helped bring about a dominant global discourse of 
revolution. However, they were also informed by more widely prevalent discourses about the 
need for political integration and world government. These were interpreted by different 
people in different ways, and did not follow one logical path from colonial enslavement, to 
sovereign statehood, to world government. Claude McKay and others saw the potential for 
revolution in the mismatch between black subjectivity and global modernity. They argued 
that black subjects were inherently ill-suited to modernity, and therefore would continue to 
represent its limits and potential for transformation outside of formal institutions. These more 
anarchistic conceptions resonated with those of federalists, like James, Padmore, Du Bois, 
and Jones, who argued that the state needed to be remade as a radically democratic and 
egalitarian institution. McKay, Padmore, and Du Bois shared the belief that white supremacy, 
globally and in colonial societies, was an impediment to any truly revolutionary course of 
action. McKay’s first-hand experience with the COMINTERN and white labour led him to 
largely give up on organised political movements. Du Bois concurred that ‘the wages of 
whiteness’ were a roadblock to inter-racial collaboration, and so he argued for strategic and 
temporary segregation as a path to multiracial democracy. Padmore, James, and Jones argued 
for black sovereignty for Africa and the Caribbean, but each imagined this as a path to 
federalism, which would embody and defend multiracial democracy, social freedom, and 
egalitarianism. Each saw these forms of political organisation – not as abstract -- but already 
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in place through various patterns of labour organising, particularly the longstanding tradition 
of West Indian labour federation. 
 While more of a subject for contention in previous generations, the idea that Africans 
and the diaspora shared a path to development with the West became dominant in the post-
WWII discourse of African, Caribbean, and black American Third Worldists. This reflected 
both a perceived need to establish robust development economies to pay for state 
independence, and to enter into new forms of international cooperation with the Great 
Powers. At least in the case of many African and Caribbean nations, the rhetoric of non-
alignment often concealed new forms of imperial dependence between emerging post-
colonial states, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Though they mattered more than 
some post-colonial leaders wanted to, or could, admit, Cold War geopolitics and colonial 
legacies with Britain and France delimited the possibilities for political union and more direct 
and equal popular sovereignty.  
 Again, racialised discourse and policy played an important role. New African leaders 
sought to promote traditional cultural difference in order to legitimate democratic and 
socialist reforms. Various African Socialist programmes were devised with progressive 
intentions, but, in practice, often served ethno-nationalist and authoritarian ends. Promoting a 
single traditional ‘African difference’ often put the ruling party and majority ethnic group at 
the head of multinational constituencies, which could not conform to this totalising statist 
vision without coercion. Native African opposition was labelled ‘reactionary’, ‘nativist’, or 
‘neo-colonial’, if it was not amenable to new development targets and state building policies. 
These political divergences were often framed in terms of ethnic difference—some Africans 
were more ‘fit for modernity’ than others. Obversely, both in Africa and the Caribbean, black 
sovereigntism could be used to justify exclusion and suspicion of non-black residents – or 
progressive, ‘communist’ ideas -- on the grounds that they were inauthentic or neo-colonial. 
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This combination: new leaders maintaining hierarchical ties with the Great Powers and 
former empires, and legacies of imperial racialisation, are both necessary to explain why the 
interwar politics of anti-imperial globalism and progressive federalism from below did not 
survive the transition of power in African and the Caribbean. This is not to say that no 
movements for multi-racial unity and social egalitarianism exist today– far from it. But 
arguments that these values could become foundational for the conduct and form of state and 
world government – the basis for international relations between former empires and colonies 
-- are far scarcer today than they were in 1919, 1935, or 1957.  
 These histories offer context and lessons for analysis of contemporary international 
relations. First, IR should expand or depart from its overemphasis on order, and make space 
for an analysis more attuned to justice claims. This is not to say that IR scholars must devote 
themselves to the political theoretical work of ethics or normative evaluation. However, 
scholarship concerned with the constitution of international relations should be attentive to 
the ways that movements and arguments for justice play a key role in shaping politics and 
identities between societies. Order based in a norm of sovereignty has often been a potential 
or actual impediment to the justice claims of marginalised groups, and thus cannot be 
assumed as the taken-for-granted end goal of world politics. Justice claims and movements 
might, of course, involve demands for sovereignty, but IR should not only pay attention to 
them when they do. The West Indies Federation and United States of Africa did not come to 
fruition in the form imagined, but we should expect that global injustice and inequality will 
continue to inspire reformist and revolutionary politics, including those to remake the state as 
a progressive force, or to seek new forms of inter-societal unity. 
 Second, the politics of the ‘non-West’ are not reducible to recognition of the 
particular or the different, any more than ‘the West’ should continue to claim its privileged 
access to ‘universal knowledge.’ Claims to difference are often arguments for alternative 
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universalisms, and might also contain a potential or actual impetus to shape the world in the 
claimants’ image. A valuable contribution of scholarly work to ‘provincialise Europe’, is not 
necessarily to demand that we recognise cultures and politics outside Europe, but to show 
that trans-boundary power, imperialisms, and totalising ideologies always come from a 
particular place, though they might create global forms of engagement and conflict. Scholars 
should also be cautious when promoting recognition, that they are not enacting colonial 
recognition. IR can and should study recognition claims, but should not define groups of 
people in terms of fixed characteristics or essences.   
 Third, empires engender thick social relations and boundary-crossing discourses, 
which have determining effects on social practice. These social relations and discourse can 
provide an important analytical orientation for future inquiry into empire, racialisation, their 
legacies in, and effects on, contemporary international relations. The recent interest in race in 
IR carries with it the potential for a proliferation of anti-racist sentiment, which can simply 
ascribe ‘racism’ to individuals and attitudes, without a deeper exploration of why 
racialisation persists in many societies throughout the world. This is not to draw a false 
equivalency between different racisms. Rather, I merely suggest that the academic goal when 
it comes to racialisation should be understanding, not litigation or defence. IR has recently 
begun to draw upon related disciplines for better understanding social relations and 
boundary-crossing discourses: global historical sociology and intellectual history. From the 
tools offered by these disciplines we can fashion a historical-relational approach to empire 
and race in IR, which can provide a richer understanding of the power relations shaping 
contemporary world politics.  
      
   
  
P a g e  | 244 
 





CLR James Collection, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago 
George Padmore Research Library, Accra, Ghana 
National Archives of Trinidad and Tobago, Port of Spain 
Public Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD), Accra, Ghana 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
Newspapers and journals 
(Newspapers and journals with less than two citations are only cited in footnote)  
 
African Times and Orient Review 
Crisis 
Gold Coast Leader 
Negro World 
The Crusader 
The People (Trinidad and Tobago) 
WASU – Journal of the West African Students Union 
West African Pilot 
 
Books, journal articles, and pamphlets 
 
Abbott A (2001) Time Matters: On Theory and Method. University of Chicago Press. 
Abdullah I (1994) Rethinking the Freetown Crowd: The Moral Economy of the 1919 Strikes and 
Riot in Sierra Leone. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des études 
africaines 28(2): 197–218. 
Abrahams P (2000) The Coyaba Chronicles: Reflections on the Black Experience in the 20th 
Century. Ian Randle. 
P a g e  | 245 
 
Acharya A (2014) Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds. International Studies 
Quarterly 58(4): 647–659. DOI: 10.1111/isqu.12171. 
Acharya A (2016) Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions, and Contributions. 
International Studies Review 18(1): 4–15. DOI: 10.1093/isr/viv016. 
Adas M (2004) Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the 
Civilizing Mission Ideology. Journal of World History 15(1): 31–63. 
Adas M (2015) Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western 
Dominance. Cornell University Press. 
Adelman J (2006) Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic. Princeton University Press. 
Adi H, Sherwood M and Padmore G (1995) [1945] Colonial and Coloured Unity. In: The 1945 
Manchester Pan-African Congress Revisited with Colonial and Coloured Unity. New Beacon 
Books. 
Agassi JB (1989) Theories of Gender Equality: Lessons from the Israeli Kibbutz. Gender and 
Society 3(2): 160–186. 
Agathangelou AM (2016) Fanon on Decolonization and Revolution: Bodies and Dialectics. 
Globalizations 13(1): 110–128. DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2014.981056. 
Agathangelou AM and Ling LHM (2004) The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the 
Poisies of Worldism. International Studies Review 6(4): 21–49.  
Althusser L, Balibar E, Establet R, et al. (2016) Reading Capital: The Complete Edition. 
Unabridged edition edition. London ; New York: Verso. 
Amin S (1989) Eurocentrism. NYU Press. 
Amin S (1990) Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World. Zed Books. 
Anderson B (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
London and New York: Verso. 
Anderson D (2011) Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. W. 
W. Norton. 
Anderson P (2017) The H-Word: The Peripeteia of Hegemony. Verso Books. 
Anghie A (2005) Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Anievas A and Nişancıoğlu K (2015) How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of 
Capitalism. Pluto Press. 
Anscombe FF (2014) State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Armitage D (2000) The Ideological Origins of the British Empire. Cambridge University Press. 
P a g e  | 246 
 
Armitage D and Subrahmanyam S (eds) (2009) The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, C. 
1760-1840. Macmillan International Higher Education. 
Asad T (2009) Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam. JHU Press. 
Austin G (2005) Labour, Land, and Capital in Ghana: From Slavery to Free Labour in Asante, 
1807-1956. Boydell & Brewer. 
Aydin C (2007) The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic 
and Pan-Asian Thought. Columbia University Press. 
Azikiwe N (1937) Renascent Africa. Negro Universities Press. 
Azikiwe N (1961) The Future of Pan-Africanism. Nigeria High Commission. 
Babu ARM (1981) African Socialism Or Socialist Africa? Zed Press. 
Bair B (n.d.) Pan-Africanism as Process: Adelaide Casely Hayford, Garveyism, and the Cultural 
Roots of Nationalism. In: Imagining Home: Class, Culture and Nationalism in the African 
Diaspora. Verso, pp. 121–144. 
Bairoch P (1981) The Main Trends in National Economic Disparities Since the Industrial 
Revolution. In: Bairoch P and Levy-Leboyer M (eds) Disparities in Economic Development 
since the Industrial Revolution. London: Macmillan, pp. 3–17. 
Barkawi T (2010) Empire and Order in International Relations and Security Studies. Available at: 
https://www.academia.edu/348812/Empire_and_Order_in_International_Relations_and_Secu
rity_Studies (accessed 10 April 2018). 
Barkawi T (2016) Decolonising war. European Journal of International Security 1(2): 199–214. 
DOI: 10.1017/eis.2016.7. 
Barkawi T (2017) Soldiers of Empire. Cambridge University Press. 
Barkawi T (2018) From law to history: The politics of war and empire. Global Constitutionalism 
7(3): 315–329. 
Barkawi T and Laffey M (1999) The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization. 
European Journal of International Relations 5(4): 403–434. 
Barkawi T and Laffey M (2006) The postcolonial moment in security studies. Review of 
International Studies 32(2): 329–352. DOI: 10.1017/S0260210506007054. 
Barkey K (2008) Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Barkin JS and Cronin B (1994) The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of 
Sovereignty in International Relations. International Organization 48(1): 107–130. 
P a g e  | 247 
 
Barnett M and Duvall R (2004) Power in Global Governance. Cambridge University Press. 
Barooah NK (2004) Chatto, the Life and Times of an Indian Anti-Imperialist in Europe. Oxford 
University Press. 
Bayly CA (2004) The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914. Wiley. 
Bayly MJ (2014) The ‘re-turn’ to empire in IR: colonial knowledge communities and the 
construction of the idea of the Afghan polity, 1809–38. Review of International Studies 
40(3): 443–464. DOI: 10.1017/S0260210513000338. 
Bayly MJ (2016) Taming the Imperial Imagination: Colonial Knowledge, International Relations, 
and the Anglo-Afghan Encounter, 1808–1878. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bell D (2001) International relations: the dawn of a historiographical turn? The British Journal of 
Politics & International Relations 3(1): 115–126. DOI: 10.1111/1467-856X.00053. 
Bell D (2009) The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900. 
Princeton University Press. 
Bell D (2013) Ideologies of Empire. The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies. DOI: 
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199585977.013.0012. 
Bell D (2014) To Act Otherwise: Agonistic Republicanism and Global Citizenship. In: Tully J 
(ed.) On Global Citizenship: James Tully in Dialogue. Bloomsbury Publishing: 181. 
Bell D (2016) Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire. Princeton University 
Press. 
Benhabib S (1986) Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory. 
Columbia University Press. 
Benner E (2018) Really Existing Nationalisms: A Post-Communist View from Marx and Engels. 
London and New York: Verso. 
Berland O (1999) The Emergence of the Communist Perspective on the ‘Negro Question’ in 
America: 1919–1931: Part One. Science & Society 63(4): 411–432. 
Bevir M (1999) The Logic of the History of Ideas. Cambridge University Press. 
Bhambra GK (2014) Connected Sociologies. London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
Bieler A (2001) Questioning Cognitivism and Constructivism in IR Theory: Reflections on the 
Material Structure of Ideas. Politics 21(2): 93–100. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9256.00140. 
Bieler A and Morton AD (2004) A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical 
change: neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations. Capital & Class 28(1): 85–
113. DOI: 10.1177/030981680408200106. 
Bilgin P (2008) Thinking past ‘Western’ IR? Third World Quarterly 29(1): 5–23. DOI: 
10.1080/01436590701726392. 
P a g e  | 248 
 
Bilgin P (2016) “Contrapuntal Reading” as a Method, an Ethos, and a Metaphor for Global IR. 
International Studies Review 18(1): 134–146. DOI: 10.1093/isr/viv018. 
Biswas S (2007) Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International 
Relations Theorist. Millennium 36(1): 117–133. DOI: 10.1177/03058298070360010801. 
Blyden EW (1908) The Three Needs of Liberia, a Lecture. Phillips. 
Boehmer E (1998) Questions of neo-orientalism. Interventions 1(1): 18–21. 
Bogues A (2003) Black Heretics, Black Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals. Routledge. 
Boittin JA (2010) Colonial Metropolis: The Urban Grounds of Anti-Imperialism and Feminism in 
Interwar Paris. University of Nebraska Press.  
Bowden B (2010) The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea. The University 
of Chicago Press.  
Brennan T (2014) Borrowed Light: Vico, Hegel, and the Colonies. Stanford University Press. 
Brenner N (1997) Global, Fragmented, Hierarchical: Henri Lefebvre’s Geographies of 
Globalization. Public Culture 10(1): 135–167. 
Brown JK (1970) A Note on the Division of Labor by Sex. American Anthropologist 72(5): 1073–
1078. 
Brubaker R and Cooper F (2000) Beyond “identity”. Theory and Society 29(1): 1–47. DOI: 
10.1023/A:1007068714468. 
Buck-Morss S (2009) Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History. University of Pittsburgh Pre. 
Buhle P (2017) C.L.R. James: The Artist as Revolutionary. Verso. 
Bull H (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. Columbia University 
Press. 
Bull H (1984) The Revolt against the West. I: Bull H and Watson A (eds) The Expansion of 
International Society. Oxford University Press. 
Bull H and Watson A (1984a) Conclusion. In: Bull H and Watson A (eds) The Expansion of 
International Society. Oxford University Press, pp. 429–35. 
Bull H and Watson A (1984b) Introduction. In: Bull H and Watson A (eds) The Expansion of 
International Society. Oxford University Press, pp. 1–9. 
Burbank J and Cooper F (2010) Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference. 
Princeton University Press. 
Busia KA (1962) The Challenge of Africa. Praeger. 
Butler J and Athanasiou A (2013) Dispossession: The Performative in the Political. John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Buzan B (2016) Could IR be different? International Studies Review 18(1): 155–157. 
P a g e  | 249 
 
Buzan B and Lawson G (2015) The Global Transformation. Cambridge University Press. 
Cabral A (2016) Resistance and Decolonization. Rowman & Littlefield International. 
Cammett JM (1967) Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism. Stanford University 
Press. 
Campbell D (1992) Writing Security. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Casely Hayford A (1954), American Journey, in West Africa Review (February, 1954): 153 
Casely Hayford JE (1969) [1920] West African Leadership. Sampson MJ (ed.). F. Cass. 
Casely Hayford JE (1971) The Truth about the West African Land Question. Psychology Press. 
Casely Hayford JE and Blyden EW (1905) Introduction. In: West Africa Before Europe: And 
Other Addresses, Delivered in England in 1901 and 1903. C. M. Phillips. 
Césaire A (2000) Discourse on Colonialism. Monthly Review Press. 
Chakrabarty D (2002) Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies. 
University of Chicago Press. 
Chakrabarty D (2009) Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. 
Princeton University Press. 
Chamberlin PT (2018) The Cold War’s Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace. HarperCollins. 
Chandler D and Reid J (2018) ‘Being in Being’: Contesting the Ontopolitics of Indigeneity. The 
European Legacy 23(3): 251–268. DOI: 10.1080/10848770.2017.1420284. 
Chatterjee P (1986) Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse. Zed 
Books. 
Chatterjee P (1993) The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Princeton 
University Press. 
Chatterjee P (2012) The Black Hole of Empire: History of a Global Practice of Power. Princeton 
University Press. 
Chowdhury A (2018) The Myth of International Order: Why Weak States Persist and Alternatives 
to the State Fade Away. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Cohn BS (1983) Representing Authority in Victorian India. In: The Invention of Tradition. 
Reissue edition. Cambridge Cambridgeshire: Cambridge University Press. 
Connelly M (2000) Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the 
Algerian War for Independence. American Historical Review: 739–769. 
Connelly M (2002) A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of 
the Post-Cold War Era. Oxford University Press. 
Cooper F (2005) Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. Univ of California Press. 
P a g e  | 250 
 
Cooper F (2014) Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 
1945–1960. Princeton University Press. 
Coulthard GS (2014) Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition. U of 
Minnesota Press. 
Crawford N (2002) Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and 
Humanitarian Intervention. Cambridge University Press. 
Cronon ED (1955) Black Moses: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro 
Improvement Association. Univ of Wisconsin Press. 
Crowder M (1964) Indirect Rule—French and British Style. Africa 34(3): 197–205. DOI: 
10.2307/1158021. 
Cruse H (2005) The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual: A Historical Analysis of the Failure of Black 
Leadership. New York Review Books. 
Cunard N and Padmore G (1945) The White Man’s Duty. Panaf Service. 
Daiya K (2011) Violent Belongings: Partition, Gender, and National Culture in Postcolonial India. 
Temple University Press. 
Darwin J (1988) Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World. 
Macmillan International Higher Education. 
Das RJ (2017) David Harvey’s theory of uneven geographical development: A Marxist critique. 
Capital & Class 41(3): 511–536. 
Davidson B (1978) Africa in Modern History: The Search for a New Society. Allen Lane. 
Davidson B (1992) The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State. Oxford: 
James Currey. 
Davies CB (2007) Left of Karl Marx: The Political Life of Black Communist Claudia Jones. Duke 
University Press. 
Devji F (2012) The Impossible Indian: Gandhi and the Temptation of Violence. Harvard 
University Press. 
Dickstein M (1993) After the Cold War: Culture as Politics, Politics as Culture. Social Research 
60(3): 531–544. 
Dietrich CRW (2017) Oil Revolution: Anti-Colonial Elites, Sovereign Rights, and the Economic 
Culture of Decolonization. Cambridge University Press. 
Doty RL (1996) Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations. U 
of Minnesota Press. 
Drayton R (2000) Nature’s Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the ‘Improvement’ of the 
World. Yale University Press. 
P a g e  | 251 
 
Du Bois WEB (1970) [1915] The African Roots of War. In: Foner PS (ed.) W.E.B. Du Bois 
Speaks, 1890-1919. N.Y.: Pathfinder Press, p. 260. 
Du Bois WEB (1970) [1917] The problem of problems. In: Foner PS (ed.) W.E.B. Du Bois 
Speaks: 1890-1919. Pathfinder Press, p. 274. 
Du Bois WEB (1970) [1925] 'What is Civilization?’ Africa’s Answer. In: Weinberg M (ed.) 
W.E.B. Du Bois: A Reader. Harper & Row. 
Du Bois WEB (1971) [1920] Marcus Garvey. In: Foner PS (ed.) WEB Du Bois Speaks: 1920-
1963. Pathfinder Press. 
Du Bois WEB (1971) [1928] Negro Citizen. Foner PS (ed.). New York: Pathfinder Press. 
Du Bois WEB (2014) [1924] The Gift of Black Folk. Oxford University Press, Incorporated. 
Du Bois WEB (2014) [1940] Dusk of Dawn. Oxford University Press. 
Du Bois WEB (2017) [1935] Black Reconstruction in America: Toward a History of the Part 
Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-1880. 
Routledge. 
Duberman M (2014) Paul Robeson: A Biography. Open Road Media. 
Dunn KC and Englebert P (2019) Inside African Politics. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Incorporated. 
Dussel E (2013) Ethics of Liberation: In the Age of Globalization and Exclusion. Durham and 
London: Duke University Press. 
Edwards BH (2003) The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and the Rise of Black 
Internationalism. Harvard University Press. 
Eisenstadt SN (ed.) (2002) Multiple Modernities. Transaction Publishers. 
Elkins C (2005) Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya. Random House. 
Eluwa GIC (1971) Background to the Emergence of the National Congress of British West Africa. 
African Studies Review 14(2): 205–218. DOI: 10.2307/523823. 
Engels F (2015) [1884] The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Fb&c Limited. 
Enloe CH (1990) Bananas, Beaches & Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. 
University of California Press. 
Ewing A (2014) The Age of Garvey: How a Jamaican Activist Created a Mass Movement and 
Changed Global Black Politics. Princeton University Press. 
Fabian J (1983) Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object. Columbia University 
Press. 
Fanon F (1961) Les damnés de la terre. Paris: La Découverte. 
Fanon F (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. Penguin Books. 
P a g e  | 252 
 
Fanon F (1980) [1956] Toward the African Revolution. London: Writers and Readers Co-op. 
Fanon F (2008) [1952] Black Skin, White Masks. Grove Press. 
Fanon F (2018) Alienation and Freedom. Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Ferrer A (2014) Freedom’s Mirror. Cambridge University Press. 
Finnemore M and Sikkink K (1998) International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. 
International Organization 52(4): 887–917. DOI: 10.1162/002081898550789. 
Flint JE (1999) ‘Managing nationalism’: The colonial office and Nnamdi Azikiwe, 1932–43. The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 27(2): 143–158. 
Foley B (2010) Spectres of 1919: Class and Nation in the Making of the New Negro. University of 
Illinois Press. 
Ford RT (2006) Racial Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Fraser C (1994) Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism: The United States and the Genesis of West Indian 
Independence, 1940-1964. Greenwood Press. 
Frazer E and Hutchings K (2007) Argument and Rhetoric in the Justification of Political Violence. 
European Journal of Political Theory 6(2): 180–199. 
Frazier RT (2015) The East Is Black: Cold War China in the Black Radical Imagination. Duke 
University Press. 
Frost M (1996) Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Gallagher J and Robinson R (1953) The Imperialism of Free Trade. The Economic History 
Review 6(1): 1–15. DOI: 10.2307/2591017. 
Gandhi L (2006) Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle Radicalism, and the 
Politics of Friendship. Duke University Press. 
Gao Y (2013) W. E. B. and Shirley Graham Du Bois in Maoist China. Du Bois Review: Social 
Science Research on Race 10(1): 59–85. DOI: 10.1017/S1742058X13000040. 
Getachew A (2019) Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination. 
Princeton University Press. 
Gilroy P (1993) The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. Verso. 
Glissant É (1997) Poetics of Relation. University of Michigan Press. 
Go J (2010) Modelling States and Sovereignty: Postcolonial Constitutions in Asia and Africa. In: 
Lee CJ (ed.) Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political 
Afterlives. Ohio University Press. 
Go J (2013) Fanon’s postcolonial cosmopolitanism. European Journal of Social Theory 16(2): 
208–225. 
P a g e  | 253 
 
Go J and Lawson G (2017) Introduction: For a Global Historical Sociology. In: Go J and Lawson 
G (eds) Global Historical Sociology. Cambridge University Press. 
Goebel M (2014) Geopolitics, transnational solidarity or diaspora nationalism? The global career 
of M.N. Roy, 1915–1930. European Review of History 21(4): 485–499. 
Goebel M (2015) Anti-Imperial Metropolis. Cambridge University Press. 
Gordon LR (2015) What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought. 
Fordham University Press. 
Goswami M (2002) Rethinking the Modular Nation Form: Toward a Sociohistorical Conception 
of Nationalism. Comparative Studies in Society and History 44(4): 770–799. 
Goswami M (2004) Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space. University of 
Chicago Press. 
Goswami M (2012) Imaginary Futures and Colonial Internationalisms. The American Historical 
Review 117(5): 1461–1485. 
Grant K, Levine P and Trentmann F (eds) (2007) Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and 
Transnationalism, c.1880-1950. Springer. 
Grovogui S (1996) Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in 
International Law. U of Minnesota Press. 
Grovogui S (2002) Regimes of Sovereignty: International Morality and the African Condition. 
European Journal of International Relations 8(3): 315–338.  
Grovogui S (2006) Beyond Eurocentrism and Anarchy: Memories of International Order and 
Institutions. Springer. 
Guha Ramachandra (2018) Gandhi 1914-1948: The Years That Changed the World. London: 
Penguin Books. 
Guha Ranajit (1997) Dominance Without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India. 
Harvard University Press. 
Guilhot N (2017) After the Enlightenment: Political Realism and International Relations in the 
Mid-Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press. 
Hall M and Jackson PT (2007) Introduction: Civilizations and International Relations Theory. In: 
Hall M and Jackson PT (eds) Civilizational Identity: The Production and Reproduction of 
‘Civilizations’ in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–12.  
Hall S (1985) Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist 
Debates. Critical Studies in Mass Communication 2(2): 91–114. 
Hall S (1986) Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity. Journal of 
Communication Inquiry 10(2): 5–27. DOI: 10.1177/019685998601000202. 
P a g e  | 254 
 
Hall S (1996) New Ethnicities. In: Morley D and Chen K-H (eds) Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues 
in Cultural Studies. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 442–452. 
Halliday F (1999) Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power. 
Macmillan International Higher Education. 
Hansen P and Jonsson S (2014) Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and 
Colonialism. Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Hardt M and Negri A (2001) Empire. Harvard University Press. 
Harrison H (2001) A Hubert Harrison Reader. Perry JB (ed.). Wesleyan University Press. 
Harvey D (2014) Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism. Oxford University Press. 
Hathaway O and Shapiro S (2017) The Internationalists: And Their Plan to Outlaw War. London: 
Penguin Books. 
Hill RA (1983a) The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers, Vol. 
II: August 1919-August 1920. University of California Press. 
Hill RA (1983b) The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers, Vol. 
IV: September 1921-September 1922. University of California Press. 
Hill RA (1986) Pan-African Biography. African Studies Center, University of California. 
Hirschman AO (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, 
and States. Harvard University Press. 
Hobsbawm EJ (1994) Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991. Penguin 
Publishing Group. 
Hobson JM (2004) The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation. Cambridge University Press. 
Hobson JM (2012) The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 
1760-2010. Cambridge University Press. 
Hoffmann S (1977) An American Social Science: International Relations. Daedalus 106(3): 41–
60. 
Høgsbjerg C (2014) C. L. R. James in Imperial Britain. Duke University Press. 
Holcomb GE (2007) Claude McKay, Code Name Sasha: Queer Black Marxism and the Harlem 
Renaissance. University Press of Florida. 
Hooker JR (1967) Black Revolutionary; George Padmore’s Path from Communism to Pan-
Africanism. Praeger. 
Hopkins AG (1973) An Economic History of West Africa. Longman. 
Hopkins AG (ed.) (2002) Globalisation In World History. London: Pimlico. 
P a g e  | 255 
 
Horne G (1986) Black and Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold 
War, 1944-1963. SUNY Press. 
Horne GC (2007) Cold War in a Hot Zone: The United States Confronts Labor and Independence 
Struggles in the British West Indies. Temple University Press. 
Hourani A (1983) Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939. Cambridge University Press. 
Hudis P (2015) Frantz Fanon: Philosopher of the Barricades. Pluto Press. 
Huntington SP (1993) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Penguin 
Books. 
Hutchings K (2011) Dialogue between Whom? The Role of the West/ Non-West Distinction in 
Promoting Global Dialogue in IR. Millennium 39(3): 639–647. DOI: 
10.1177/0305829811401941. 
Inayatullah N and Blaney DL (2004) International Relations and the Problem of Difference. 
Routledge. 
Isaac J (2009) Tangled loops: theory, history, and the human sciences in modern america. Modern 
Intellectual History 6(2): 397–424. 
Jabri V (2012) The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming Politics/Governing Others in Late Modernity. 
Routledge. 
Jackson RH (1993) Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Jacques-Garvey A (ed.) (2006) Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey: Or, Africa for the 
Africans. Routledge. 
Jagan C (1989) Forbidden Freedom: The Story of British Guiana. Hansib Pub. 
James CLR (1938) The Black Jacobins: Toussaint Louverture and the San Domingo Revolution. 
Secker and Warburg. 
James CLR (1961) Federation, ‘We Failed Miserably’: How and Why. West Indies Federation. 
James CLR (1977) Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution. L. Hill. 
James CLR (1980) Notes on Dialectics: Hegel, Marx, Lenin. L. Hill. 
James CLR (1992) [1932] The Case for West Indian Self-Government. In: Grimshaw A (ed.) The 
C.L.R. James Reader. Oxford, UK & Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, pp. 49–62. 
James CLR (1992) The C. L. R. James Reader. Grimshaw A (ed.). Wiley. 
James CLR (2012) [1938; 1969] A History of Pan-African Revolt. PM Press. 
James CLR (2013) [1960] Modern Politics. PM Press. 
P a g e  | 256 
 
James CLR and Lee GC (2006) [1958] Facing Reality. Charles H. Kerr Publishing Company. 
James CLR, Dunayevskaya R and Boggs GL (2013) [1950] State Capitalism and World 
Revolution. PM Press. 
James L (2015) George Padmore and Decolonization from Below: Pan-Africanism, the Cold War, 
and the End of Empire. Palgrave Macmillan. 
James L (2015b) ‘Playing the Russian Game’: Black Radicalism, the Press, and Colonial Office 
Attempts to Control Anti-Colonialism in the Early Cold War, 1946–50. The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 43(3): 509–534. 
James W (1998) Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia: Caribbean Radicalism in Early Twentieth-
Century America. Verso. 
Jansen JC and Osterhammel J (2017) Decolonization: A Short History. Princeton University Press. 
Johnson C (n.d.) Revolutionaries to Race Leaders: Black Power and the Making of African 
American Politics. U of Minnesota Press. 
Jones BG (2008) The global political economy of social crisis: Towards a critique of the ‘failed 
state’ ideology. Review of International Political Economy 15(2): 180–205. DOI: 
10.1080/09692290701869688. 
Jones BG (2010) Anti-Racism and Internationalism in the thought and practice of Cabral, Neto, 
Mondlane and Machel. In: Shilliam R (ed.) International Relations and Non-Western 
Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity. London: 
Routledge. 
Jones BG (ed.) (2006) Decolonizing International Relations. Rowman & Littlefield. 
Jones EL (1987) The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History 
of Europe and Asia. Cambridge University Press. 
Jones, D.V. (1992) The Declaratory Tradition in Modern International Law. In Nardin, T. and 
Mapel, D. R. (eds), Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press). 
Keene E (2002) Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Keller K (2018) Colonial Suspects: Suspicion, Imperial Rule, and Colonial Society in Interwar 
French West Africa. U of Nebraska Press. 
Kelley RDG (1999) “But a Local Phase of a World Problem”: Black History’s Global Vision, 
1883–1950. Journal of American History 86(3): 1045–1077. DOI: 10.2307/2568605. 
Kelley RDG (2012) Introduction. In: A History of Pan-African Revolt by C.L.R. James. PM Press. 
Kennedy DK (2016) Decolonization: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. 
P a g e  | 257 
 
Koskenniemi M (2001) The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 
1870–1960. Cambridge University Press. 
Krebs RR and Jackson PT (2007) Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political 
Rhetoric. European Journal of International Relations 13(1). SAGE Publications Ltd: 35–66. 
Krishna S (1993) The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International 
Relations Theory. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 18(3): 385–417. 
Lake M and Reynolds H (2008) Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the 
Question of Racial Equality. Melbourne Univ. Publishing. 
Lal P (2015) African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania. Cambridge University Press. 
Langley JA (1979) Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa, 1856-1970: Documents on Modern 
African Political Thought from Colonial Times to the Present. Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Incorporated. 
Langley JA (1997) W.E.G. (Kobina) Sekyi’s Theory of History, Social, Political, and Economic 
Development, 1910-1954. In: McGrath S, Jedrej C, King K, et al. (eds) Rethinking Africa 
History. Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, p. 251. 
Langley JA and Sekyi K (1974) Introduction. In: The Blinkards: A Comedy by Kobina Sekyi. 
BRILL. 
Law R (1991) The Slave Coast of West Africa 1550-1750: The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade 
on an African Society. Clarendon Press. 
Law R (2005) Ouidah: The Social History of a West African Slaving Port, 1727–1892. Ohio 
University Press. 
Lawrence A (2013) Imperial Rule and the Politics of Nationalism: Anti-Colonial Protest in the 
French Empire. Cambridge University Press. 
Lawson G (2012) The eternal divide? History and International Relations. European Journal of 
International Relations 18(2): 203–226.  
Lawson G (2019) Anatomies of Revolution. Cambridge University Press.  
Lazarus N (2011) The Postcolonial Unconscious. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, 
Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo, Delhi, Toyko, Mexico City: Cambridge University Press. 
Lee CJ (ed.) (2010) Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political 
Afterlives. Ohio University Press. 
Legum C, Friedland WH and Rosberg CG (1964) Socialism in Ghana : a political interpretation. 
In: African Socialism. Stanford University Press. 
Levine D (2012) Recovering International Relations: The Promise of Sustainable Critique. OUP 
USA. 
P a g e  | 258 
 
Levine P (2000) Orientalist Sociology and the Creation of Colonial Sexualities. Feminist Review 
65(1): 5–21. 
Lewis MW and Wigen K (1997) The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography. 
University of California Press. 
Linebaugh P and Rediker M (2000) The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and 
the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic. Verso. 
Lorde A (1984) Age, Race, Class and Sex: Women Redefining Difference. In: Sister Outsider: 
Essays and Speeches. Freedom, CA: Crossing Press, pp. 114–123. 
Lovejoy PE (2000) Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Luff J (2012) Commonsense Anticommunism: Labor and Civil Liberties between the World Wars. 
Univ of North Carolina Press. 
Lynch A (2002) Woodrow Wilson and the Principle of ‘National Self-Determination’: A 
Reconsideration. Review of International Studies 28(2): 419–436. 
Maingot AP (2015) Race, Ideology, and the Decline of Caribbean Marxism. University Press of 
Florida. 
Makalani M (2011) In the Cause of Freedom: Radical Black Internationalism from Harlem to 
London, 1917-1939. Univ of North Carolina Press. 
Makonnen TR (1973) Pan Africanism from Within. King K (ed.). Oxford University Press. 
Maldonado-Torres N (2008) Against War. Duke University Press. 
Mamdani M (2012) Define and Rule. Harvard University Press. 
Manchanda N (2018) The Imperial Sociology of the ‘Tribe’ in Afghanistan. Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies 46(2): 165–189. 
Manela E (2007) The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of 
Anticolonial Nationalism. Oxford University Press. 
Manjapra K (2010) M. N. Roy: Marxism and Colonial Cosmopolitanism. Routledge. 
Manjapra K (2014) Age of Entanglement: German and Indian Intellectuals Across Empire. 
Harvard University Press. 
Mann M (2012) The Sources of Social Power Vol. 3: Global Empires and Revolution. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mantena K (2010) Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism. Princeton 
University Press. 
Marable M (1986) African and Caribbean Politics: From Kwame Nkrumah to Maurice Bishop. 
London and New York: Verso. 
P a g e  | 259 
 
Martin T (1973) Revolutionary Upheaval in Trinidad, 1919: Views from British and American                
Sources. The Journal of Negro History 58(3): 313–326. 
Mazower M (2009) No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the 
United Nations. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Mazrui AA (1967) Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition. Weidenfeld and 
Nicolsond. 
Mbembe A (2016) Decolonizing the university: New directions. Arts and Humanities in Higher 
Education 15(1): 29–45. 
Mbembe A (2019) Thoughts on the planetary: An interview with Achille Mbembe. Available at: 
https://www.newframe.com/thoughts-on-the-planetary-an-interview-with-achille-mbembe/ 
(accessed 29 September 2019). 
McKay C (1937) A Long Way from Home. Lee Furman. 
McKay C (1940) Harlem: Negro Metropolis. E. P. Dutton & Company. 
McKay C (1986) [1933] Banana Bottom. Pluto Press. 
Mehta US (2018) Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought. 
University of Chicago Press. 
Mignolo W (2011) The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options. 
Duke University Press. 
Mitchell T (2011) Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil. Verso Books. 
Morrison JA (2012) Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of 
the First Era of Globalization. International Organization 66(3): 395–428. DOI: 
10.1017/S0020818312000148. 
Moyn S (2016) History and Political Theory: A Difficult Reunion. Theory & Event 19(1). 
Muppidi H (2004) The Politics of the Global. U of Minnesota Press. 
Muppidi H (2012) The Colonial Signs of International Relations. Columbia University Press. 
Murray C (2019) Imperial dialectics and epistemic mapping: from decolonisation to anti-
Eurocentric IR. European Journal of International Relations. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119873030. 
Muthu S (2009) Enlightenment against Empire. Princeton University Press. 
Nandy A (1997) The Twilight of Certitudes: Secularism, Hindu Nationalism, and other Masks of 
Deculturation. Alternatives 22(2): 157–176. DOI: 10.1177/030437549702200201. 
Nexon DH (2009) The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic 
Empires, and International Change. Princeton University Press. 
Ngũgĩ  wa T (1977) Petals of Blood. Heinemann. 
P a g e  | 260 
 
Ngũgĩ  wa T (1981) Detained: A Writer’s Prison Diary. Nairobi, Ibadan: Heinemann. 
Ngũgĩ  wa T (2009) Consideration by the General Assembly on the Responsibility to Protect. 
Available at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/63/pdf/calendar/20090723-resptoprotect.pdf. 
Nkrumah K (1965) Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. Nelson. 
Norfield T (2016) The City: London and the Global Power of Finance. London and New York: 
Verso. 
Nyerere J (1964) Ujamaa. In: Friedland WH and Rosberg CG (eds) African Socialism. Princeton 
University Press. 
Nyerere J (1967) Freedom and Unity: Uhuru Na Umoja; a Selection from Writings and Speeches, 
1952-65. Oxford University Press. 
Odinga AO (1967) Not Yet Uhuru: The Autobiography of Oginga Odinga. Hill and Wang. 
Odysseos L (2017) Prolegomena to Any Future Decolonial Ethics: Coloniality, Poetics and ‘Being 
Human as Praxis’. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 45(3): 447–472. 
Ofosu-Appiah LH (1974) The Life and Times of Dr. J.B. Danquah. Waterville Publishing House. 
Osterhammel J (2014) The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth 
Century. Princeton University Press. 
Padmore G (1931) The Life and Struggles of Negro Toilers. London: Red International of Labour 
Unions Magazine for the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers  
Padmore G (1936a) How Britain Rules Africa. Negro Universities Press. 
Padmore G (1936b) The West Indies To-Day. London: International African Service Bureau. 
Padmore G (1956) Pan-Africanism Or Communism?: The Coming Struggle for Africa. D. 
Dobson. 
Padmore G (1964) A Guide to pan-African Socialism. In: Friedland WH and Rosberg CG (eds) 
African Socialism. Stanford University Press. 
Padmore G and Pizer D (1946) How Russia Transformed Her Colonial Empire: A Challenge to 
the Imperialist Powers. Dennis Dobson. 
Pagden A (1995) Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France C. 
1500-c. 1800. Yale University Press. 
Pagden A (ed.) (2002) The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Parsons TH (2014) The Second British Empire: In the Crucible of the Twentieth Century. 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
P a g e  | 261 
 
Pasha MK (2007) Civilizations, Postorientalism, and Islam. In: Hall M and Jackson PT (eds) 
Civilizational Identity: The Production and Reproduction of ‘Civilizations’ in International 
Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 61–79. 
Pasha MK (2010) Untimely Reflections. In: Shilliam R (ed.) International Relations and Non-
Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism, and Investigations of Global Modernity. 
Routledge, pp. 217–226. 
Pedersen S (2015) The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire. Oxford 
University Press. 
Pennybacker SD (2009) From Scottsboro to Munich: Race and Political Culture in 1930s Britain. 
Princeton University Press. 
Perry JB (2009) Hubert Harrison: The Voice of Harlem Radicalism, 1883-1918. Columbia 
University Press. 
Pham Q and Shilliam R (2016) Introduction: Meanings of Bandung. In: Pham Q and Shilliam R 
(eds) Meanings of Bandung: Postcolonial Orders and Decolonial Visions. Rowman & 
Littlefield International. 
Phillips A and Sharman JC (2015) Explaining Durable Diversity in International Systems: State, 
Company, and Empire in the Indian Ocean. International Studies Quarterly 59(3). Oxford 
Academic: 436–448.  
Philpott D (2001) Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations. 
Princeton University Press. 
Pitts J (2009) A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France. Princeton 
University Press. 
Polsgrove C (2009) Ending British Rule in Africa: Writers in a Common Cause. Manchester 
University Press. 
Pomeranz K (2009) The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World 
Economy. Princeton University Press. 
Prakash G (ed.) (1994) After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements. 
Princeton University Press. 
Prashad V (2008) The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World. New Press. 
Prashad V (2013) The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South. Verso Books. 
Ranger T (1983) The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa. In: The Invention of Tradition. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ransby B (2013) Eslanda. Yale University Press. 
Rao R (2010) Third World Protest: Between Home and the World. OUP Oxford. 
P a g e  | 262 
 
Rao R (2017) Recovering Reparative Readings of Postcolonialism and Marxism. Critical 
Sociology 43(4–5): 587–598. DOI: 10.1177/0896920516630798. 
Rathbone R (2000) Nkrumah & the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951-60. Ohio 
State University Press. 
Reade WW (1864) Savage Africa: Being the Narrative of a Tour in Equatorial, Southwestern, and 
Northwestern Africa; with Notes on the Habits of the Gorilla; on the Existence of Unicorns 
and Tailed Men; on the Slave Trade; on the Origin, Character, and Capabilities of the Negro, 
and on the Future Civilization of Western Africa. Harper. 
Reddock R (1990) Feminism, Nationalism, and the Early Women’s Movement. In: Cudjoe S (ed.) 
Caribbean Women Writers. Wellesley, Massachusetts: Calaloux Publications. 
Reed Jr. AL (1997) W. E. B. Du Bois and American Political Thought: Fabianism and the Color 
Line. Oxford University Press. 
Reus-Smit C (2017) Cultural Diversity and International Order. International Organization 71(4): 
851–885.  
Reus-Smit C (2018) On Cultural Diversity: International Theory in a World of Difference. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Risse T (2000) ‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics. International 
Organization 54(1). [MIT Press, University of Wisconsin Press, Cambridge University Press, 
International Organization Foundation]: 1–39. 
Robinson CJ (1983) Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. Zed. 
Rocker R (1948) Nationalism and Culture. Rocker Publications Committee. 
Rosenberg J (2006) Why is There No International Historical Sociology? European Journal of 
International Relations 12(3): 307–340. DOI: 10.1177/1354066106067345. 
Rosenberg J (2013) The ‘philosophical premises’ of uneven and combined development. Review 
of International Studies 39(3): 569–597. DOI: 10.1017/S0260210512000381. 
Rosenboim O (2017) The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the 
United States. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Rutazibwa O (2014) Studying Agaciro: Moving Beyond Wilsonian Interventionist Knowledge 
Production on Rwanda. Journal of Intervention and State Building 8(4): 291–302. 
Sabaratnam M (2011) IR in Dialogue … but Can We Change the Subjects? A Typology of 
Decolonising Strategies for the Study of World Politics. Millennium 39(3): 781–803. DOI: 
10.1177/0305829811404270. 
Said EW (1979) Orientalism. Vintage Books. 
Said EW (1993) Culture and Imperialism. Random House. 
P a g e  | 263 
 
Said EW (1996) The Limits of the Artistic Imagination and the Secular Intellectual. Macalester 
International 3: 3–34. 
Salter MB (2002) Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations. Pluto Press. 
Sarbah JM (1968) [1897] Fanti Customary Laws: A Brief Introduction to the Principles of the 
Native Laws and Customs of the Fanti and Akan Districts of the Gold Coast with a Report of 
Some Cases Thereon Decided in the Law Courts. Cass. 
Sartori A (2014) Liberalism in Empire: An Alternative History. Univ of California Press. 
Sassen S (2014) Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy. Cambridge, MA 
and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Saunders FS (2001) The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters. New 
Press. 
Scott D (1999) Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality. Princeton University Press. 
Scott D (2004) Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment. Duke 
University Press. 
Scott D (2013) On the Very Idea of a Black Radical Tradition. Small Axe: A Caribbean Journal of 
Criticism 17(1): 1–6. 
Scott JC (1998) Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed. Yale University Press. 
Scott JS (2018) The Common Wind: Afro-American Currents in the Age of the Haitian 
Revolution. Verso Books. 
Sealey K (2020) Creolizing the Nation. Northwestern University Press. 
Sewell Jr. WH (2005) Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation. The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Shepard T (2008) The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of 
France. Cornell University Press. 
Shilliam R (2008) The Hieroglyph of the `Party’: Contextualising the Agent—Structure Debate 
through the Works of Trotsky, C. L. R. James and Althusser. International Relations 22(2): 
193–219. 
Shilliam R (2010) The perilous but unavoidable terrain of the non-West. In: Shilliam R (ed.) 
International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and 
Investigations of Global Modernity. London: Routledge. 
Shilliam R (2011) Decolonising the Grounds of Ethical Inquiry: A Dialogue between Kant, 
Foucault and Glissant. Millennium 39(3): 649–665. DOI: 10.1177/0305829811399144. 
Shilliam R (2012) Civilization and the poetics of slavery. Thesis Eleven 108(1): 99–117. 
P a g e  | 264 
 
Shilliam R (2015) The Black Pacific: Anti-Colonial Struggles and Oceanic Connections. 
Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Shilliam R (2016) Colonial Architecture or Relatable Hinterlands? Locke, Nandy, Fanon, and the 
Bandung Spirit. Constellations 23(3): 425–435. DOI: 10.1111/1467-8675.12163. 
Shilliam R (2017) Race and Revolution at Bwa Kayiman. Millennium 45(3): 269–292. DOI: 
10.1177/0305829817693692. 
Shivji IG (1976) Class Struggles in Tanzania. Heinemann. 
Shivji IG (2008) Pan-Africanism Or Pragmatism?: Lessons of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union. 
Mkuki na Nyota Publishers. 
Shumway R (2014) The Fante and the Transatlantic Slave Trade. Boydell & Brewer. 
Skinner Q (1969) Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas. History and Theory 8(1): 3–
53. DOI: 10.2307/2504188. 
Slobodian Q (2018) Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism. Harvard 
University Press. 
Sluga G (2013) Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism. University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Smith N (2003) American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization. 
University of California Press. 
Spivak GC (1996) The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Landry D 
and MacLean G (eds). Psychology Press. 
Taylor C (2002) Modern Social Imaginaries. Public Culture 4(1): 91–124. 
Thakur V, Davis AE and Vale P (2017) Imperial Mission, ‘Scientific’ Method: an Alternative 
Account of the Origins of IR. Millennium 46(1): 3–23. DOI: 10.1177/0305829817711911. 
Thomas M (2008) Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder After 1914. 
University of California Press. 
Tignor RL (1998) Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in 
Decolonizing Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, 1945-1963. Princeton University Press. 
Tignor RL (2006) W. Arthur Lewis and the Birth of Development Economics. Princeton 
University Press. 
Todorov T (1984) The Conquest of América: The Question of the Other. Harper & Row. 
Tooze JA (2014) The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 
1916-1931. Viking. 
Torrent M (2016) A ‘New’ Commonwealth for Britain? Negotiating Ghana’s Pan-African and 
Asian Connections at the End of Empire (1951–8). The International History Review 38(3): 
573–613. 
P a g e  | 265 
 
Trouillot M-R (1995) Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. Beacon Press. 
Tuck R (2012) Alliances with Infidels in the European Imperial Expansion. In: Muthu S (ed.) 
Empire and Modern Political Thought. Cambridge University Press, pp. 61–83. 
Tully J (1988) Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics. Princeton University Press. 
Tully J (2009) Lineages of Contemporary Imperialism. In: Kelly D (ed.) Lineages of Empire: The 
Historical Roots of British Imperial Thought, p. 3. 
Umoren ID (2018) Race Women Internationalists: Activist-Intellectuals and Global Freedom 
Struggles. Univ of California Press. 
Utudjian ES-A (1997) ’Uses and Misuses of English in ‘The Blinkards’ by Kobina Sekyi. 
Commonwealth (Dijon); Dijon 20(1): 23–31. 
Vitalis R (2013) The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-
doong). Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and 
Development 4(2): 261–288. DOI: 10.1353/hum.2013.0018. 
Vitalis R (2015) White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International 
Relations. Cornell University Press. 
Von Eschen PM (1997) Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957. 
Cornell University Press. 
Von Eschen PM (2004) The Cold War Seduction of Harold Cruse. In: Harold Cruse’s The Crisis 
of the Negro Intellectual Reconsidered. New York: Routledge. 
Vucetic S (2011) The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International 
Relations. Stanford University Press. 
Walker RBJ (1993) Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Walker RBJ (1994) Social Movements/World Politics. Millennium 23(3): 669–700.  
Wallerstein IM (2004) World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham and London: Duke 
University Press. 
Wallerstein IM (2005) [1961, 1965] Africa: The Politics of Independence and Unity. U of 
Nebraska Press. 
Weber C (1998) Performative States. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 27(1): 77–95. 
Weber M (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. University of 
California Press. 
Weiss H (2013) Framing a Radical African Atlantic: African American Agency, West African 
Intellectuals and the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers. BRILL. 
P a g e  | 266 
 
Weldes J (1996) Constructing National Interests. European Journal of International Relations 2(3): 
275–318. 
Westad OA (2007) The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our 
Times. Cambridge University Press. 
Wilder G (2005) The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism Between 
the Two World Wars. University of Chicago Press. 
Wilder G (2012) From Optic to Topic: The Foreclosure Effect of Historiographic Turns. The 
American Historical Review 117(3): 723–745. 
Wilder G (2015) Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World. Duke 
University Press. 
Wolf ER (1982) Europe and the People Without History. University of California Press. 
Wolfe P (2016) Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race. London and New York: Verso. 
Wolfers M (1976) Politics in the Organization of African Unity. Methuen. 
Wolters R (2003) Du Bois and His Rivals. University of Missouri Press. 
Wright R, Myrdal G and Singh A (1995) [1956] The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung 
Conference. Univ. Press of Mississippi. 
Yoshikuni T (1989) Strike action and self‐help associations: Zimbabwean worker protest and 
culture after World War I. Journal of Southern African Studies 15(3): 440–468. 
Younis M (2017) The grand machinery of the world: race, global order and the black Atlantic. 
http://purl.org/dc/dcmitype/Text. University of Oxford. Available at: 
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:0acb981c-305e-4577-841e-8ced9b8e9174 (accessed 24 
September 2019). 
Younis M (2018) Race, the World and Time: Haiti, Liberia and Ethiopia (1914–1945). 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 46(3): 352–370. 
Zachernuk PS (2000) Colonial Subjects: An African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas. University 
of Virginia Press. 
Zarakol A (2014) What made the modern world hang together: socialisation or stigmatisation? 
International Theory 6(2). Cambridge University Press: 311–332.  
Zarakol A (ed.) (2017) Hierarchies in World Politics. Cambridge University Press. 
Zimmerman A (2012) Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the 
Globalization of the New South. Princeton University Press. 
Životić A and Čavoški J (2016) On the Road to Belgrade: Yugoslavia, Third World Neutrals, and 
the Evolution of Global Non-Alignment, 1954–1961. Journal of Cold War Studies 18(4): 79–
97. 
P a g e  | 267 
 
Zumoff J (2007) The African Blood Brotherhood: From Caribbean Nationalism to Communism. 





























For his mentorship, I thank Tarak Barkawi.  
For her love and support, I thank my wife, Annina Bergman. 
For their excellent questions, which helped make a better thesis, Raymond D. Duvall and 
Kimberly Hutchings.   
 
For their friendly suggestions and hospitality, I would like to thank the archivists at the 
University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, the George Padmore Research Library and 
PRAAD in Accra, the National Archives of Trinidad and Tobago, and the University of 
Edinburgh.  
 
Thanks also to Dr. Leslie James for early advice and introductions.  
 
Thanks is also due to the organisations that helped fund travel for archival research: the Sir 
Patrick Gillam Fund and LSE’s Global South Doctoral Fieldwork Award. 
 
This thesis benefitted immeasurably from feedback and conversations with colleagues at 
LSE, the University of London, and elsewhere. To recognise a few: Jacob Kripp, Musab 
Younis, Broderick Chow, Joseph Leigh, Sarah Bertrand, Adrian Rogstad, Kirsten Ainley, 
William Rooke, George Lawson, Jeppe Mulich, Martin Bayly, John Sidel, Rahul Rao, Iver 
Neumann, Robbie Shilliam, Juha Vuori, Robert Vitalis, Himadeep Muppidi, Megan Black, 
Paul Kirby, Ida Danewid, and Imaobong Umoren.   
 
 
